A T H 



tlie courfe of the river, rendered the ground round the faips 

 dr)', took every one of them, and put the greateil part of their 

 crews to the fword. The army being thus difabltd from op- 

 pofing the enemyanylonger, partly periihedandpartlydifpen- 

 ed. During thcfe misfortunes the Athenians became fen- 

 fiblc of the injuftice of their treatment of Cimon, and 

 recalled him after five years baiiidiment. Soon after his 

 return, that great man fuccteded in bringing about a peace 

 between his countrymen and the Laccdamonians (B.C. 

 455); and with a view of diverting the Athenians, grown 

 prefumptuous by their late good fortune, from making 

 war on their neighbours, he refolved to find occupation for 

 their arras abroad. Departing, therefore, for Cyprus with a 

 fleet of a hundred and forty veflcls under his command, and 

 being there joined by fixty more from Egypt, he attacked 

 Artabazns, the admiral of Artaxcrxes, and took a hundred 

 of his fliips: he next made a defcent upon Cilicia, and 

 totally defeated Megabaz;is, another officer of thr.t prince: 

 he then returned to Cyprus to form the fiege of Citium. 

 In the courfe of the fiege, Cimon fell fick: perceiving his 

 end approaching, he befeeched his men to keep his death a 

 fecret. They followed his advice, and, proceeding with 

 their operations, obtained a fignal viftory, in which they 

 took a hundred of the enemy's Ihips, and then failed back 

 in triumph to Attica. Artaxerxes, finding his inability to 

 contend with the Athenians, fent deputies to Athens to 

 folicit peace. His ambafladors were favourably heard in 

 the Athenian alTembly by thofe who were more folicitous 

 about confirming their ufurpations over their allies and 

 colonies, than ambitious of extending their Afiatic con- 

 quefts. Cimon, who invariably maintained the contrary 

 fyllem, was now no more. A peace, therefore, was con- 

 cluded on the following conditions: that all the Greek 

 colonies in Lower Afia fhould be declared independent of 

 the Perfian empire; that the armies of the great king Ihould 

 not approach within three days journey of the wellern 

 coaft ; and that no Perfian vefTel fhould appear between the 

 Cyanean rocks and the Chtlidonian ifles; that is, in the 

 wide extent of the ^gean and Mediterrar.eaii feas, between 

 the northern extremity of the Tiiracian Bofphorus and the 

 fouthern promontory of Lycia. On fuch terms the Athe- 

 nians and their allies ilipulated to withdraw tlieir armament 

 from Cyprus, and to abftain thenceforward from niolelling 

 the territories of the king of Perfia. Such was the con- 

 clufion of this memorable war, whicii, fince the burning of 

 Sardis, the firll decifive aA of hoftility, had been canied on 

 with little intermiflion, during fifty-one years. The fame 

 magnanimous republic which firll ventured to oppofe the 

 pretenfions of Perfia, dictated to that haughty empire the 

 mofl humiliating conditions of peace; an importa.nt and 

 illuflrious aera in Grecian hiftory, which was often celebrated 

 with pompous panegyric during the declining ages of Athe- 

 nian glory. 



Having terminated the war againft the Afiatic foe with 

 fuch honour and advantage, the Athenians directed more 

 conllant and undivided eflorts to render themfelves para- 

 mount in Greece; and, during twenty years, various con- 

 tefls arofc between the Athenians and neighbouring ftatcs. 

 "Without purfuing the detail of tliefe contentions, and the 

 various truces by which they received a temporary fufpen- 

 fion, we fhall merely mention the refult, which was ex- 

 tremely favourable to Athens, fo that the republic rofc to un- 

 precedented power. With her profperity the pride of 

 Athens rofc in proportion, until her neighbours, both ap- 

 prehenfive and envious of her power, and farther inflamed to 

 refentment by her infolence, formed for her humiliation a 

 confederacy which brought on the rdopoimelan war. 



A T H 



Jeaioufy of an overgrown potentate, and what in modem 

 language is called the balance of power, was the chief znd 

 uhimate political caufe of that celebrated war; rivalry, re- 

 fentment, and pride, infiamed the differences on both fides; 

 but the proximate and incidental caufe was a difpute be. 

 twecn the Corinthians and the Corcyreans, a colony fron» 

 Corinth; the contell was inflamul into a v. ar. (The details 

 of the difpute belong to the articles Corcvp.a, and Co- 

 rinth). The Corcyreans were firll fuccefsful, and gainfd 

 a great naval viclcrj- ; the Corinthians fonr.ed a confederacy 

 with neighbouring ftates of the Pclopounefus (li.C. 434.), 

 to combat the power to wliich they were tlicii;felves un- 

 equal. Alarmed at this combination, the Corcvrca.is applied 

 (B.C. 433) for afTillanccto the Athenians; and urged that 

 an alliance between Athens and Corcyra would be advan- 

 tageous to both parties; that of its benefits the Athenians 

 would become immediately fenfible, if they refieded that 

 the people of the Peliponnelus being enualiy hoflile to 

 both (tiie open enemies of Corcyra, the fecret and more 

 dangerous enemies of AtheiiS) ; their cou^.tr^■ muil derive a 

 vail acceffion of ftrength by receiving, without trouble or 

 expence, a rich and warlike illand, which, unalSllcd and 

 alone, had defeated a numerous confederacy, and whofc 

 naval force, augmenting the fleet of Athens, would for ever 

 render thai republic fovereign of the feas. If the Corin- 

 thians complained of the injullice of receiving their colony, 

 let them remember that colonies are preferved by modera- 

 tion, and alienated by oppieffion; that men fettle in foreign 

 parts to better their fituation, not to fuircnder their liber- 

 ties; to continue the equals, not to become tlie Daves cf 

 their lefs adventurous fellow-citizens. Ambalfadors from 

 the Corinthians endeavoured to counteract the eloquence of 

 the Corcyreans, conteiled their propofitions concerning the 

 independence of colonies, affirmed that the m.other-country 

 always retained a fuprcniacy over its emigrated dcfcendanU, 

 and appealed to the intcreiU of the Athenians, as power- 

 fully inducing them practically to fupport their doClrincs 

 concerning the relative duties of colonic?. Thefe iDanderj 

 (they faid) acknowledged tlieinfelves a colony of Corinth, 

 but pretended that fettlements abroad owe nothing to thofe 

 who eflabliihed them, to thofe whofe follcring cure reared 

 their infancy, from whole blood they fprung, by whofe arms 

 they have been defended. We affirm, on the contrary (and 

 appeal to you, Athenians! who have planted fo many colo- 

 nics), that the mother-country is entitled to that authority 

 which the Corcvreans have long fpurned, to that rcfpeA 

 which their infolence now refufes and diidains; that it be- 

 longs to us, their metropolis, to be their leaders in war, their 

 magillrates in peace; nor can you, Athenians! oppofe our 

 jull pretenfions, and protect our rebellious colony, without 

 ietting an example moil dangerous to yoiirfclves. The 

 Athenians did not implicitly liilen to the arguments of 

 either fide, but were more favourable to the Corcyreans, 

 and entered into a defcnfive alhance with that ilate. Before 

 the Athenians difpatchcd a fleet to fupport the objects of 

 their new engagement, the Corinthians attacked the fqua- 

 dron of their enemies, and gained a fignal victory; but the 

 arrival of the Athenian armament (B. C. 432) prevented 

 them from reaping any I'.ecifive advantage from their late 

 fuccefs. To divert the force of the Athenians, the Corin- 

 thians flirred up revolt among colonies which the Atlie- 

 nians had planted along the coalls of Theflaly, Mace- 

 don, and Thrace. But thefe were not their only mea- 

 fures; aware of the jealoufy and alarm with which Sparta 

 and her aUies regarded the Athenians, they tried to kiudk 

 the combullible particles into a conflagration, which they 

 truHed would uveiwLcim Athens. They calily fuccecdeJ 

 Ee- Z iu 



