452 THE PENN MONTHLY. [June, 
theory of morals. I therefore proceed to a brief examination of its 
claims in this direction. 
Good is well defined as the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number ; and by a natural transfer, the term is applied to whatever 
is conducive to that object. It therefore includes not only present 
pleasures, but also the influences which conduce to future pleas- 
ures, and which may be sown in the mind long before they bring 
forth fruit. As present pleasures are not always consistent with 
greater ones in the future, so present pleasure is not always good. 
Evil being the reverse or negation of good or happiness, is avoided 
by all beings to whom it is consciously known; but what they re- 
gard as evil will of course depend on their intelligence in deter- 
mining or predicating the future effects of actions. But no mat- 
ter what the degree of intelligence, no responsibility, as usually 
understood, can be expected of beings which have no power of 
choosing, or will. 
The utilitarian theory of the evolution of morals asserts that the 
development of goodness is simply due to the discovery and en- 
forcement of the law of self-protection and preservation. The 
selfish interests require the protection of person and property 
without which a community is an impossibility. Law being thus 
established and enforced, moral habits are imposed upon men, 
which become incorporated into character and transmitted to suc- 
ceeding generations. This is all doubtless true, but whether it is a 
fundamental or secondary truth is the point requiring attention. 
The fundamental objection to this hypothesis is, that the altruis- 
tic affections are not inherited or transmitted. This is because the 
pains and penalties of wrong-doing as inflicted by law, cannot and 
ought not to overcome the inherent instinct of self-preservation in 
man. It is true that moral character is inherited, and that changes 
in this department for better or worse are transmitted to offspring. 
The mental organization of a race may be improved by the weak- 
ening of the emotional or the strengthening of the rational facul- 
ties. But since the affections are at the foundation of all activity 
whatsoever, of right-doing as well as of wrong-doing, it is obvious 
that no amount of legal restraint can render them innocuous. 
Their existence is necessary for self-preservation, and law only re- 
strains their activities to certain directions. That intelligence tends 
to restrain wrong-doing is true; but although intellect is inherited, 
the manner in which its teachings are applied in practice is not. 
