Translation from Von Hartmann loi 



by way of a conscious sensual impression ; this is the 

 first linli of the process ; the last link^ appears as the 

 conscious motive of an action. Both, however, are entirely 

 unlike, and neither has anything to do with ordinary 

 motivation, which consists exclusively in the desire that 

 springs from a conception either of pleasure or dislike— 

 the former prompting to the attainment of any object, 

 the latter to its avoidance. In the case of instinct, plea 

 sure is for the most part a concomitant phenomenon ; 

 but it is not so always, as we have already seen, inasmuch 

 as the consummation and highest moral development of 

 instinct displays itself in self-sacrifice. 



The true problem, however, lies far deeper than this. 

 For every conception of a pleasure proves that we have 

 experienced this pleasure already. But it follows from 

 this, that when the pleasure was first felt there must have 

 been will present, in the gratification of which will the 

 pleasure consisted ; the question, therefore, arises, whence 

 did the will come before the pleasure that would follow 

 on its gratification was known, and before bodily pain, 

 as, for example, of hunger, rendered rehef imperative ? 

 Yet we may see that even though an animal has grown 

 up apart from any others of its kind, it will yet none 

 the less manifest the instinctive impulses of its race, 

 though experience can have taught it nothing whatever 

 concerning ithe pleasure that will ensue upon their grati- 

 fication. As regards instinct, therefore, there must be a 

 causal connection between the motivating sensual con- 

 ception and the will to perform the instinctive action, 

 and the pleasure of the subsequent gratification has 

 nothing to do with the matter. We know by the experi- 

 ence of our own instincts that this causal connection does 



' " Das Endglied tritt als bewusster Wille zu irgend einer Hand- 

 lung auf ; beide sind aber ganz ungleichartig und haben mit der 

 gewohnlichen Motivation nichts zu thun, welche ausschliesslich 

 darin besteht, dass die Vorstellung einer Lust oder einer Unlust das 

 Begehren erzeugt, erstere zu eriangen, letztere sich fern zu halten." 

 — Ibid., p. 76. 



