Refutation 167 



particular point itself ; there is, therefore, at each point 

 in a habitual performance a memory at once of like ante- 

 cedents and of a like present. 



If the memory, whether of the antecedent or the pre- 

 sent, were absolutely perfect ; if the vibration (according 

 to Professor Hering) on each repetition existed in its full 

 original strength and without having been interfered with 

 by any other vibration ; and if, again, the new wave 

 running into it from exterior objects on each repetition 

 of the action were absolutely identical in character with 

 the wave that ran in upon the last occasion, then there 

 would be no change in the action and no modification or 

 improvement could take place. For though indeed the 

 latest performance would always have one memory more 

 than the latest but one to guide it, yet the memories being 

 identical, it would not matter how many or how few they 

 were. 



On any repetition, however, the circumstances, external 

 or internal, or both, never are absolutely identical : there 

 is some slight variation in each individual case, and some 

 part of this variation is remembered, with approbation or 

 disapprobation as the case may be. 



The fact, therefore, that on each repetition of the 

 action there is one memory more than on the last but 

 one, and that this memory is slightly different from its 

 predecessor, is seen to be an inherent and, ex hypothesi, 

 necessarily disturbing factor in all habitual action — and 

 the life of an organism should be regarded as the habitual 

 action of a single individual, namely, of the organism it- 

 self, and of its ancestors. This is the key to accumulation 

 of improvement, whether in the arts which we assiduously 

 practise during our single life, or in the structures and 

 instincts of successive generations. The memory does not 

 complete a true circle, but is, as it were, a spiral slightly 

 divergent therefrom. It is no longer a perfectly circu- 

 lating decimal. Where, on the other hand, there is no 

 memory of a like present, where, in fact, the memory is 



