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into its fimple couftituent parts ; and vicwiiijf each hv itfeir, 

 cxclufivi; of the rtil, frames abllract ideas of cxtLiifiuii, co- 

 lour, and motion. Not that it is poflibk for fucti colour 

 and motion to exift without cxtcnfion ; but only that the 

 mind can frame to itfelf, by ahdraftion, the idea of colour 

 exclufive of extenfion ; and of motion, exelufivc botli of co- 

 lour and extenfion. 



Again, fay the fame philofophcrs, the mind havinjr ob- 

 ferved that in the particular extenfions perceived by fenfe, 

 there is fomcthing common, and alike in all ; and fome other 

 things peculiar ; as, this, or that figure, or magnitude, 

 ^vhich diftinguith them one from another : it can confider 

 apart, or fingle out by itfelf, that which is common ; mak- 

 ing thereof a general ablhaft idea of extenfion, wliich is 

 neither line, furface, norfolid, nor lias any ligure or magni- 

 tude, but is an idea entirely prefcinded from them all. So, 

 likewife, by leaving out of the fcveral colours perceived by 

 fenfe, that which diilinguiihes them one from another, and 

 only retaining what is common to all, it makes an idea of 

 colour in the abllraft, which is neither red, nor blue, nor 

 ■white, S:c. — After the fame manner by confidering motion 

 abllratledly, both from the body moved, and from the figure 

 it defcribes, and all particular direftions and velocities ; an 

 abftraft idea of motion is framed, which equally corrcfponds 

 to'aU n-.otions whatever. 



They add, that as the mind frames abftracl ideas of quali- 

 ties or modes, fo does it by the fame faculty, obtain abftraci 

 ideas of the more compound beings, which include many co- 

 exiftent qualities. For example : Having obfen-ed that 

 Peter, James, John, &c. refemble each other in fliape, and 

 other qualities ; we can leave out of the complex idea we had 

 of Peter, James, &c. that which is peculiar to each, retain- 

 ing only what is common to all, and fo make an abftraft 

 idea, wherein all the particulai-s equally partake. And 

 thus it is we are fuppofed to obtain the abflraft idea of 

 man, or of humanity, or human nature ; wherein there is 

 indeed included colour, bccaufe there is no man that has not 

 fome colour ; but it is neither white, nor black, nor brown ; 

 becaufc there is no one particular colour wherein all men par- 

 take. So likewife there is included ftature, but then it is 

 neither tall nor low, nor yet middle ilature, but fomething ab« 

 ftrafted from all thefe ; and fo of the reit. 



Farther yet, there being a general variety of other crea- 

 tures, which partake in fome parts, but not all, of the com- 

 plex idea of man ; the mind leaving out thofe parts which 

 lire peculiar to men, and retaining only thofe which are 

 common to all living creatures, frames the idea of animal ; 

 which abftracts not only from all particular men, but alfo 

 from all birds, hearts, flfhes, and infefts. 



The conllituent parts of fuch abftratl idea uf animal, are 

 body, life, fenfe, and fpontaneous motion. By body is 

 meant, body without any particular (liape, or figure ; there 

 being no one common to all animals ; v/ithout covering, either 

 of hair, or feathers, or fcales ; nor yet naked ; hair, feathers, 

 fcales, and nakednefs, being the diftinguifhing properties of 

 particular animals, and for that reafon left out of the ab- 

 ftract idea. Upon the fame account, the fpontaneous mo- 

 tion muft be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping ; it is 

 neverthelefs a motion. But what the motion is, it is not 

 eafy to conceive. " I will not aihrm," fays Dr. Berkeley, 

 " that other people have not this wonderful faculty of ab- 

 «« ftrafting their ideas ; but I am confident I have it not my- 

 " felf. I have, indeed, a faculty of imagining, or repre- 

 «' fenting to myfelf the ideas of things I have perceived, or 

 " of varioufly compounding or dividing them : I can imagine 

 <' a -man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined 

 " to the body of a Uorfe. I c»n confider the hand, die 



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*' ej-os, the nnfe, each by itfelf, abftra^-d or fcnnrated frtim 

 " the left of the body. I'ut then, whatever (laiid or rve 

 " I imagine, it mud have fome particular (hapi- and colour. 

 " So again, the idea of a man I frame to myfjf, mull be 

 " either of a white, oi- a black, ora tawiiey, a llr.ii;;ht, or a 

 •' crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middlc-fizcd man. 



I' I cannot by any effort of thought, conceive the abftnft 

 " idea above dcfcribed ; and it is equally in.pnfl'blf f».r me 

 " to form the abrti-att idea of motion, diUiiid fmm iho body 

 " moving, and whicii is neither fwift nor flow, curvilinear 

 " nor rtftilincar. And the like may be faid of all other ub- 

 " ftraft general ideas whatever." 



Since all things that exift are only particulars, " Whence." 

 fays Mr. Locke, " is it, that wc come by general wcrdi, 

 " tx]irenive of a thoufand individuals!" His anfwcr it, 

 terms only become general, by being made the figns of ab- 

 ftraci and general ideas ; fo that the generality of ahllratt 

 ideas fliould follow from the reality of general words. — I'ut, 

 according to Dr. Berkeley, a word becomes general, by be- 

 ing made the fign not of an abftract general idea, but of fc- 

 veral particular ones, any of which it mdiifercntly fuggefts to 

 the mind. — For example, when I fay, that whatever has ex- 

 tenfion is divifible ; tlic propofition is to be undcrftood of 

 extenfion in general ; not that I mud conceive any abftradl 

 general idea of extenfion, which is neither line, furface, nor 

 folid, neither great nor fmall, &c. To miike tltis more evi- 

 dent, fuppofe a geometrician to be demonftraling a method 

 of dividing a line into two equal parts : with tliis view, he 

 draws, for inftance, a black line, an inch long ; and this, 

 which in itfelf is a particular line, is neverthelefs, with refpedl 

 to its figniiication, general ; fince it reprefents all lines what- 

 ever ; fo that what is demonflratcd of this one will hold of 

 all others — And as that particular line becomes general by- 

 being made a fign, fo does the name line, and the idea of a 

 line in the imagination, either of which, taken abfolutely, 

 is particular, by being figns become general likewnfe ; and as 

 the former owes its generality, not to its being the fign of 

 an abilraft or general line, but of any or all particular right 

 lines that may poffibly exift ; fo mull the latter, both the 

 name and the idea, derive their generality from the fame caufc, 

 or the various particular hues which each of them indiffer- 

 ently denotes. • 



But to this reafoning it has been replied, that the iniivcr- 

 fality confifts in the idea ; and not merely in the name as 

 ufed to fignify, and recal into the mind, a variety of pirti- 

 cular things, refembling that which is the immediate object 

 of refleftion ; becaufe had we no previous fixed notion what 

 the name fignifies, we could not know what particular things 

 to apply it to, or affign any reafon for applying it to one 

 thing rather than another. All that can be pictured in tlie 

 imaginat on, as well as all that we take notice of by our 

 fenfes, is indeed particular. And whenever any general no- 

 tions are prefent in the mind, the imagination, at the fame 

 time, is commonly engaged in reprefeiiting to itfelf fome of 

 the particulars comprehended under them. Rut it would be 

 a very llrange inference from hence, that we have none but 

 particular ideas. As well almoll might we conclude, that 

 we have no other notion of any thing than of its name, bc- 

 caufe they are fo affociated in our minds, that we cannot 

 feparale them ; or of the fun, than as a white bright circle 

 fuch as we fee in the heavens, becaufe this idea or phantafiu 

 is apt to accompany all our thoughts of it. See Dr. Pricf's 

 Review of the principal Queftions and Difficulties in Morals, 



P- «• 



Dr. Cudworth obfen-cs, that abftraci ideas are implied in 

 the cognofcivivc power of the mind ; and he pronounces the 

 opinion, tliat they are only fingular ideas aDnci^ed to a com- 



K i HluA 



