184 ADAPTATION AND PROGRESS 
coincide and tally with our own, we necessarily approve of them, 
otherwise we necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and 
out of proportion.” ! 
Man is so constituted that he derives pleasure not only from 
a perception of right, i. e., fitting or adapted to the end proposed, 
according to Smith, but also from an appreciation of utility.? 
Thus as the perception of order, harmony, system, propriety, 
utility, gives pleasure, whereas the perception of the opposite 
qualities gives pain, so also does the perception and experience 
of the familiar give pleasure, — hence the influence of custom and 
fashion on moral sentiments. 
Although merit and demerit should depend upon motive, 
according to our author, rather than upon results, and although 
the sentiment of approval or disapproval should come only from a 
sympathetic appreciation of motives, yet he grants that in fact 
the result of an act is the basis of judgment rather than motive. 
The explanation of this irregularity he finds in the good of the 
species.* 
Important, too, is the emphasis placed by Smith on the truth 
that man desires not only approval but even more the conscious- 
ness of being worthy of such approval.’ “It is only the weakest 
and most superficial of mankind who can be much delighted with 
that praise which they themselves know to be altogether un- 
merited. To desire, or even to accept of praise, where no praise 
is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible vanity.” & 
This necessity for the highest happiness, that conduct should 
conform as nearly as possible to one’s ideal, —which according to 
our author is the basis of the sense of duty,7—will be discussed 
later under the head of “ idealization.” 
Sympathy, then, according to Adam Smith, is the bond of social 
cohesion, the basis of moral sentiments, and the most essential 
factor in individual and social well-being. 
1 Theory of Moral Sentiments, pp. 25 f. 
2 Tbid., pp. 286 f. Propriety and utility are practically identical. 
2 [bid., pt. 5. 
4 [bid., pp. 159-175. 8 Tbid., p. 189. 
5 Ibid., pp. 188 ff. 7 Ibid., pp. 184 ff. 
