142 Luck, or Cunning ? 
its extreme consequences, and how to put those conse- 
quences clearly before his readers. Mr. Spalding said :— 
“* Against Mr. Lewes’s proposition that the movements of 
living beings are prompted and guided by feeling, I urged 
that... the amount and direction of every nervous dis- 
charge must depend solely on physical conditions. And 
T contended that to see this clearly is to see that when we 
speak of movement being guided by feeling, we use the 
language of a less advanced stage of enlightenment. This 
view has since occupied a good deal of attention. Under 
the name of automatism it has been advocated by Professor 
Huxley, and with firmer logic by Professor Clifford. . . . 
In the minds of our savage ancestors feeling was the source 
of all movement. . . . Using the word feeling in its ordinary 
sense . . . we assert not only that no evidence can be given 
that feeling ever does guide or prompt action, but that the 
process of its doing so ts inconceivable. (Italics mine.) How 
can we picture to ourselves a state of consciousness putting 
in motion any particle of matter, large or small? Puss, 
while dozing before the fire, hears a light rustle in the corner, 
and darts towards the spot. What hashappened ? Certain 
sound-waves have reached the ear, a series of physical 
changes have taken place within the organism, special 
groups of muscles have been called into play, and the 
body of the cat has changed its position on the floor. Is it 
asserted that this chain of physical changes is not at all 
points complete and sufficient in itself ? ”’ 
I have been led to turn to this article of Mr. Spalding’s by 
Mr. Stewart Duncan, who, in his ‘“‘ Conscious Matter,’’* 
quotes the latter part of the foregoing extract. Mr. Duncan 
goes on to quote passages from Professor Tyndall’s utter- 
ances of about the same date which show that he too took 
much the same line—namely, that there is no causative 
connection between mental and physical processes ; from 
this it is obvious he must have supposed that physical 
* London, David Bogue, 1881, p. 60, 
