THE PRINCIPAL ACTS 383 



that they do not notice is for them non-existent, although most of the 

 surrounding objects act upon their senses. 



How great is the hght thus thrown over the question why animals 

 which possess the same senses as man have yet so few ideas, think 

 so Uttle, and are always subjected to the same habits ! 



Shall I go on to say how many men there are also who remain un- 

 conscious of nearly all that nature presents to their senses ? Now in 

 consequence of this method of employing their faculties, and limiting 

 their attention to a small number of objects that interests them, these 

 men only exert their intellects very httle, make small variation in the 

 subjects of their thoughts, have very few ideas, hke the animals that we 

 have spoken of, and are strongly subjected to the force of habit. 



In the case of men who have not been compelled by early education 

 to exert their intellects, the needs are confined to what they think 

 necessary for their preservation and physical well-being, but are 

 extremely limited as regards their moral well-being. The ideas which 

 they form are almost entirely reduced to ideas of self-interest, property, 

 and a few physical enjoyments ; their whole attention is absorbed by 

 the few subjects which promote the satisfaction of these needs. What- 

 ever is irrelevant to the physical needs of such a man, to his ideas of 

 self-interest, and his very hmited physical and moral enjoyments, is 

 as good as non-existent for him, since he never does nor can notice it, 

 having acquired no habit of varying his thoughts. 



Finally education, which so wonderfully develops the himian in- 

 tellect, only achieves this result by imbuing a habit of thinking and 

 of fixing attention on the nimierous and varied objects which may affect 

 the senses, on all that can increase his physical and moral well-being, 

 and, consequently, on the true aspects of men's relations with one 

 another. 



By fixing attention on the various objects which may affect our 

 senses, we establish distinctions between these objects and determine 

 their differences, af&nities, and individual qualities : hence the origin 

 of the physical and natural sciences. 



In the same way, by fixing attention on the interests of men in rela- 

 tion to one another, we form moral ideas both as to right conduct in 

 the situations that arise in the course of social hfe, and as to the 

 progress of useful knowledge : hence the origin of the political and 

 moral sciences. 



Education thus inculcates a habit of exciting the intellect and vary- 

 ing the thoughts, and this greatly increases the power of giving attention 

 to numerous different objects, of forming comparisons, of carrying 

 out judgments with a high degree of accuracy, and of multiplying ideas 

 of every kind, but especially complex ideas. Lastly, this habit of 



