46 Luck, or Cunning ? 
memory on the part of offspring of the action it bond fide 
took in the persons of its forefathers.’” The reviewer made 
no reply, and I concluded, as I have since found correctly, 
that he could not find the passages. 
True, in his “ Principles of Psychology ”’ (vol. ii. p. 195) 
Mr. Spencer says that we have only to expand the doctrine 
that all intelligence is acquired through experience “so as 
to make it include with the experience of each individual 
the experiences of all ancestral individuals,” &c. This 
is all very good, but it is much the same as saying, ‘‘ We 
have only got to stand on our heads and we shall be able 
to do so and so.” We did not see our way to standing on 
our heads, and Mr. Spencer did not help us; we had been 
accustomed, as I am afraid I must have said usque ad 
nauseam already, to lose sight of the physical connection 
existing between parents and offspring; we understood 
from the marriage service that husband and wife were in 
a sense one flesh, but not that parents and children 
were so also; and without this conception of the matter, 
which in its way is just as true as the more commonly 
received one, we could not extend the experience of 
parents to offspring. It was not in the bond or nexus 
of our ideas to consider experience as appertaining to more 
than a single individual in the common acceptance of the 
term ; these two ideas were so closely bound together that 
wherever the one went the other went perforce. Here, 
indeed, in the very passage of Mr. Spencer’s just referred to, 
the race is throughout regarded as “a series of individuals” 
—without an attempt to call attention to that other view, 
in virtue of which we are able to extend to many an idea 
we had been accustomed to confine to one. 
In his chapter on Memory, Mr. Spencer certainly ap- 
proaches the Heringian view. He says, ‘‘ On the one hand, 
Instinct may be regarded as a kind of organised memory ; 
on the other, Memory may be regarded as a kind of incipient 
instinct” (“ Principles of Psychology,” ed. 2, vol. i. p. 445), 
