384 DARWINISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE 



its concepts on these, so that they exclude anything 

 incorporeal. Hence it has nothing to do with psychic 

 phenomena. These can never be understood from the 

 observation'of bodies and their processes, because the 

 corporeal can never explain anything but the corporeal. 

 Science can^ never tell us how the simplest sensation 

 comes about. Even if we had an exact knowledge of 

 the mechanism of the brain, even if we knew all the 

 movements of the atoms in feelings of desire and pain, 

 we should only be witnessing the movements and shocks 

 of bodies. It is true that the sensations are connected 

 with these, but they tell us nothing about the origin and 

 nature of the sensations. Being incorporeal, the sensa- 

 tions lie beyond our range of observation. 



The psychic processes are dealt with by psychology. 

 This science, again, is confronted with an infinite variety. 

 No one can dream of picturing to himself all his pains 

 and pleasures, his ideas and judgments. Each psychic 

 process occupies a certain time, and so passes through 

 an incalculable number of stages. 



In order to master this diversity, psychology forms 

 concepts in relation to the universal in the particular 

 psychic processes. It endeavours to find the elements, 

 or the simplest constituents, of the psychic life, of which 

 we must conceive all the psychic phenomena to be 

 composed. " Sensations " have been advanced as these 

 elements, and it is said that the will and the ideas, in 

 fact, all the psychic processes, are made up of these 

 elements. But experience knows nothing of "sensa- 

 tions " that may constitute such diverse processes as 



