16 Luck, or Cunning ? 
developments occurring in any organism after this haS 
been attained—the sterility of many animals in confine- 
ment, the development in both males and females under 
certain circumstances of the characteristics of the opposite 
sex, the latency of memory, the unconsciousness with which 
we grow, and indeed perform all familiar actions, these 
points, though hitherto, most of them, so apparently 
inexplicable that no one even attempted to explain them, 
became at once intelligible, if the contentions of “ Life 
and Habit ” were admitted. 
Before I had finished writing this book I fell in with 
Professor Mivart’s ‘‘ Genesis of Species,’’ and for the first 
time understood the distinction between the Lamarckian 
and Charles-Darwinian systems of evolution. This had 
not, so far as I then knew, been as yet made clear to us by 
any of our more prominent writers upon the subject of 
descent with modification ; the distinction was unknown 
to the general public, and indeed is only now beginning 
to be widely understood. While reading Mr. Mivart’s 
book, however, I became aware that I was being faced by 
two facts, each incontrovertible, but each, if its leading 
exponents were to be trusted, incompatible with the 
other. 
On the one hand there was descent; we could not read 
Mr. Darwin’s books and doubt that all, both animals and 
plants, were descended from a common source. On the 
other, there was design; we could not read Paley and 
refuse to admit that design, intelligence, adaptation of 
means to ends, must have had a large share in the develop- 
ment of the life we saw around us ; it seemed indisputable 
that the minds and bodies of all living beings must have 
come to be what they are through a wise ordering and 
administering of their estates. We could not, therefore, 
dispense either with descent or with design, and yet it 
seemed impossible to keep both, for those who offered us 
descent stuck to it that we could have no design, and those, 
