1877.] ORIGIN OF THE WItg. 435 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WILL. 
I. THE DEFINITION OF THE WILL. 
EFINITIONS of the term “ Will,” as we find them in meta- 
physical writers, are not identical; and much apparent 
difference of opinion depends, as usual, on this diversity of state- 
ment. Locke regards the concepts “will” and “freedom” as 
entirely distinct in their nature, and not essentially related to each 
other. He says, “ Freedom belongs as little to the will, as swift- 
ness to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Freedom to do is one 
power, will to dois another: will, a power of the mind exerting 
dominion over some part of a man by employing it in or with- 
holding it from any particular action; freedom, again, a power 
which a man has, to do or to forbear doing any particular action.” 
It appears that what Locke here denominates will is that common ac- 
tivity of the mind which expresses itself in action, which may be 
readily considered apart from the question of choice. This doubtless 
expressed something to the metaphysicians of that time, but merely 
signifies to the physiologist of the’ present day, the movement 
derived from the metamorphosis of nutritive material in the arteri- 
oles of the brain, which when consciously performed, are called 
thoughts, and feelings, and are the necessary precursors of a class 
of muscular acts. The question of will properly so called is not 
’ yet entered on at this point. Doctor Willis! elaborates Locke’s 
position in the following language: “ But there is, in fact, no one 
particular primitive faculty that wills in the human mind; will isa 
general term, and belongs to and is expressive of the activity of 
each of the primitive faculties of our nature; the benevolent 
faculty being active, causes us to will to do good and charitable 
offices ; the reverential faculty being active, to will to feel respect- 
fully or reverently; the musical faculty active, to will to sing or 
hear music, etc.; and the willing, here is necessary; but whether 
“we yield to the impulse of the benevolent, reverential, or musical 
faculty, and indulge therein their various willings is not so; here 
we are free, and can yield or abstain as we list.” This passage 
renders it the more clear, that the latter part of Locke’s statement, 
in which he defines freedom, is that in which he really refers to 
' Benedict de Spinoza: his Life, Correspondence and Ethics. 1870. p. 145. 
