PSYCHOLOGY Ixxxi 



noting that Lamarck presumed the quantity of sensation to 

 be proportional to the strength of the stimulus, and thus at 

 all events formulated one of the greatest problems of physio- 

 logical psychology in later times. It is now known that the 

 presumption is incorrect. It is more accurate to say that 

 the quantity of sensation is proportional to the logarithm of 

 the stimulus, but even this is only a very rough approxima- 

 tion, and the latest researches tend to limit more and more 

 the sphere of application of the law. When Lamarck speaks 

 of feehng, he means sensation, not emotion. 



Coming now to emotions, Lamarck postulated for their 

 explanation the existence of an entity which he variously 

 calls the " feeling of existence," the " inner feeling," the 

 " moi " or ego. Even so close a student as Professor Packard 

 seems doubtful what Lamarck meant by this "feeling." 

 It is stated to be due to the summation of a large number of 

 indefinite sensations reaching the nucleus from all parts of 

 the body : the summation of these stimuli, individually 

 very weak, gives rise to an " inner feeling " of appreciable 

 magnitude. An emotion was understood by Lamarck to be 

 an affection or condition of this inner feeling, and he usually 

 speaks of it as an " emotion of the inner feeling." 



I cannot resist from drawing attention once more to that 

 constantly alluring temptation to explain difficulties by the 

 manufacture of a psychical entity. Lamarck fails to under- 

 stand what an emotion is : he therefore invents an " inner 

 feeUng " and affirms that emotion is a special state of this 

 entity. I am far indeed from wishing to raise the question 

 of the true existence of an " inner feeling," which has been 

 defended by William James and many other psychologists. 

 But unquestionably it has no such peculiar relation to the 

 emotions as that alleged by Lamarck, and for which purpose 

 he invented it. An emotion is not rendered more intelligible 

 by being regarded as a special state of some psychical entity. 

 The point is exactly analogous to the postulate of " mind " 

 as a special entity, in modern psychology. We are ac- 

 quainted with various mental processes, such as emotions. 



