A B S 



nion term ; or in other vords, names without any meaning, 

 !.» bt lb ridiculoufly fa'fc, as to dtlVivc no confutation. See 

 Ettnial and Immutable Monility, book iv. 



Mr. l.ockc, (EiF. b. iv. c. 7. §. 9.) fpeaking of the dif- 

 ficulty of forming abilnft ideas, fays: " docs it not re- 

 " quire fome pains and (kill to fonn the general idea of a tri- 

 •' an^'le, which yet is none of the moil abftiad and compre- 

 •' heniivc ; for it mull neither be oblique, nor rectangular ; 

 " neither equilateral, ifofccles, nor fcalcnous ; but all, and 

 " none of thcfe at once. In eiTecl, it is fomcthing imptr- 

 " fcft, that cannot exiil ; an idea, wherein fome parts of 

 «• feveral ditlcrent and inconfulent id.as are put together." 

 Now, let any man look into his tlioughts, and tiy whether 

 lie has, or can attain to un idea of a triangle correfpondeiit 

 to this defcription. 



Dr. Campbell, in his Philofophy of Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 

 joy. expredes his apprehenfion, that the bare mention of 

 this h)'pothefis is equivalent to a confutation of it, fince it 

 really confutes itfelf. He adopts the fentiments of Berkeley 

 on this fubjeft, and will allow to the mind no other power 

 of abilraclion, if the term be retained, bcfidc that, by which 

 a particular idea is regarded, as rcprtfenting a whole order, 

 hir. Locke, he fays, has, on fome occaiions, evidently in- 

 clined to the fame opinion : in proof of wiiich he refers to 

 his ElTay, book iii. chap. 3. §. 11. 



In this feftion Mr. Locke maintains, that not only words 

 but ideas are made figns ; and a particular idea is made ge- 

 neral, not by any change produced in it (for then it would 

 no longer be the fame idea), but by being fet up as the re- 

 jjrcfentative of many particular things. Univerfality, he ob- 

 ferves, as it belongs not to things, belongs not even to thofe 

 ■words and ideas, which are all of them particular in their 

 txillence, but general in their llgnification. Again, the ge- 

 neral nature of thofe ideas is nothing but the capacity they 

 arc put into by the underilanding of lignifying or reprefent- 

 ing many particulars ; and, if polTible, ftill more explicitly, 

 the iiguitication they have is nothing but a relation, (no al- 

 teration in their eflejice,) that by the mind of man is added 

 to them. " If fuch an extraordinary faculty," as abflrac- 

 tion, fays Dr. Campbell, (:iii /ufira, p. no.) " were poffi- 

 " ble, I cannot for my part conceive what purpofe it would 

 *' ferve. An idea hath iieen defined by fome logicians, the 

 " form or refemblance of a thing in the mind, and the v/hole 

 " of its power and ufe in thinking is fuppofed to arife from 

 " an exacl conformity to its archetype. What then is the 

 " ufe or power of that idea, to which there neither is, nor 

 •' can be, any archetv'pe in nature, which is merely a crea- 

 *' ture of the brain, a moniler that beais not the likenefs of 

 " any thing in the univerfe." 



The late Lord Bolingbroke llkewife controverted the exift- 

 encc of abilraft ideas. He apprehends that the difputes about 

 abftraftion may after all be confidered as verbal, and owing 

 to the want of making a proper diitindlion between ideas and 

 notions, which have been ufed, he fays, both by Mr. Locke 

 and his antagonift the Bifhop of Cloyne, as if they were 

 fynonymous. We m.ight avoid the confufion arifmg from this 

 ambiguity, he prefumes, if we conceived the former to be. 

 particular in their nature, and general only by their apph- 

 cation ; and the latter to be general in their nature, and 

 particular only by their apphcation. In another place he 

 cbferves, that much confuiion and error have ari fen from the 

 improper ufe of the word abflraclion. There is a very prac- 

 ticable operation of the mind, by which we are faid to ab- 

 ftra£l ideas, and by which we do, in efFeft, gencrahze them 

 in a certain manner, and to a certain degree, by fubftituting 

 one as reprefentative of many. There is another fuppofed, 

 biit impracticable operation of the niind, by v/hich fome 



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phi".of(>pli«s have made themfelvis and others believe, that 

 they abilracl, from a multitude of panicular ideas, the idea 

 of one general nature or effcnce, which is all of them, and 

 none of them ; whereas, in truth, though they tan define 

 general natures or cfl'ences in very clear propofitions, they 

 cannot frame an idea of any general nature, which is not a 

 particular idea of that nature. Bolin^»broke's Works by 

 Mallet, vol. iii. p. 438. and vol. v. p. 17. &c. 



The acute Mr. Hume has alfo attacked the fyftem of ab- 

 ftradlion. He afierts, (ElTays, vol. ii. p. 165.) that it is 

 unintelligible, and even abfurd, to conclude, that the ideas 

 of prim.ai-y qualities are obtained by abllraclion. An exten- 

 i'loa, that is neither tangible nor vilible, cannot poiiibly be 

 conceived ; and a tangible or vifible extenfion, which is 

 neither hard nor foft, bkck nor white, is equally beyond 

 the reach of human conception. Let any man try to con- 

 ceive a trlan-^le in general, which is neither ifofceles, nor 

 fcalene, nor has any particular length or proportion of fides, 

 and he will foon perceive the abfurdity of all the icholaftic 

 notions with regard to abftraiStion and general ideas. Mr. 

 Hume has purfued Berkeley's reafaning to an extent which 

 he himfelf never propofed, and rq^refcnted all his arguments 

 as merely fceptical, " becaufe they admit of no anfwer, and 

 " produce no conviftion." — Dr. Reid, in his valuable 

 E'fayson the Intellectual Powers of Man, (EfT. v. />a//:rn,)ha3 

 difcuffed the fubjecl: of abftradlion, and examined the various 

 opinions that have been formed concerning it, in a very dif- 

 fufe and elaborate manner. This ingenious writer appre- 

 hends, that we cannot, with propriety, be faid to have ab- 

 llradl and general ideas, either in the popular or philofo- 

 phical fenfe of that word. In the former fenfe, an idea is 

 a thought, or an acl of the mind in thinking, or in conceiv- 

 ing any objeft ; and this mull be an individual aft. In the 

 latter fenfe, an idea is an image in the mind, or in the brain, 

 which in Mr. Locke's fyftem is the immediate objeft of 

 thought, and in the fyilem of Berkeley and Hum.e, the 

 only objeft of thought : and as he believes there are no fuch 

 ideas, there can be no abflraft general ideas. If they exift- 

 ed, they could not be general, becaufe every thing that 

 really exifts is an individual. Univerlals are Reither a6ts of 

 the mind, nor images in the mind. They cannot be the 

 objefts of imagination when the word is taken in its flricl 

 and proper fenfe. We cannot imagine a man, without 

 colour, or ftature, or (hape. But though Dr. Reid denies 

 the reality of abjlra8 iJais in the ienfc above ftated, he main- 

 tains the fame doftrine by merely fubftituting the term cori' 

 ception for liLa. As general words are necethiry in language, 

 there muft, he fays, be general conceptions, of which thefe 

 are the figns ; and they take this denomination, not fron^ 

 the act of the mind in conceiving, which is an individual aft, 

 but from the objeft or thing conceived, which is generaL 

 Theie general words exprefs either the attributes of things, 

 or the genera and fpecies, into which we divide and fub- 

 divide them ; and of both thefe we may have clear and dif^ 

 tinft conceptions. As to the operations of the underftasd- 

 ing, by which we fonn thefe general conceptions, he appre- 

 hends that they are the three following, viz. i. The ana- 

 lyfing or refolving a fubjeft into its known attributes, and 

 giving a name to each attribute, fignifying that attribute, 

 and no more. 2. The obferving one or more fuch attri- 

 butes to be common to many fubjefts. The firft aft 

 is by philofophers called alJlraS'wn ; the fecond may be 

 C'Aled genera/ijitig ; but both are commonly included under 

 the name of abftraftion. We cannot generahfe, he fays, 

 without fome degree of abftraftion ; but we may abftraft- 

 without generahfing. For what hinders me from attending 

 to the whitenefs of the paper before me, without applying* 



that 



