36 THE COMMITTEE ON COMMONS. 
“‘The opinions so expressed (as to the soundness of which, 
however, your Committee give no opinion) have proceeded from 
judicial decisions of ancient date; your Committee cannot 
help observing that, even if binding on legal tribunals, they 
appear to rest upon no very intelligible principle. Your Com- 
mittee are at a loss to conceive why, upon general principles, 
a right of enjoyment which may be acquired by the inhabit- 
ants of a small hamlet should be denied to the inhabitants of 
the metropolis, or even to the general public. . . . It may 
deserve consideration whether some declaratory law should 
not be passed to remedy what appears to us to be a somewhat 
narrow doctrine of the Courts, hardly in accordance with the 
general principles of the law, having regard to the increased 
population of large towns in later times. 
“The policy which dictated the earlier legislation in 
respect to Commons seems to have proceeded without regard 
to those particular interests of the public which we are now 
considering ; but nevertheless, there is nothing to show that 
that legislation proceeded upon other than grounds of general 
public advantage. 
“Tn early times the great extent of Commons and waste 
lands in England was regarded as prejudicial to the public, on 
whose bebalf it may be fairly assumed that the Legislature 
acted in facilitating their inclosure, in order that agriculture 
might be promoted and the whole country benefited by an 
increase in the produce of the land.” 
The report then proceeded to discuss the Statute of 
Merton, and to show that it was passed in the interest of 
agriculture, and that in more modern times it had been 
superseded by Private and Public Inclosure Acts. 
“Tt appears,” the report added, “that even in agricultural 
districts any attempt at inclosure of lands under the alleged 
