114 Unconscious Memory 



of unconscious knowledge. Hence the word " presenti- 

 ment," which carries with it an idea of faintness and in- 

 distinctness, while, however, it may be easily seen that 

 sentiment destitute of all, even unconscious, ideas can 

 have no influence upon the result, for knowledge can only 

 foUow upon an idea. A presentiment that sounds in con- 

 sonance with our consciousness can indeed, under certain 

 circumstances, become tolerably definite, so that in the case 

 of man it can be expressed in thought and language ; 

 but experience teaches us that even among ourselves this 

 is not so when instincts special to the human race come 

 into play ; we see rather that the echo of our unconscious 

 knowledge which finds its way into our consciousness is so 

 weak that it manifests itself only in the accompanying 

 feelings or frame of mind, and represents but an infinitely 

 small fraction of the sum of our sensations. It is obvious 

 that such a faintly sympathetic consciousness cannot form 

 a sufficient foundation for a superstructure of conscious 

 deliberation ; on the other hand, conscious deliberation 

 would be unnecessary, inasmuch as the process of thinldng 

 must have been already gone through unconsciously, for 

 every faint presentiment that obtrudes itself upon our 

 consciousness is in fact only the consequence of a distinct 

 unconscious knowledge, and the knowledge with which it 

 is concerned is almost always an idea of the purpose of 

 some instinctive action, or of one most intimately con- 

 nected therewith. Thus, in the case of the stag-beetle, 

 the purpose consists in the leaving space for the growth 

 of the horns ; the means, in the digging the hole of a 

 sufficient size ; and the unconscious knowledge, in pre- 

 science concerning the future development of the horns. 



Lastly, all instinctive actions give us an impression of 

 absolute security and infallibility. With instinct the will 

 is never hesitating or weak, as it is when inferences are 

 being drawn consciously. We never find instinct making 

 mistakes ; we cannot, therefore, ascribe a result which is 

 so invariably precise to such anobscure condition of mind 



