A B S 



lint cJcur to any other objeft. TliC v.-h'tenefs of t'his ir.di- 

 vida.ll objctt is an abilract conception ; thovigh not a ge- 

 neral one, while applied to one individual only. To tliis 

 reafoning it might be replied, that if whitenefs be ftparatcd 

 in his conception of it from the paper, it is no lonjrer the 

 whitenefs of that objeft ; and lie muft cither conceive it as 

 abllratted from all objedls, which is impoffible, or as per- 

 taining to fome other objeft : and thtis neither the quality 

 of whitenefs, nor his conception of it, is abilraft and ge- 

 neral, but concrete and particular. 3. A third mental opera- 

 tion, by which we fcnn abftraiil conceptions, is, according 

 to Dr. Reid, the combining into one whole a certain num- 

 ber of thofe attributes, of which we have formed abftraft 

 notions, and giving a name to that combination. It is thus 

 we form abftracl notions of the genera and i'pecies of thino-s. 

 With regard to abllraftion ilriAly fo called, the difficulty 

 of which was acknowledged by Mr. Locke, this author fays, 

 " I can perceive nothing in it that is dilEcult either to be 

 " underllood orpraiitifed." " AVhat can be more enfy," 

 as he proceeds, " than to diftinguHh the different attributes 

 " which we know to belong to a fubjeft ? In a inan, for in- 

 " ilance, to diilinguiih his lize, his complexion, his age, his 

 *' fortune, his birth, his profefilon, and twenty other things 

 •' that belong to him." But in this cafe, it may be al- 

 ledged, that though we feparate one or more of thefe attri- 

 butes from the otliers in our conception of them, we can- 

 not abftradl them from the individual perfon without tranf- 

 ferring them to fome others ; fo that our conceptions will 

 be Hill concrete and particular. Dr. Reid adds farther, 

 that attributes which are in their nature abfolutely infepa- 

 rable from their fubjccl:, and from one another, may be dif- 

 joined in our conception. In a body we can dilfinguifh its 

 folidity from its extenfion, and its weight from both : and 

 in cxtenlion we can diilinguiih length, breadth, and tliick- 

 nefs ; and yet none of tliefe can be fcparated from the body, 

 or from one another. But can we conceive folidity, as fe- 

 parated from all extenfion and weight ? Can we conceive fo- 

 lidity or extenfion, feparated from all bodies ? Thofe who 

 cannot do this will ftill contend that there is no abilraftion 

 ftriftly fo called. Without purfuing this ingenious writer's 

 reafoning any farther, or giving in detail his anfwcrs to the 

 various cbjeftions of Berkeley and Hume, we iliall clofe our 

 abllraft of wiiat he fays on this fubjeft with the following 

 general conclufions, which he has deduced from his account 

 of abftraft and general conceptions. I. It is by abftraftion, 

 he fays, that the mind is furnilhed with all its moft fimple 

 and moll diilincl notions. Abftraftion analyfes the fimplelt 

 objefts of fenfe, as well as thofe of memoiy, and of confci- 

 oufnefs. 2. Our moil diftinifl complex notions are formed 

 by compounding the finiple notions got by abftradlion. 3. 

 Without the powers of abllraiSling and generalifing, it would 

 be impoffible to reduce things into any order and method, 

 by dividing them into genera and fpecies. 4. Without thefe 

 powers there could be no definition, which can only be ap- 

 plied to univerfals, as no individual can be defined. 5. Without 

 abftradl and general notions, there can be neither reafoning 

 nor language. 6. As brute animals Ihew no figns of being 

 able to diilinguiih the various attributes of the fame fubjeft ; 

 of being able to clafs things into genera and fpecies ; to de- 

 fine, to reafon, or to communicate their thoughts by artifi- 

 cial figns, as men do ; " I muft think," fays this author, " with 

 " Mr. Locke, that they have not the powers of abftraftingand 

 " generalifing ; and that, in this particular, nature has made 

 •' a fpecific difference between them and the human fpecies." 

 The notion of abftradl ideas, which, according to Dr. 

 Berkeley, has contributed to render fpeculation intricate 

 and perplexed, and to occafion innumerable crroro and dit- 



A B S 



f-culiies In aunofl all parts of knowli dgo, led m<*n, in h!« 

 opinion, firft to fiippofe, tliat bodies liavc an exillci.cc of 

 their own, exchifively and independently of the mind wliitli 

 perceives them. — Can there be a greater lli-ain of abllraftion, 

 fays he, than to diilinguiih the exillcnee of fenliblc obiiCts 

 from their being perceived, fo as to conceive them cxiili:.f» 

 unperceived ? — If there were external bodies, lie fays, it it 

 impoffible we fliould ever come to know it ; and if tlicre were 

 not, we might have the very fame reafons to think their 

 were that we have now. His principal argument may be re- 

 duced to tlie follov/ing fyllogil'm ; whatever i.-. immeiiiatclv 

 perceived by fenfe, is an idea; fenfible tilings are immediately 

 perceived by fenfe ; for tlie proof of which he uppcis to 

 experience ; therefore fenfiblc things are ideas ; and conft- 

 quently txill only in the mind. See his Dialogues between 

 Hylas and Philonous. 



Mr. Hume concurs with Dr. Berkeley in denying the 

 exiftence ol matter ; and advances a Hep farther, maintain- 

 ing that the foul is merely a bundle of perceptions, and llujt 

 there is nothing in the univerfe but imprelfionb and idtas. 



Some late Scots writers, Doclure Reid, Beattie, and Of- 

 wald, with a view of obviating thofe fceptical inference-, 

 which had been deduced from the principles of Mr. Locke, 

 have, in oppofition to thefe, olfered a new fyftem refpect- 

 ing the nature and origin of our ideas, the outlines of whicli, 

 with remarks, will be inferted under their proper heads, in 

 the courfe of this work. See Ideas, Intuition, and 

 Common Sense. 



We ihall only add, that abftrafting, on the common fyf- 

 tem, is no more than generalifing : it is making one thii;g 

 ftand for a hundred, by omitting tlie confideration of tlie 

 differences between them : it is taking feveral differents, /'. r. 

 different combinations, fetting alkie the peculiarities in cacli, 

 and confidering only what is finiiid alike in all. — Thus it ii 

 that I fay, I love my friend, love my miiliefs, love niyfelf, 

 my bottle, my book, my cafe, &c. — Not that it is polfiblc, 

 I Ihould have the fame perception with refpett to fo many 

 different forts of things, things that Hand in fueh ihfferent 

 relations to me ; but only that there a])pearing fomethiiig ni 

 them all that bears a refemblance to the reft, in fome circum- 

 ftance or other, I chufe to cxprefs all by one name, love. 

 For if I confiderthe tendency and effedsof them all, I (hall 

 find they lead me veiy different ways, to very different 

 aftions ; all the analogy there is between them, is a fort of 

 plcafure or fatisfailion, arifing upon the application of- tiie 

 particular objetl to its proper organ, or lenfe. — The ab- 

 ilraft idea of love, then, v.ill tenninate in the idea of plea- 

 fure : but it is certain, there can be no idea of pleafurt w;ili- 

 out a thing pleafant to excite it. Any other abftrafl idta 

 of pleafure will amount to no more than a view or percep- 

 tion of the circumilanccs wherewith our pleafures have bteu 

 attended ; but thefe are mere externals foreign to the jjlea- 

 furable fenfation itfelf ; which nothing but an object apphed 

 in fuch and fuch a manner can excite. — To fuppofe an idea 

 of pleafure produced indireftly, by any other than by the 

 proper caufe, is as abfurd as to fuppofe an idea of found,, 

 produced without a fonoious objedt. The mind has no 

 power of making any ideas, call them what you will, whether 

 al>/lr{i3 ox concrete, or general, or parlicular : its adiivity goes, 

 no farther than to the perceiving of fuch as are prc- 

 fcnted to it ; fo that its aftion is really no other than a degree 

 of paffion.. 



ABSTRACTITIOUS, or Aestractive, is applied 

 by fome modern Chemifis to a fpirit drawn from veget.ibki 

 without fermentation. 



ABSTRUSE, nhjlnifiis, {onr\edo{ ais, from, and truJc, 

 I tliruJI, denotes fonicvhing deep, hidden, or far vemcvcd 



