ATT 



fuiface ; and confcquenily, that the denf:ty of the internal 

 parts of the earth is much greater than that of thofc near 

 the furface ; a!fo that the v%ho!e quantity of matter in the 

 c:vrth will be at kail twice as great as if it were compofed of 

 niatter of the fame dcnlity with that at the furface ; and 

 therefore that the hypothcfis of thofe naturahfts, who fup- 

 pofe tlie earth to be only a great hollow (licU of matter, is 

 groundlefs. And finally, that the fenfible deflexions in the 

 plumb-lines of aftrononncal inllruments, by the denfity of 

 the fuperficial parts of the earth, mull caufe apparent ine- 

 qualities in the menfuration of degrees in the meridian. He 

 candidly acknowledges, however, that a fingle experiment 

 is not fufficient to afcertaiu a matter of fuch importance, 

 and recommends other experiments of a limilar kind to be 

 repeated in various places, and attended with different cir- 

 cumftances ; fince Schehallien may differ in its internal con- 

 flitution from other mountains, as there is no appearance of 

 its ever having been a volcano, which is the cafe of many 

 others. Phil. Tianf. vol. Ixv. part 2. N° 48 and 49. 



ATTREBATII, in Ancient Geography. See Atre- 



SATII. 



ATTRIBUTE, from attrllm, in a general fenfe, that 

 which agrees to fome perfon or thing ; or a quality which 

 determines fomething to be after a certain manner. Among 

 logicians, it denotes the predicate of any fubjeCl, or whatever 

 iTiav be affirmed or denied concerning it. But more ifrittly 

 fpeakins;, an attribute is the fame with an effential mode, 

 or it is "that which belongs to the nature or eifence of the 

 fubjefts in which it is. Tlius, underftanding is an attribute 

 of mind ; figure, an attribute of body, &c. 



Of the feveral attributes belonging to any fubftance, that 

 which prefents itfclf firll, and which the mind conceives as 

 the foundation of all the reft, is called its effential attribute. 

 Thus, extenfion is by fome, and folidity by others, made 

 the effential attribute of body or matter. The other attri- 

 butes are called accidental ones ; e. gr. roundnefs in wood, 

 or learning in a man. Mr. Locke endeavours to prove, 

 that thinking, which the Cartefians make the effential attri- 

 bute of the mind, is only an accidental one. 



Mr. Harris (Hermes, p. 29.) confidering all things what- 

 ever that exiil either as the energies or affeftions of iome 

 other thing, or as not being the energies or affedlions of 

 fometliing elfe, refers the former to the denomination of at- 

 tributes, and the latter to that of fubftances. Thus, to 

 think is the attribute of a man ; to be white, of a fwan ; to 

 fly, of an eagle, &c. If they exift not after this manner, 

 then they are called fubflances. 



Spinoza makes the foul and the body to be of the fame 

 fubftance, with this only difference, that the foul is to be 

 conceived under the attribute of thought, and the body 

 under that of extenfion. 



Attributes, in Theology, denote the feveral quahties 

 and perfections which we conceive in God, and which con- 

 fiitute his proper effence ; as juftice, goodnefs, wifdom, 

 &c. The perfeftions of God are called his attributes, be- 

 eaufe he cannot be without them. Theological writers have 

 diflributed the attributes of the dtity into natural, fuch as 

 knowledcje and power ; and moral, fuch as juftice and be- 

 nevolence. Of thefe writers fome have maintained that all 

 tlie natural attributes are comprehended under power and 

 knowledge ; and that benevolence comprehends all thofe that 

 are denominated moral. Others, alleging that God always 

 does that which is right and fit, have confidered all his moral 

 attributes, viz. juflice, truth, faithfulnefs, mercy, patience, 

 &c. as merely different modifications of reftitude. Others, 

 ao-ain, have repreientcd wifdom as the fpring of all the di- 

 vine aftions. Accordingly, they have ilated the moral 

 7 



ATT 



attributes of God to be only different ways of confidering 

 his will, as invariably determined by his wifdom to that 

 which is befl in all poffible circumllanccs. The attributes 

 difcriminated by thisdenomination are goodnefs, juftice, truth, 

 and faithfulnefs. Goodnefs is the will of God, det-rmined by 

 his wifdom, to the communication of being and happincfs, be- 

 caufe it is fit, and as far as it is fit ; juftice is the will of God, 

 determined by his wifdom., to maintain right and order, and 

 for this purpofe to do all that is necefiary for convincing his 

 reafonable creatures of the regard he hath for the prefcrva- 

 tion of his own rights, and of theirs ; truth, or tincerity, 

 is the will of God determined by his wifdom to avoid 

 ufiug all figns in his ir.tercourfes with his intelligent crea- 

 tures, fro in which they may not only take occafion, with- 

 out necefTity, to deceive themfelves, but would have juft 

 ground to charge him with being their deceiver, having 

 a meaning to himfelf quite different from that which the 

 words or other figns he made ufe of naturally fuggefted, 

 and were intended to fuggeft ; faithfulnefs is the will of 

 God, determined by his wifdom to make good all his 

 proniifcs and engagements ; and the holinefs of God feems 

 to lland for all thefe perfeftions in conjunftion, the Deity 

 being feparated by them from all fociety and friendfhip 

 with falfe gods. According to this ftatcment it is alleged^ 

 that we have clear, dillinft, and proper, though not ade- 

 quate, ideas of the moral attributes of the divine nature ; 

 whereas fome have maintained, that our notions of jnilice 

 and goodnefs do not at all agree to thefe attributes as they 

 pertain to the Deity, in whom they fignify fomething, cf 

 which we have only a confufed or rather no appreherilion, 

 and very different from what they do when afcribed to men. 

 To this purpofe, lord Bolingbroke (Works, vol. iv. and v.) 

 founds his fyftem on this extravagant paradox, as it has been 

 juftly called, that we have no adequate ideas of God's mo- 

 ral attributes, his goodnefs and juftice, as we have of his 

 natural, his wifdom and power ; and accordingly he denies 

 juftice and goodnefs to be the fame in kind in God as in 

 man ; and he pretends, that the ideas of God's moral attri- 

 butes cannot be acquired by any realoning at all, either a 

 priori or a pojleriori, and hence concludes, that if a man has 

 fuch ideas, they were not found but invented by him. See 

 his objections ftated and anfwered by the late bifiiop V/ar*- 

 burton, in his " View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philofophy," 

 Letter I. See Hartley's Obf. on Man, p. 316. Bays 

 on Divine Benevolence. Wollafton's Rel. of Nat. p. 116 

 — 119. Grove's Wifdom the firft Spring of A£f ion in the 

 Deity, in his Works, vol. iv. p. i — 46, &c. Balguy's Di- 

 vine Rectitude, p. 3 — 8. 



The heathen mythologifts divide the deity into as many 

 diftinft beings as he has attributes : thus the power of God 

 was called 'Jupiter ; the wrath of God, ytinoj the abfolute 

 will of God, Fate, or Dejliny, to which even his power is 

 fubjett. 



Attributes, in Painting and Sculpture, are fymbols 

 added to figures and ftatues, to denote their particular office 

 and character. Thus the club is an attribute of Hercules } 

 the palm is an attribute of viftory ; the peacock, of Juno ; 

 the eagle, of Jupiter ; the trident, of Neptune ; the balance, 

 of juftice; the olive, of peace, &c. See Painting. 



Attributives, in Grammar, are words which are 

 fignificant of attributes ; and thus include adjedtives, verbs, 

 and participles, which are attributes of fubftances, and ad- 

 verbs, which denote the attributes only of attributes. Mr, 

 Harris, who has introduced this diftribution of words, de- 

 nominates the former attributives of the firft order, and the 

 latter attributives of the fccond order. Harris's Hermes. 



attrition, formed of atterere, to wear, triture or 



friiilion. 



