ATT 



ATT 



in burning a few mifcrable villages. Siipenority of numbers 

 generally iniured the advantage. The vanquKlied Were ex- 

 terminated. The victors v/ithdrew with their hard earned 

 booty, diminilhed in numbers, and cxhaulled bv fatigue. 



The Greeks, who firll brought the military art to fome 

 degree of pcrRdlion, were fully fenfible of tiie advantages 

 to be derived from ihe attack. Even at the famous plain 

 of Marathon (vid. Marathon ), where, by the mod moderate 

 accounts, thcPerlian army exceededthem ten times in number, 

 they had the temerity to forfake a vvell-chofen pofition, and 

 (Herodotus, 1. vi. c.Il2.) advance running to the onfet ; 

 a degree of raflinels, which, though in tiie inllance before 

 us crowned with the moft glorious fuccefs, can never find 

 an excufe in the eyes of military judgment. At the final 

 engagement of Thermopyla*, the defpair of Leonidas drove 

 him to purfuc a fimilar conduft. (Herod, l.vii. c. 223.) 

 The particular circumftances of his fituation, and the cele- 

 brity of his death, extenuate in part his conduct. 



Among the Greeks, the Lacedemonians alone advanced 

 to battle in filcnce, and at a Heady pace, regulated by the 

 found of mulical inllruments. (Thucyd. I. v. c. 70.) On 

 the contrary, the other Grecian nations ruflu d forward with 

 the utmoll cagernefs and velocity, clafliing their fpcars upon 

 their bucklers, and, at the moment of the onfet, raifing a 

 loud (hout, to aftoniOi and terrify their enemies. This mode 

 of attack was generally irrefiilible, where only oppofed by 

 an undifciplined and tumultuous alTemblagc of Ahatics. 

 Witnefs the battle of Cynaxa (vid. Cynaxa), where a pha- 

 lanx of 13.000 Greeks difperfed in an inftant the almoft in- 

 numerable forces of ArtaSerxes Mnemon ; and, if it had not 

 been forthe fatal temerity of Cyrus the younger, would in- 

 fallibly have placed the crown of Perfia on his head. 

 (Xenophon, Anab. 1. i. c. 8.) 



In engagements with every nation, the vigorous onfet of 

 the Greeks was attended with fplendid viiilorj'. Even in the 

 declining ages of their monarchy, when the arbitrary fway 

 of Macedonian tyranny had extinguilhed within theirbofoms 

 that fpirit of liberty which glowed lo fervently at Marathon 

 anel Platsca, their formidable phalanx was regarded with 

 apprchenlion by Roman intrepidity ; and in the famous and 

 decifive battle of Pydna (vid. Pvdna), the firmnefs and ta- 

 lents of a Paulus Emilius defpaired of vittor)-, till a happy 

 and well-timed exertion of bis fuperior military abilities de- 

 cided the doubtful contett. i.Plut. in JEm. Paul.) 



The Romans, thofe great mailers in the art of war, were 

 not ignorant of the advantages of afting offenfively, nor 

 how to improve them. The impetus of their legion, a 

 heavy and well-organized body of infantrj', exceeded in effeft 

 that of the Macedonian phalanx ; and no weight of armour, 

 no exertion of courage, no refolution, however daring, 

 could prefervc the front of that army unbroken, which 

 once experienced the terrible difcharge of the Roman 

 pilum. 



In every age the fyftem of attack has been preferred by 

 experienced generals (with fome few exceptions, juiUfieJ 

 always by coincident circumftances), to that of protrafting 

 a war by tedious and indecifivc manoeuvres, ai;d it has gene- 

 rally been attended with fuccei's. Hannibal, Sylla, Alex- 

 ander, Caefar, the greatell captains of antiquity, never fuf- 

 fered a favourable opportunity of tugaging to efcape them. 

 Their attacks were general, violent, frequently unexpected, 

 and rarely unattended v/ith the moft ample fuccefs. 



Of later days, we may reckon among the commanders, 

 who, in their eagernefs to engage an enemy, have fometimes 

 overleaped the bounds preftnbed to gcniii; by modern taftics, 

 a Conde, a Guftavus, an Eugene, a Charles the Twelfth, 

 and a Frederic the Great, whofe rapid maneeuvres frequently 



baffled the tnort acute obfervation of their antagonid.T, 

 and the impetnolity of whofe attacks feldom gave time for 

 effeftual oppofition. 



It is fcareely neccflary to infill upon the manifcft advan- 

 tages an attackinp; army polfefies over that which afts upon 

 the defenlive. With niunbers generally fuperior, a ronli- 

 dence intheirown (Irength, and fpirits which defy oppofition, 

 they rarely encounter an enemy able, or refolute enough to 

 repulfe them. 



In the cotuTe of the late war, Europe has beheld with 

 furpri/.e the fyllem of attack, which before only affected a 

 tract of country comparatis'tly trifling, carried to an extent 

 and a perfection truly allonifhing. In 1794, amiies afting 

 offenfively, though in bodies widely diltant, pierced, as if 

 animated by the fame foul, in all direftions, from the fron- 

 tiers of France to the left bank of the Rhine, and the cen- 

 tre of the Batavian territories. Two years alter, at the 

 fame moment when Moreau was penetrating by the circle of 

 Suabia, and along the Danube to the Auflrian borders, the 

 aimy of the Sombre and Meufe advanced through Franconia, 

 and Buonaparte fought his way through Italy to gain the 

 fummit of the None Alj)s. According to the new princi- 

 ple, fuccefs in a general engagement, however complete, 

 in no wife contributed to terminate the campaign. A battle 

 gained only opened the road to new attacks. A town taken 

 merely furniflicd materials for frefh fieges. The armies ri- 

 valled each other in overcoming, with incredible expedition, 

 obllacles which formerly would have been deemed infur- 

 niountahle ; and as long as any veftige of an adverfe power 

 remained to face them ui the field, all fuccefs was regarded 

 as incomplete. 



In the fluctuating campaign of 1799, the fame fyften* 

 was carried to a Itill greater extent. I'he rocks and moun- 

 tains of Switzerland furnifhed frefli fubjcfts for plans of a 

 nature ftill more difficult, intricate, and coinplicated. The 

 line of attack and defence was lengthened in an unexampled 

 manner, and from the Zuyder Zee to the Adriatic formed 

 but one va*it field of battle, on which French, Auftrians, 

 Ruifians, Helvetians, Dutch, Englilh, and Italians, alter- 

 nately dellroyed each other ; and ilrove, with infinite viciffi- 

 tude of fortune, but finally with nearly equivalent fuccefs, 

 to gain a dear-bought advantage. 



Attack, in Bijhgiiig, fignifies the operations carried oa 

 by the befiegers, with mines, faps, trenches, batteries, &c. 

 againft an enemy's fortrcfs. The rules of war naturally pre- 

 fcribe the v.eakell fide of the place as the point of attack. 

 Neverthelcls, prince Eugene thought proper to infringe upon 

 them in the inltance of the ficge of Lifle, where, to favour 

 the movements of the covering armv, he direfted his ap- 

 proaches againft the ftrongeil part of the fortifications. 



Two, or even three attacks, are formed in fieges where 

 difpatch is necefiary. In fuch cafes, their communications 

 fhould be eafy, carefully conllrufted, and induflrioufly maia- 

 tained. 



ATTKCV.,Falfe, is an attack but famtly profecu ted, though 

 fufficiently ferious to induce the enemy to divide his forces, 

 and more efpecially to weaken, if poflible, that part of 

 his pofition, or works, which is the object of the true 

 alTault. 



ATTACOTTI, in ylnclcnt H}jhry, a favage people of 

 Great Britain, mentioned by Amraianus Marcellinus (1. 27. 

 c. 8.) and St. jercm (torn. ii. p. 75.), as well as in the No- 

 titia Imperii, whofe fituation is not precifely afcertained by 

 antiquaries. Some have fuppofed that they inhabited Wales, 

 and alledge, that their name was derived from the Britifh 

 words " at a coit, or coed," fignifying amongft woods. 

 But it is probable, that they were fcated iomewhcre further 



north 



