THE ORGANIC CONCEPT OF SOCIETY I31 
individuals,! he holds that the individual apart from society is an 
abstraction.2 He does, however, emphasize the psychical unity 
of society, considering persons or groups who are unassimilated 
as instruments of a civilization of which they do not partake. 
III. Social Goals.— In discussing possible ends to which the 
world-order is tending he holds that it must be considered in terms 
of the well-being of individuals and discusses various ways of 
interpreting individual well-being as in terms of knowing, feeling, 
willing, in some combination of these, or finally as a realization of 
our conscious nature as a whole.* His conclusion is that the end 
is in the fulfilment of certain wants of our nature rather than in 
the pleasure which ensues upon their satisfaction. This brings 
his teaching into harmony with the doctrine of adaptation, for our 
real needs are such as make for largeness and fullness of life and 
this depends upon our being adapted to our environment and 
especially upon our mastery of our environment, as our author 
holds.§ 
Mackenzie divides these wants or needs into three classes: (1) 
vegetable, (2) those arising from our organic or animal sensations, 
and (3) those due to reason.” He shows that the end cannot be 
merely either (1) or (2) or both combined, so must be (3), and this 
requires that we view our world as issuing from intelligence of 
which our own and that of our fellow-men are parts, and that we 
make ourselves at home in this world. He concludes as follows:— 
1 Introduction to Social Philosophy, pp. 66, 159. 
2 Ibid., pp. 120, 180; cf. pp. 131, 136. 
3 Ibid., p. 156. 4 Tbid., chs. IV and V. 5 Tbid., p. 228. 
8 “ Men were first exploited by men; then they were exploited by things; the 
problem now is to combine men together that they may exploit things,” ibzd., p. 
107. 
7 Tbid., p. 228. 
8 “ We must not only be able to bring our world into a certain intelligible order, 
but we must also be able to see it issuing out of an intelligible order. Such an 
intelligible world would exist for us if the world of our experience were not merely 
presented to our intelligence, but arose from our intelligence, i.e., if we created 
our world as well as perceived it, and such a world would equally exist for us if 
we saw it as issuing from the unity of some other intelligence than our own. It 
would then appear not merely as a collection of facts which is reduced to system, 
but as a collection which flows from a system, and which is consequently intelligible 
from beginning to end. . . . Now such an intelligible world is presented to us 
