CHAPTEE I. 



ON ARTIFICIAL DEVICES IN DEALING WITH THE 

 PRODUCTIONS OP NATURE. 



Throughout nature, wherever man strives to acquire knowledge 

 he finds himself under the necessity of using special methods, 1st, 

 to bring order among the infinitely numerous and varied objects 

 which he has before him ; 2nd, to distinguish, without danger of 

 confusion, among this immense multitude of objects, either groups 

 of those in which he is interested, or particular individuals among 

 them ; 3rd, to pass on to his fellows all that he has learnt, seen and 

 thought on the subject. Now the methods which he uses for this 

 purpose are what I call the artificial devices in natural science, — devices 

 which we must beware of confusing with the laws and acts of nature 

 herself. 



It is not merely necessary to distinguish in natural science what 

 belongs to artifice and what to nature. We have to distinguish as 

 well two very different interests which incite us to the acquisition 

 of knowledge. 



The first is an interest which I call economic, because it derives 

 its impetus from the economic and utiHtarian needs of man in deal- 

 ing with the productions of nature which he wants to turn to his 

 own use. From this point of view he is only interested in what 

 he thinks may be useful to him. 



The other, very different from the first, is that philosophic interest 

 through which we desire to know nature for her own sake, in order 

 to grasp her procedure, her laws and operations, and to gain an idea 

 of what she actually brings into existence. This, in short, is the kind of 

 knowledge which constitutes the true naturahst. Those who approach 

 the subject from this point of view are naturally few ; they are in- 

 terested impartially in all natural productions that they can observe. 



To begin with, economic and utilitarian requirements resulted 

 in the successive invention of the various artificial devices employed 



