258 



of the sovereign of the shore over the contiguous sea extends as far as 

 is requisite for his safety and for some lawful end. A more extended 

 dominion must rest entirely upon force and maritime supremacy. 

 According to the current of modern authority, the general territorial 

 jurisdiction extends into the sea as far as cannon-shot will reach, and 

 no farther, and this is generally calculated to be a nxarine league ; and 

 the Congress of the United States have recognised this limitation by 

 authorizing the district courts to take cognizance of all captures made 

 within a marine league of the American shores. The executive author^ 

 ity of this country, in 1793, considered the whole of Delaware bay to 

 be within our territorial jurisdiction, and it rested its claim upon those 

 authorities which admit that gulfs, channels, and arms of the sea belong 

 to the people with whose land they are encompassed. It was intimated 

 that the law of nations would justify the United States in attaching to 

 their coasts an extent into the sea beyond the reach of cannon-shot. 

 Considering the great extent of the fine of the American coasts, we 

 have a right to claim for fiscal and defensive regulations a liberal ex- 

 tension of maritime jurisdiction ; and it would not be unreasonable, as 

 I apprehend, to assume, for domestic purposes connected with our 

 safety and welfare, the control of the waters on" our coast, though in- 

 cluded within lines sUetching from quite distant headlands, as, for 

 instance, from Cape Ann to Cape Cod, and from Nantucket to Mon- 

 tauk point, and from that point to the capes of the Delaware, and from 

 the south cape of Florida to the Mississippi. It is certain that our 

 government would be disposed to view with some uneasiness and sen- 

 sibility, in the case of war between other maritime powers, the use of 

 the waters of our coast far beyond the reach of cannon-shot as cruising 

 ground for belligerent purposes. In 1793, our government thought 

 they were entitled, in reason, to as broad a margin of protected navi- 

 gation as any nation whatever, though at that time they did not posi- 

 tively insist beyond the distance of a marine league from the sea shores ; 

 and in 1806 our government thought it would not be unreasonable, 

 considering the extent of the United States, the shoalness of their coast, 

 and the natural indication furnished by the well-defined path of the 

 Gulf stream, to except an immunity from belligerent warfare for the 

 space between that limit and the American shore.' 



" From the foregoing extract it will be observed that Chancellor Kent 

 agrees with the principles put forth by the law officers of the crown, 

 and which justify the conclusion ' that no foreign power, independently 

 of treaty, has any right to navigate the passage of Canso.' Having 

 thus, by the highest legal authorities of England and the United States, 

 been borne out in the assumption that no foreign power has any such 

 right, the next inquiry is, as to where the power of controlling the pas- 

 sage of Canso exists. By the act of 1820, Cape Breton was annexed- 

 to Nova Scotia, and has since that period formed a part of this province, 

 which for nearly a century has enjoyed a representative form of govern- 

 ment, and which, in making laws, is only controlled by the operation of 

 imperial statutes and the veto of the crown. The right to make laws to 

 affect navigation, except the registry of ships, has been enjoyed and 

 acted upon by this legislature. Various laws have also been enacted 

 making regulations for setting nets, and in other respects for regulating 



