394 DARWINISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE 



particular wolf, or when we express a certain plant or a 

 certain piece of gold by the corresponding concepts. 

 There are also stones that have an individual interest, 

 and here again it is clear that they are not fully 

 expressed by their generic ideas. Take, for instance, 

 the diamonds Orloff, Star of the South, or Kohinoor. 



The concepts are not definite pictures, because they 

 do not mirror reality ; but we think this into them, 

 and thus they appear to be pictures. When we speak 

 of wolves, we always think involuntarily of a particular 

 wolf. When we say " man," we think of a particular 

 man — with a medium-sized, straight nose and other 

 definite features, just as when we make sketches of 

 the objects. i 



Thus the reality is always forcing its way into our 

 narrower concepts, but it does this less in the case 

 of those with wider range. It must be difficult to 

 imagine a " vertebrate " — impossible, if one has never 

 seen one. Try to form a mental picture of an 

 " animal," without thinking of the features of the 

 protozoa, worms, insects, birds, or other organisms. 



Thus we see that the concepts are less definite and 

 depart more from the reality the " better " or more 

 comprehensive they are. The ultimate concepts, that 

 embrace everything, cannot become mental pictures ; 

 there is nothing of reality in them. 



It is true that when we think of " ether," we picture 

 to ourselves tiny balls, pushing and attracting each 

 other, and in a state of perpetual motion ; such an idea 

 enables us to grasp a mechanical process in the world. 



