ASS 



confl'!-5 of tlie Wetter and Nidda, eleven miles noitli-eaft of 

 Frankfort on the Mayne. N. lat. 50° 1 1'. -E. long. 

 8^ 50'., 



ASSENS, a fea-port town of Denmark, fitnate on the 

 weft coa'l of the illand of Funen, with a good harbour on 

 t]ie Little Belt, chiefly inhabited by filliennen. The paf- 

 fage from hence, acrofs the Little Belt, to Arroa foi'.nd, in 

 the duchy of Slefwick, is nine miles. N. lat. 55'^ 21'. 

 E. long. 9" 54. 



ASSENSU,^/;.", CapiluH, in Laiv, Sec Sine, &c. 



AssENsu Re^^'io. See Regio. 



AsstNsu Palris, Doiver ex. See Dower. 



ASSENT, AssENSus, an agreement or acquiefcence of 



tiie mind to iomething propofed or affirmed Tiius, to 



alfcr.t to any propoiitiou, is to allow it to be true, or to 

 perceive its truth. 



Aflent is dillinguifhed, like faith, into impUc'it, or bllnil ; 

 and explicl;, or Jiang, &e. — Others dillinguifli it into ai^ual 

 and hal'iluah 



Assent, actual, is a determination of the mind, arifmg 

 from the perception of the truth of any propofition. 



Assent, habitual, confifts in certain habits of believing 

 or aequielcing, induced in the mind by repeated acts. 



To this belongs faith, which is an aiTent arifing from the 

 authority of the perfon who fpeaks. — Such alfo is opinion, 

 which is defined an affent of the mind, cum fonntillne oppofil'i, 

 ice. 



Father Malebranche lays it down as an axiom, or prin- 

 ciple of method, never to allow any thing for truth, from 

 wliich we can forbear our affent without fome fecrct reproach 

 of our own reafon. 



Mr. Hume, in his Treatife of Human Nature (vol. i. 

 p. 172, Sec), has given us a new theory of affent or belief in 

 general ; a theory, which fuits very well with his hypothe- 

 fis of ideas, and ieems to be a natural confequence of it, 

 and which at the fame time reconciles all tiie belief tiiat we 

 find in human nature to perfecl fcepticifm. According to 

 this writer, " an opinion or belief may be mofl accurately 

 defined, a lively idea related to or afTociated wiih a prefcnt 

 iniprcflion." Upon this notion of belief a great part of his 

 theory is formed ; and hence he deduces wliat he cn'ls his 

 hypothefis, " that belief is more pioperly an aft of the fen- 

 filive than of the cogitative part of our natures." Dr.'Reid 

 has juiHy obferved, in his examination of this theory (Eff. 

 on tlie Intellectual Powers jf Man, p. ^y^.), that the be- 

 lief of a propofition is an operation of the mind, of which 

 every man is confcious, und what it is he underllands per- 

 feftly, though, on account of its fimplicity, he cannot give a 

 logical definition of it. If he compares it with the ftrengtli 

 or vivacity of his ideas, or with any modification of ideas, 

 they are fo far from appearing to be one and the fame, 

 that they have not the kail fimilitude. That a llrong be- 

 lief and a weak belief differ only in degree, we may cafily 

 comprehend ; but that belief and no belief fhould differ 

 only in degree, no man can admit who underllands what he 

 fpeaks ; for this in reality is to fay, that fomething and 

 nothing differ only in degree, or that nothing is a degree of 

 fomething. Every propofition that may be the objeft of 

 behef, has a contrary propofition that may be the obieit of 

 a contrary belief. The ideas of both, according to Mr. 

 Hume, are the fame, and differ only in degrees of viva- 

 city : that is, contraries differ only in degree ; and fo plea- 

 fure may be a degree of p^n, and hatred a degree of love. 

 Such are the abfurdities that follow from this doftrine ; but 

 it is needlefs to trace them, as none of them can- be more 

 abfurd than the doftrine itfelf. Mr. Hume, in the third 

 volume of his " Treutife of Human Nature," fcnfible that 



ASS 



his theory of belief is very objeftionable, feems in fome 

 meafure to retraft it ; but he full appezis to be of opinion, 

 that beuef is only a modification of tlie idea, th.ough viva- 

 city is not a proper term hv which to cxprefs that modifi- 

 cation. He therefore adopts fome analogical phrafes to ex- 

 plain that modification ; fuch as " apprehending the idea 

 more ftrongly, or taking faflcr hold of it." But tliis is 

 merely a change of terms whicli have no precife difference ; 

 and whatever modification of the idea he makes belief to 

 be, whether in vivacity or in a ftronger apprehenfion of it, 

 tlie hypothefis, which makes perception, memoi-y, and ima- 

 gination to be diflerent degrees of that modification, is 

 chargeable witli tiie fame abfurdities already mentioned. 

 Dr. Hartley's theory on tliis fubjeft, though not very intelli- 

 gibly expreffed, is not very difiercnt from that of Mr. Hume ; 

 and it is liable to fimilar objeftions. " Affent and diflent," 

 fays this writer (Obfervations on Man, p. 191. ed. Ato. 

 1 79 1.), " whatever their prccife and particular nature may 

 be, mud com.e under the notion of ideas, being only thole 

 very complex internal feelings, which adhere by affocialion 

 to fuch clufters of words as are called propofitions in ge- 

 neral, or affirmations and negations in particular." Ac- 

 cordingly, he dillinguilhes afieiit, and of courfe its oppo- 

 fite, dilTent, into two kinds, rati'jnal a.nd prac?i:a/. Ratio- 

 nal ojfaii to any propofition may be defined a readinefs to 

 affirm it to be true, proceeding from a clofe affociation of 

 the ideas fuggefted by the propofition with the idea, or in- 

 ternal feeling, belonging to the word truth ; or of the 

 terms of the propofition with the word truth. Rational 

 dijjcnt is the oppofile to this. This affent, he adds, might 

 be called verbal ; but as every perfon fuppofes himfelf al- 

 ways to have fu-licient reafon for fuch readinefs to afHrm 

 or deny, he prefers tlie term rational. PraP.ical ajfent is 

 a readinefs to aft in fuch manner as the frequent vivid recur- 

 rency of the rational affent, difpofes us to aft; and />/v7(7;V<»/ 

 dijfan the contrary. Pratlical ajfent is therefore the natural 

 and neceffary confequence of rational, when fufficiently im- 

 preffed. For his mode of invelb'gating the caufes of both 

 kinds of affent, and of accounting for them on the princi- 

 ples of affociation, we mufl refer to his work vbifuprn. 



For a farther account of this fubjeft, with regard to the 

 reafons or principles upon which aflent is founded, and 

 the various meafures and degrees of it, fee Demonstra- 

 tion, Evidence, Faith, Judgment, Knowledge, 

 PROiiABiLiTY, and Testimony. See alfo Axioms, 

 Maxims, and Principles. 



Assent Royal, See Royal. 



ASSER, or AssERius Menevensie, in 5/ijfr<</i/jv, an 

 Englifli divine of the ninth century, was a native of St. 

 David's in Wales, where he afTunied the monaftic habit 

 among the Bentdiftines. According to Dr. Cave, he was 

 a relation, and Hearne fays, nephew, to Afferius, archbi- 

 fliop of St. David's. Having made a confidcrablc progrefs 

 in learning under John Scotus Erigcua, he was invited to 

 court by king Alfred, and amongll other preferments, ob- 

 tained the bifhoprie of Shcrburn. Dr. Cave informs us, 

 that Alfred, by his advice, founded the univerfity of Ox- 

 ford ; but the time of its eflabliniment has been a fubjeft 

 of difpute. Afler wrote " The Life of Alfred," firll pub- 

 lifiied by archbifnop Parker in the old Saxon charafter in 

 his edition of Walfingham's Hillory, printed at London, in 

 folio, in 1574; and republillied in a colleftion of Engliih 

 hiilorians by Cambden, at Frankfort, in folio, in 1602; 

 and again by Mr. Wife, at Oxford, in 8vo., in 1722. Ni- 

 cholfon, in his " Hiilorical Library," obferves, that Al- 

 fred's Life, by Afierius, reaches no farther than the 45th 

 year of his age, coinciding by his computation with the 

 0^2 year 



