440 THE PENN d’ONTILY. [JuNE, 
tions of matter as to its atomic constitution; consciousness being 
only possible, so far as we can ascertain, to matter which has not 
fallen into fixed and automatic relations of its atoms. The con- 
dition appears to be one of tension, in which the automatic (crys- 
talline) tendencies antagonize each other, the material being all 
the while in the metastatic condition of nutrition. This idea is 
parallel to that of Heraclitus, who held that the essence of all 
things lay in perpetual modification, a universal becoming, an 
eternal emergence and disappearance. 
In accordance with the preceding views, the relations between 
consciousness and matter are thus depicted as of a mutually ne- 
cessary character, the movements of conscious force involving | 
consequences to itself from which the properties of matter neces- 
sarily preclude its escape. 
If we trace the consciousness of animals to such an origin, it 
may be asked, why have not such beings the powers and perfec- 
tions of their source, in quality if not in quantity? The answer 
to this query, in view of the fact that they have not such qualities, 
is only to be found in an investigation of the nature of memory. 
The absence of memory of the past would be equivalent to ignor- 
ance; while a new material vehicle might render memory possi- 
ble for the future, and thus education, under new surroundings, 
create diverse beings from a primal common source. 
We must include in our estimation of the distributions of con- 
sciousness and forces, not our planet alone, nor our system only, 
but the universe. Hence Sir William Thompson’s idea that con- 
sciousnesss (“life”) was originally exotic to our earth, is an alto- 
gether permissible hypothesis. 
If there be such a state of consciousness as will, it must have 
appeared in.course of the evolution of animals, at some point in 
the series of stages of progress through which their mind has 
passed. Yet it is maintained by some thinkers that the doctrine of 
evolution necessarily excludes the idea of freedom from the nature 
of the minds thus produced. The case is, however, involved in 
that of consciousness, and the investigation of it must proceed in 
the same manner. If it has been shown that will does exist in 
connection with evolution, we must proceed to discover, if possible, 
the relation between the two facts. 
The proof of the existence of a freedom, power of choice, or will, 
is found in the origin of the altruistic class of acts, which are 
