1877.] ORIGIN OF THE WILL. 437 
the case to the latter side at the outset. This is the dictum which 
has often passed unchallenged by both parties, that “human action 
is the product of the strongest inducement,” or, otherwise stated, 
that “the willis the result of a balancing of opposing motives ;” or 
that “the will obeys the strongest motive.” This is simply the 
statement in reversed order, of what we might suppose without 
examination to be a general truth, viz.: that the motives which 
precede the acts which we observe, are stronger than all others 
at the time. If this proposition be true without qualification, 
there is no further need of discussion, since it involves the negation 
of freedom, or of a power of choosing. But as such, it isan assump- 
tion in advance of a conclusion in the case under consideration; a 
begging of the question in a clear sense. Such a position can 
only be adopted as a result of the fullest investigation into the 
phenomena; it cannot be accorded before examination into the 
facts. 
But the statement may be admitted with this important qualifi- 
cation, by which the argument is transferred to another stage of 
the subject, viz.: that we do not thereby explain why the induce- 
ments to act thus and so do, in many obvious cases, overbalance 
all others in a given human mind? This inquiry is not fruitless, 
so long as we have before us every day examples of men acting 
differently under identical circumstances. If there be any “ lib- 
erty,” it is exercised at the point of permitting inducements or 
motives of one kind to occupy the mind to the exclusion of those 
of another kind; and secondly, such occupation being granted, 
freedom might be exercised in removing restraint from the pressure 
of the present motive, so that the act can take place. If there be 
no inherent power of controlling the attention, and none of 
restraining the pressure of motive, then there is no will in any 
proper sense of the word, and man is an irresponsible automaton. 
The proof or disproof of this proposition must be the end, not the 
beginning of the discussion. ‘ 
An inquiry into the origin of actions must be preceded by an 
examination into the nature of the acts themselves. The follow- 
ing classification is offered as expressing as nearly as possible 
their relations to the general developmental position of active 
beings, without any pre-suppositions as to their automatic or vol- 
untary character. It is necessarily assumed that all acts are per- 
formed with reference to the acquisition of pleasure or the avoid- 
