442 THE PENN MONTHLY. [JUNE, 
There are three primary conditions of consciousness, which 
naturally grade into each other, viz: pain, indifference, and pleas- 
ure. Consciousness is of one or the other of these types in all 
animals. The constant flow of activity either in movements of the 
whole body or of particular parts of the body, has brought animals 
from their beginning into contact with other bodies, either at rest, 
or animated by active forces, as light and heat, which have varied 
their sensations, rendering them more positive in each of ‘the three 
directions named. These sensations soon cease, leaving conscious- 
ness where it was, but not without marks of their former presence 
in the organism. They are recorded, and continue in unconscious- 
ness so long as the organism remains unchanged. This is the 
first part of memory, z. ¢., retention. Under the influence of what is 
called cohesion, the impressions may be returned to consciousness 
ina less distinct form by the occurrence of new impressions which 
have some near relation with them as to time, place, or qualities of 
other kinds. This is the second part of memory, or reminiscence. 
The sum of the impressions which are necessary to memory, con- 
stitutes experience. It is evident that reminiscence is pleasurable 
or painful, as the experiences recalled were pleasurable or painful. 
Another quality is rendered possible by the two faculties of reten- 
tion and cohesion,. viz: classification. This consists of a re-ar- 
rangement of retained impressions in accordance with different 
kinds of cohesions, z. ¢., different kinds of likenesses. The pro- 
ducts of classification may be brought into consciousness just as 
sensible impressions are revived; but unlike these, they constitute 
in their totality a new experience of internal origin. When a co- 
hesion between two circumstances is due to a repeated experience 
of the one as following the other, men entertain the idea that one 
is necessary to the other. From memory of the necessary results 
of our own activity, we have come to regard necessary sequences 
as the result of activity somewhere. If activity be discerned in the 
first of two coherent events, we regard it as a cause of the second; 
if the first be passive, the idea of cause does not arise in connection 
with it, but in some other active agent. Finally, all processes in- 
volving reminiscences are less distinct than the original impres- 
sions. Spencer calls the former /azw/, the latter distinct; the faint 
order are the processes of reason; the distinct, of perception. 
Whether these processes are pleasurable, painful or indifferent, 
depends on the characteristics of the reminiscences which are 
