A T H 



A T H 



the Athenians ; but his advice was difJained by officers in- 

 capable and unworthy of command, and his orders were 

 dtfpifed by feamen uiiaccuftomed and unwilling to obey. 

 At length they became fcnfiblc of the danger, when it was 

 too late to avoid it. Their fliips were taken, either altoge- 

 ther empty, or manned with fuch feeble crews as were 

 unable to work, much Icfs to defend them.. - The troops 

 and failors who flocked to the fliore from different quarters, 

 and with dilordered precipitation, were attaciced by the 

 regular onfct and difciplined valour of the Peloponnefians. 

 Thofe who fought were flain ; the remainder fled into the 

 utmoft recelTes of the Cherfoiiefus, or took refuge in the 

 Athenian fortrefles, which were fcattered over that penin- 

 fula. Out of a fl;tt of an hundred and eighty fail, only 

 nine vefTels had efcaped, eight of which were condnfled by 

 Conon to the fricr.Jly iiland of Cyprus, while the ninth 

 carried to Athens the melancholy news of a difaller equally 

 unexpected and fatal. L.yfander propofed to purfue his 

 blow to the deitruiAion of the Athenians, reduced all the 

 colonies of Athens under the dominion of Sparta, and pro- 

 ceeded to the fi.-ge of Athens. While he invefted this 

 city by fea, a powerful army co-operated with him by land. 

 The Athenians, having defended themfelv'ssfor three months, 

 were reduced to the e;;tremity of diilrefs, and at length this 

 celebrated city was captured, difmantled, and rendered a 

 dependency of Sparta. Such was the ruinous termination 

 of the Peloponnelian war. (B.C. 404.) The conquerors 

 placed the government in the hands of thirty perfons, who, 

 from their rapacity and cruelty, earned and acquired the 

 name of the thirty tyrants. During their fway Athens had 

 fcarcely any political txiftence, and its hiltory is only 

 marked by domedic injuftice and mifery. The unhappy 

 Athenians cad their eyes on Alcibiades, in the confidence 

 that he could, and the hopes that he would, effeft their 

 deliverance. But Lyfander, entertaining a fimilar idea of the 

 powers and difpofition of that illuftrious exile, prevailed 

 on Pharnabazus, the Perfian fatrap, to perpetrate his mur- 

 der. The thirty tyrants, freed from the fear of fuch an 

 avenger, proceeded to greater enormity than ever ; until 

 Thralybnlus, inheriting the magnanimous f;>irit of a free 

 Athenian, put himfelf at the head of his injured country- 

 men, expelled the tyrants (B. C. 401), and favoured by the 

 diffLnfions of the Spartan leaders, re-eftablifhed a free go- 

 vernment in Ath.ens. Deprived, however, of her colonial, 

 naval, and many of her commercial refources, Athens con. 

 tinned of little importance in the public tranfaftions of 

 Greece. The chief domeltic event which diftinguiflies this- 

 part of Athenian hiftory, is tiie fate of Socrates ; but of the 

 life as well as of the death of this extraordinary fage, a full 

 account will be given under the appropriate article. 



While the Athenians had thus loll not only pre-eminence 

 but independence and political importance, they were IHll 

 diilingnifhed for good a-nd bad qualities, which had (lione fo 

 confpicuoudy in the days of their profperity. Genius was 

 Jtill iranfcendent, though direfted to difl'erent objefts from 

 thofc which had employed a Themiftocles and a Cimon. 

 Inllead of aftive efforts for aggrandizing their country, 

 Athenian talents were now chiefly employed in piirfuits 

 dellined to delight and inftrucl all the enhgntened world. 

 Poetry, hilirory, and philofophy by different means purfued 

 the fame end, the promotion of wifdom, virtue, and happi- 

 nefs. But as epic and dramatic excellence had been already 

 carried to the higheft conceivable perfeftion ; the poetry 

 of Athens at this period was lefs fupereminent than her 

 hiftory and philofophy. Thucydides and Socrates being 

 dead, Xenophon and Plato occupied the. higheft rank. 

 The overbearing infolence with which the Spartans exer- 



cifed their fupremacy over the Grecian ftates, proved ulti- 

 mately the means of their degradation, ar.d enabled the 

 Athenians to recover a certain portion of their political 

 power, and their confequence among their neighbours. The 

 confederacy which was formed againfl Sparta enabled the 

 Athenians to defeat the LacedsEnioi'iiiMis at fea, to regain 

 their naval fupcriority, and to rebuild their harbour and 

 walls. (B. C. 394-) This revolution from dependency to 

 maritime fupremacy they owed to the courage and policy of 

 the celebrated Conon. {See Conon). Thrafybulus feconded 

 the exploits of Conon, and the Athenians rcfumed the com- 

 mand of maritime fcttlements, which had been wreftcd from 

 them ten years before by the viftorious Spartans. The re- 

 viving fortune of the Athenians recalled their military ener- 

 gies, and various commanders ftarted up, not unworthy of 

 the native country of Pericles and Alcibiades. Iphicratcs, 

 Chabrias, and Tim.otheus, gave glorious fpecimicns of valour 

 and conduct; but the peace of Antalcidas (B.C. 387.) 

 fufpended their exertions. For feveral years after this 

 treaty, the Spartans endeavoured'by ftratagem and furprife 

 to re-eftabli(h their predominancy ; thty feized the citadel of 

 Thebes, and attempted to make themfelves matters of the 

 harbour of Athens, though nominally at peace with both 

 countries. The Athenians joined with the Thebans in re- 

 venging this outrage : Chabrias repulfed the army of Sparta, 

 while Iphicrates and Timotheus deftroyed her fleets, and 

 Athens rofe to an equality with her rival. Peace being again 

 concluded between the Spartans and Athenians, the latter 

 were fpeftators of the conteft between Sparta and Thebes, 

 where the renowned EpaminondasgaveatLeudlra(B.C.37i) 

 fuch a blow to Spartan power ; the Athenians were invited 

 by the viftors to join in an alliance for crufliing their antient 

 enemies ; but they regarded found policy more than reient- 

 ment, and would not throw their weight into the Theban 

 fcale, already preponderant. The Theban hero having llill 

 farther reduced the Spartans, and invaded Laconia, the 

 Athenians took active fteps for rendering afTiftance to the 

 now weaker party, and fent an army to defend Peloponntfus ; 

 but the battle of Mantinoea (B. C. 363) arrelled Epaminon- ' 

 das in the career of victory. After him no Theban arole fit 

 for imitating his example, or executing his defigns. The 

 Thebans became languid; the Spartans on the other hand 

 were exhauftcd. Athens did not fail to take advantage of 

 the contefts which had weakened her two fucceffors in the 

 dominion of Greece. Taught by experience, they did not 

 attempt to fubdue the territories of her warlike neighbours; 

 but the numerous iflar.ds of the jEgean and Ionian teas, the 

 remote coafts of Thrace and Afia, invited the adtivity of 

 their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign con- 

 quefts, fearlefs of domeftic envy. Tt appears, that foon 

 after the death of Epaminondas, Euboca again acknow- 

 ledged the authority of Athens, an event facilitated by the 

 deftruftion of the Theban partifans belonging to that place, 

 in the battle of Mantina;a. From the Tliracian Bofphorus 

 to Rhodes, feveral places along both ftiores fubmitted (B. C. 

 360.) to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; 

 men, who, having furvived Agefilaus and Epaminondas, 

 were far fnperior in abilities and in virtue, to the contempo- 

 rary generals of otl'.er republics. The Cyclndes and Corcyra 

 courted the friendlhip of a people able to interrupt their navi- 

 gation, and to dclhoy their com.mercc : Byza:itium had be- 

 come their ally ; and there was reafon to hope that Aniphi- 

 polis would foon be reduced to fubjedtion. Such multi- 

 plied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, 

 which once more commanded the fea. with a fleet of near 

 three hu.ndred fail, and employed the belt half of her citi- 

 zens and fubjcfts in flups of war or commerce. This tide 



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