234 ADAPTATION AND PROGRESS 
be classified for logical purposes, but Professor Ward seems to 
identify the product of logical classification with ontological 
reality. 
4. Approaching social philosophy from the point of view of 
biology and individual psychology, and an individualist much 
like Spencer, his philosophy culminates in an emphasis on pleas- 
ure and consumption which on the whole seems to be its weakest 
point. Although in Pure Sociology abundance of life is set forth 
as the apparent end of cosmic evolution,’ in Dynamic Sociology, 
pleasure is given a place of pre-eminence, this being correlated 
with increase in the complexity of organisms.? This emphasis, 
however, does not grow out of his system necessarily, indeed 
seems almost to have been grafted on. If abundant life is the 
end; if adaptation is the means to abundant life, as he holds, and 
if pleasure and pain are sign-boards indicating the ways of life and 
death,’ as he shows also, the end of telic endeavor should be 
adaptation, not pleasure; and the test of progress should likewise 
be adaptation and abundance of life, — an objective test which 
Spencer insisted rightly was necessary for science. This error, if 
it be one, is the result of his thesis that feeling is the dynamic 
agent in social progress. Desire, with him, is the mainspring of . - 
human endeavor.*’ Modern functional psychology, on the con- 
trary, makes organic reactions the fundamental phenomena, 
sensations of pleasure and pain being considered as arising in 
connection with these reactions because of their adaptive value. 
The organic needs that impel to activity may well be termed 
“interests ” as with Ratzenhofer. 
1 Pure Sociology, p. 114; cf. p. a. 
2 Dynamic Sociology, ii, pp. 173 f. Cf. Pure Sociology, p. 126, where feeling is 
considered as an end. 
3 Pure Sociology, p. 130. 
4 “ Preservation, continuation, and augmentation are the three aspects of the 
cosmicend. .. . But it merely happened that at a certain point it became neces- 
sary, in order to secure these ends . . . to furnish . . . later creations with some 
form of interest that should enable them to assist in the prosecution of the plan. 
Hitherto the products of creative synthesis had been passive. Henceforth they 
were to become active. . . . The form which this interest took was the faculty 
of feeling, whereby these tocogenetic creations were made to care for themselves. 
. . Henceforth there was to be animated nature. . . . In it [feeling] were 
contained the psychic world and the moral world. With it came pleasure and pain 
