TOLLARD FARNHAM. 221 
inconsistent with the past and existing state of things. We are 
to presume that a corporation has been formed many hundred 
years ago, when there is no trace at any time of its having ever 
existed. If the inhabitants had held meetings in reference to 
this right, or appointed any person to look to the right, or done 
any act collectively of that description, the case would be different. 
We should then have the inhabitants acting in a corporate 
capacity in reference to their right, and from their doing so, and 
from their existence de facto as a corporation, we might 
according to the ordinary rule find a legal origin by a grant 
from the Crown; but to say that a corporation was created, which 
never existed, would be carrying the fiction of a grant further 
than has been ever done or than is consistent with reason.” * 
The decision may well be compared with that of 
Lord Hobhouse in the Loughton Lopping case. It 
may safely be said that if the one decision was right 
the other was wrong. In the one case we find a great 
Judge holding it to be his duty, if possible, to find 
a legal origin for a custom, which had undoubtedly 
existed from time immemorial. In the other we have 
the Court of Exchequer pushing legal technicalities 
to their extreme, in order to refuse recognition to a 
custom of at least equal age and equal certainty—a 
custom which was part of the very existence of the 
people in olden time. 
Tt need not be said that those who supported the vil- 
lagers were very dissatisfied with this judgment. They 
believed it might be upset by a higher tribunal on 
appeal ; but they found themselves unable to incur the 
* Rivers v. Adams. 3 Exch. Div. 361. 
