B A T 



BAT 



Liege, Ijetween Jourclan and Clairfait, 17 & 18 Sept. 1794 

 On the Roer between the fame generals, (Gen. Clairfait 



was overthrown in both ihefeailions,) i{lto3dOft. 1794 

 Monten ;tte, lo April, 1796 



Miikfimo, 17 April, 1796 



Dego, 18 April, 1796 



Bridge of Lodi, 1 1 May, 1796 



Ettingen, 9 July, 179'' 



Near Nuremberg, . 22 Aug. 1796 



Caftiglione, 15 Aug. 179^. 



Roveredo, 4 Sept. 1 796 



Arcole, 5, 6, and 7 Nov. 1796 



S. Marco, 13 and 14 Jan. 1797 



Before Mantua (Gen.-Provera and his whole divilion 



laid down their arms), 16 Jan. 1797 



On the Tagliamcuto ■ 16 March, 1797 



Tarvis, 25 March, 1797 



Stokach, 25 March, 1799 



Verona, 26 and 30 March, 1799 



Magnan, 5 April, 1799 



Of the Adda, 27 April, 1799 



Zurich, 4 June, 1799 



On the Trebbia* f], 18, and 19 June, 1799 



Novi, 16 Aug. 1799 



Zurich, 24 Sept. 1799 



Engen, 3 May, 1800 



Moikirch, 5 May, 1800 



On the Rifs» 9 May, 1800 



Ulm, 21 May, 1800 



Marengo, 14 June, 1800 



Hohenlinden, 3 Dec. 1800 



The chief view of the great commanders of modern times 

 has been, till of late years, rather to harafs, or ftarve an 

 cnemv, by frequent alarms, by cutting off his fupplies of 

 proviiions, carrying off his baggage, feizing his polts, &c. 

 than to (lake their fortune and reputation on the event of a 

 day ; a battle generally deciding the fate of a campaign, and 

 not unfrequently of the war. It is therefore a rule never to 

 venture a general aftion without important reafons, or when 

 abfolute neceffitv leaves no other choice. 



Reafons for fecking and engaging the enemy are, a de- 

 cided fuperiority in number or quality of forces ; difcord 

 among the commanders of the oppofite army, when actuated 

 by different interefts ; an obvious incapacity on' their part, 

 demonftrated by a negledl of the ordinary- precautions in en- 

 camping, or on a march, the neccffity of relieving a con- 

 fiderable place bcfieged by the adverfary ; an apprehenlion 

 of the total ruin and difperiion of an army, unlefs prevented 

 by fuccefs in a general engagement ; an intelligence of rein- 

 forcements coming to the enemy, whofe junilion would ren- 

 der him fuperior, and change the ftate of affairs ; a parti- 

 cular advantage obtained in fome preceding action, which, 

 however indecifive, has given the enemy a fmart check, and 

 procured an evident fuperiority ; or in fine, the obhgation 

 of putting all to the ri(k of a battle. 



The moft proper reafons for avoiding it are ; the having 

 lefs to hope for from a viftor}^, than to fear from an over- 

 throw ; inferiority either in number or courage of the troops ; 

 an expectation of frefh fnccours, or the iunclion of a con- 

 fiderablc detachment ; the impoffibility of bringing the ene- 

 my, too advantageoufly ported, to an eiigagement on fair 

 terms, or of forcing him in his entrenchments ; or the pro- 

 fpecl of ruining his army by temporifuig, and declining battle. 

 See Action. 



But a refolution to engage being once taken, in confe- 

 quence of one or other of the reafons above recited, the next 

 object to be ccmfidered is the means of carrying it into exe- 

 cution with the ftrongeft prefumption of fuccefs. Thofe 



meafurcs are partly preparatory to the affair ; but the moft 

 important and efTential chiefly take their rife out of the dif- 

 ferent circumflancci of the action itfclf, and are thofe which 

 almoll always determine its fuccefs. 



Preparatory to fighting, a general Ihould carefully obfer\'e 

 the following particidars. He fiioulc form the order of bat- 

 tle according to tlie ftrength and quality of tlie troops of 

 which his own army is compoied, always having an eye 

 towards counterafting the difpofition in which it is ex- 

 pefted to find the enemy. The general officers (hould be 

 affigned their refpeftive ports, and copies of the order of 

 battle carefully fent to fuch as have a fcparate command, 

 who mull be rcfponlible for its obfervalion in every refpecl. 

 All the troops muft. be perfettly armed and equipped ; the 

 proper number of cartridges diftributed previoufly to the 

 battle ; waggons loaded with ammunition, and arms lla- 

 tioned in the rear of thofe battalions, which, it is prefumed, 

 will have the hotteft fire to fuilain ; and a frefli rclerve pro- 

 vided at the park of artillei"y ; as well to give out before and 

 during the action, if wanted, as after it is over, when there 

 are generally many miffing. Time, if poffible, (liould be 

 allowed to the troops to rcrt and rcfrcili themfelves, before 

 the engagement. Phyficians, furgeons, and medicines mud 

 be provided, and rather more in number than may be 

 deemed barely fufficient. The army muft be totally difen- 

 cumbered of the heavy baggage, and the remainder lodged 

 in a place of fafety at fome diltance. The advantages of tun 

 and wind, however trivial, are not to be neglefted. The 

 foldiers (liould likewife be infpired with the delire of fight- 

 ing, and a certainty of victor^' ; inflamed with the hope of 

 plunder and good quarters ; and the officers reminded of 

 glory and of rewards. 



Thofe occafions of conquering which commonly only pre-- 

 fent themfelves on the day of battle are, taking advant?ge of 

 the ground ; ftridl obfervance of the difpofition already con- 

 certed, and, (hould a correftion prove neceffary, the making 

 of it without confufion, and with the knowledge of all thofe 

 officers, who, from their fituations, rtiould become apprifed 

 of it. The artillery is to be planted along the line, accord- 

 ing to the nature of the country ; and every opportunity 

 narrowly watched of gaining an advantage, either by ex- 

 tending the wings to turn, if poffible, the flanks of the 

 enemy ; or by clofing and protetting, to draught fufficient 

 troops from them for a grand attack where the enemy may 

 appear moft feeble. Should the march to the enemy be 

 made by night, or little probability olTer of fini(hing the 

 conteft before dark ; the word (hould be given to ti'.c whole 

 fine before they march. If the advance is made in line, due 

 care (hould be taken to preferve the equality of the wings, 

 and the requifite dillance between the lines ; frequent halts 

 (hould be made, to give the artiller)' time to fire and load, 

 and the ranks to recover their order. Frequent warnings, 

 above all, (liould be given the fuldiers to receive the 

 enemy's fire, and ablhiiii from returning it till they have 

 drawn their adverfaries' ammunition from them : for troops 

 who have parted with their fire will moft infallibly give way 

 on feeing an opponent advance, ready to pour in a heavy 

 volley upon them. If, however, both parties purfue the 

 fame maxim, the only expedient is, to march up clofe to the 

 enemy, give in a general difcharge upon them, and prevent 

 its being returned by immediately having recourfe to the 

 bayonet, under cover of the fmoke, which feldom fails to 

 produce an important effedt. 



If the advancing army, by reafon of the dirtance it has to 

 march, or the inequality and clofe nature of the ground, or 

 defiles, it mull pafs, cannot come at the enemy in front, the 

 approach muft be made in a fufficient number of columns, to 

 admit the formation in order of battle, out of Jiftancc of be- 

 I ing 



