A B S 



like alfo liolda in our iJeas of moJes, and relations : as 

 jajlire, jujl : fjua'.ity, equal, Sec. 



r.iit as to our ideas of liibftnncc, wo liavc very few ab- 

 fi-rtJ names at all. Tliofe few that the fchools have 

 forjjed, as /IwrnaHtas, Niinunilets, &c. bear no propor- 

 tion to the infinite number of names of fubilanccs ; and 

 could never get admittance into common life, or obtain 

 tlie licence of pjblic approbation; \v!iich fcems to inti- 

 mate a confefTion of mankind, that they have no ideas of the 

 rc:d eniiiccs of fubilanccs ; lincc they have not names for 

 fucli ideas. 



Indeed the reality and exiftence of all abftradl ideas, and 

 of any fuc'a faculty in the mind as abilradion, have of late 

 been controverted., and adually denied by pcrfons of very 

 confiderable eminence as mctaphylicians and philofophcrs. 

 It will ;.-ppcar in what fenfc they ufe the terms aljlraa Ideas 

 under the article ABSTRACTtoN. 



Abstract /a-m, are thofe made ufe of to denote al- 

 JlracI ideas. In which fcnfe the words r.uhitetiefs, paterni- 

 ty, anlmalhy, jujlice, cro'AedneJs, &c. are aljlrads or ahjhaa 

 It rmj. 



Abstract malhtmntics. See Mathematics. 



Abstract mimhers, are afTemblages of units confidercd 

 in themfelves, and not applied to denote any coUetlions of 

 particular forts of things. 



Abstract, in Literature, is a compendious view, or 

 £n roME of a larger work, and is fuppofid to be fomewhat 

 fliorter, and more fuperficial than an abridgment. 



ABSTRACTI, ahjlraacd, in Church iiipory, is a name 

 given to a feci among the Lutherans, under the lead of 

 Hefliufius, a Pruflian bilhop, who afterted againll Beza, 

 " that Chrift was to be adored not only in the concrete, as 

 " the fon of God, but that his fledi in the abftraft was an 

 " objecl of adoi-ation." Wigandus prevailed fo far againil 

 Hediufius as to get him depofed : aftenvards the Abftraai 

 gained the afcendant, and Wigandus was filenced. Micrxl. 

 Hill. Ecc!. 1. iii f. 2. &c. Budd. Ifag. Hift. Theol.l. ii. c. 7. 



ABSTRACTION, in Chemifiry, properly means the 

 aft of drawing off or feparating, by means of heat, one 

 part of a compound from the other. If the part abftrafted 

 is coUeftcd, t;!ie operation is fynonymous with Distilla- 

 tion. If it is not coUefted, the tenn has the fame mean- 

 ing with Evaporation. Atprefent, however, itisalmoft 

 entirely appropriated to the repeated diftillation of nitrous 

 acid- off any fub.lance ; in which cafe it is faid to have been 

 sbftrafted with the acid. 



AtfSTRACTiON, in MdaphyfiCf, an operation of the 

 mind, whereby we feparate things naturally conjunct, or 

 txifting together ; and form, and con'ider, ideas of things 

 thus fcparatcd : or, as others define it (fee Duncan's Ele- 

 ments of Logic, p. 51.), aljlraHion is that operation of the 

 mind, by which wc feparate from any of our conceptions 

 all thofe circumftances that render it particular, or the repre- 

 fentative of a fmgle determinate objeft ; fo that, inilead of 

 Handing for an individual, it is made to denote a whole 

 rank or clafs of things. In this manner we acquire our 

 general ideas, that fer\e as llandards by vshich we may rank 

 and denominate particular objefts. Thus, in viewing 

 a f((uare, or circle, we leave out the confideration of every 

 thing that is peculiar to them, except their figure and (h; pe. 

 Whenever, therefore, we meet with a figure anfwering to 

 that (h ipc and form, which we had laid up in our uudcr- 

 ftand.ngs, it is immediately referred by the mind to this 

 pattern, and called by its name, which by this means becomes 

 proper to the whole fpecies. Thus, a fquare and circle are 

 uiiii-ei-fal terms, common to all figures of that particular 

 fliapc, apd alike applicable to them \yhsrever they exift j in 



A B S 



like manner as the ideas themfelves are general, and repre- p 

 fentatives of all of the kind. 



The faculty of abftraftnig ftands direftly oppofite to that 

 of compounding. By compofition we confider thofe things 

 together, which in reality are not joined together in one 

 exillence. And by abllraclion we confider thofe things 

 feparatcly and apart, wliich in reality do not exiil apart. 



Abilradion is chiefly employed in thefe three ways. Firil-,, 

 when the mind eonfiders any one part of a thing in fome re- 

 fpeCl dilUncI from the wliolc ; as a man's arm, without the 

 confideration of the reft of the body. Secondly, when we 

 confider the mode of any fubllance, omitting the fubllance 

 itfelf, or v/hen we feparately confider feveral modes which, 

 fubfill together in one fubjecl. Tliis abftraftion the Geo- 

 metricians make ufe of, when they confider the length of a 

 body feparately, which they call a line ; omitting the con- 

 fideration of its breadth and depth. Thirdly, it is by ah- 

 ftradlion that the mind frames general, or univerfal ideas r 

 omitting the modes and relations of the particular objefts 

 whence they are formed. Thus, when we would undeV- 

 ftand a thinking being in general, we gather from our felf- 

 confcioufnefs what it is to think ; and omitting the confidera- 

 tion of thofe things which have a peculiar relation to ouc 

 mind, or to the human mind-,, we conceive of a thinking 

 being in general. 



Ideas framed thus, which are what we properly call al- 

 JlrtiS ideas, become general reprcfentatives of all objefts of 

 the fame kind ; and their names applicable to whatever exills 

 conformable to fuch ideas. Thus, the colour that we re- 

 ceive from chalk, fnow, milk, &c. is a rcprefentative of all 

 of that kind ; and has a name given it, nuhitcnej':, which 

 fignifies the fame quality, wherever found or imagined. It 

 is this laft faculty, or power of abftradling, according to 

 Mr. Locke, that makes the great difierence between men 

 and brutes ; even thofe latter muft be allowed to have fome 

 (liare of reafon ; that they really reafon in fome c;i!es, fecms 

 almoll as evident as that they have fcnfe ; but it is only in 

 particular ideas. They are confined to thofe narrow bounds ; 

 and do not fecm to have any faculty of enlarging them by 

 abflraftion. Efiay on Human Underftaridmg, book ii. 

 c. II-. § 9, 10, II. book iii. c. 3. ^ 9. Such is the doc- 

 trine of abftraft ideas, as it has been delivered by that ex- 

 cellent author. From him it became, for a confiderable 

 time, a prevailing opinion, that the mind has fuch a power 

 or faculty of framing abftraiEl ideas or- notions of things ; 

 and on fuch ideas a great part of the writings of philofo- 

 phers is founded. Thefe are fuppofed in all their fyilems ; 

 and they are more efpeciaDy reputed the cbjefts of logic, 

 mathematics, and metaphyfics, and of ever)' thing that pafles 

 under the notion of the moll abllrafted and fublims learning. 



However, an eminent and ingenious author. Dr. Berke- 

 ley, has contefted the reality of any fuch ideas ; and led 

 tlie way towards overturning the whole fyftem, and con- 

 fequently towards fetting philofopliy on a new foundation. 

 See a Treatife concerning the Principles of Human Know- 

 ledge, firft printed in 1710. 



The qualities or modes of things, it is on all hands 

 agreed, fays that learned prelate, do never really exill apart, 

 and feparated each from all others, but are conilantly mixed 

 and combined together, feveral in the fame objeft. But, 

 fay the philofophcrs, the mind being able to confider 

 each quality iingly, or abftratled from other qualities with 

 which it is united, does by that means frame to itfelf ab- 

 ftracl ideas, of a different nature and kind from the fenfible 

 ones. 



For example, when the eye perceives an objeft extended, 

 coloured, and moved, the mind refolves this compound idea 



ipto 



