THE ORGANIC CONCEPT OF SOCIETY 129 
Three of his analyses are of special importance for our discus- 
sion: that of different kinds of unity, that of different meanings 
of self, and that of different goals of social endeavor. 
I. Kinds of Unity.— The totality of the world, or any particular 
object in the world, according to Mackenzie, may be regarded: 
(x) as a simple unity, in which there is no real difference of parts; 
or (2) as a mere collection of differences, in which there is no real 
unity; or as a system in which there is both unity and difference. 
And if it is thought of as a system, it may be regarded either (3) 
as a system in which the parts have an absolutely independent 
existence, though they are subordinated to the whole to which 
they belong; or (4) as a system in which the parts are deprived of 
their independence by being transformed and swallowed up in the 
whole; or, finally, as a system in which the parts have a certain 
relative independence, but an independence which is conditioned 
throughout by its relation to the system, — an independence, in 
short, which is not freedom from the system, but freedom in and 
through it. 
Mackenzie goes on to show that the first might be typified by a 
single crystal, the second by a heap of stones or bed of flowers, the 
third by the solar system, the fourth by any chemical combina- 
tion and the fifth by the life of a single plant. 
Our author shows how these five different views of unity are 
reflected in different philosophical systems, in various ways of 
interpreting human freedom, in theology, in one’s conception of 
justice and finally in endeavors to understand society.2 He 
defines an organism as “a whole whose parts are intrinsically 
related to it, which develops from within and has reference to an 
end which is involved in its own nature,” and shows that society 
corresponds to this kind of unity rather than to any of the other 
four mentioned. 
Its parts are intrinsically related to it, for the rational nature of the beings 
who compose it is entirely dependent for its being and continuance on the 
existence of certain social relations. It develops from within; for its growth 
consists simply in the unfolding of the rational nature of each of its individual 
members, —that rational nature being, moreover, always essentially relative 
1 Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 129. 
2 Tbid., pp. 131 f. 3 [bid., p. 148. 
