NATURE, HISTORY, AND ETHICS 393 



his senses, optical instruments, which enable him to 

 detect the special features even in the smallest bodies. 



However, common features always come much more 

 naturally to man's perception than special ones, because his 

 senses are adapted to them. Thus it seems to him that the 

 general features alone are essential, and physical science 

 is thought to be the most natural of all sciences because 

 it starts from the proper nature of the sense-impressions. 



Hence in order that man may orientate himself in the 

 world, numbers of things have to be brought together 

 in virtue of their common features and provided with a 

 common name. And as most things have not a very 

 great interest individually, because this is not necessary 

 for the purposes of human life, they generally have only 

 generic and not proper or individual names. When we 

 speak of the individual we have only the generic name 

 — " wolf," for instance — and so this name or concept 

 seems to us really to coincide with the individual in 

 question. 



But there are also things in the world that have an 

 individual interest. They have generic names, but also 

 proper names, and in this case it is clear that the con- 

 cepts are not perfect images of the individuals. We 

 see this especially in the case of man. If we try to 

 express the individual " Shakespeare " by the idea 

 ' poet " or " man," we see at once that these ideas do 

 not represent the great poet, and do not embody pre- 

 cisely those features that make Shakespeare Shakespeare. 

 When we say " poet " instead of Shakespeare we are 

 really doing just the same as when we say " wolf" of a 



