BAT 



order to incoirmoJe the enemy if he form the fiege ; or keep 

 him in awe, and prevent him from dividing his forces, if his 

 objeft is only to penetrate into the country, and lay it under 

 contribution. 



If the conqueror, on account of his lofs in the engage- 

 ment, ilnds his infantry too much weakened to undertake a 

 heavy fiege ; (hould he be difabled from attempting it fcr 

 want of heavy artillei-y and ammunition ; or (hould he derive 

 no other profit from his vidlory than that of difconcerting 

 his enemy's projects, remaining mailer of the open country 

 during the reft of the campaign, or procuring his men quar- 

 ters upon hoflile territory ; the vanquifhfd general ought, 

 after the firll retreat, to occupy a defenfible pofition in the 

 vicinity of fome large town, whence he may procure thofe 

 accommodations his defeat may have deprived him of; fuch 

 as, cordials and medicines for the fick, frtfh baggage in lieu 

 of that loft, &c. He (hould encourage his troops, without 

 again facing the conquerors till he has repaired his lofFes by 

 the arrival of new fuccours, new arms, frc(h ammunition, 

 and artillery, hts cured the wounded, and finds himfelf 

 ftrong enough to oppofe the enemy, and prevent his eftab- 

 li(hment in advantageous quarters. 



Bland, Military- Difcipliue. — Memoire de Feuquicres, 

 c. Ixxx. 



Battle was alfo a term formerly ufed to denote a 

 body of forces drawn up in order of battle, and amounts to 

 the fame with what is otherwifc called Battalion. 



In this fenfe ,we meet with the length or depth of the 

 Batik; the front, rear, and flanks <f the 5c«/?. 



Battle, Ifngth of the, is the number of foldiers in rank, 

 ^or the fpace from the left flank to the right. 



Battle, Jipth of the, is the extent of a file, or the num- 

 ber of men from front to rear. 



Battle, Uneof. See Line. 



Battle array, the fame with order of Battle. 



Battle, order of, figni'lcs the difpofition of the fqua- 

 drons and battalions of an army, into one or more lines, ac- 

 cording to the nature of the ground, either for the purpofe 

 of engaging an enemy, or being reviewed by thegeneral. 



The Egyptians, whofe priority in civilization and in com- 

 irufiicating the arts to the reft of mankind is univerfally 

 allowed, were naturally, although they ranked many great 

 conquerors among their firft monarchs, a pacific nation. We 

 have no authorities to enable us to judge of the progrtfs 

 they had made in the art of war ; but from the fanciful ac- 

 count of the battle of Thymbra, given by Xenophou in his 

 Cyropxdia, we may fairly prcfume that they uiually fought 

 in large and deep battalions, forming a complete fquare. On 

 the above occafion he mentions twelve of thefe unwieldy 

 bodies, each confiding often thoufand men, and who fom-ed 

 the chief dependence of Croefus againft the army of Cyrus. 



A people fo particularly favoured and proteiled by hea- 

 ven, as the ancient Jev>-s, little needed the afliftance of hu- 

 man invention, when, on any emergency, a new miracle was 

 always ready to enfure them fuccefs againft their enemies. 

 We find, therefore, nothing in the facr^rd fcriptuces that can 

 give us an idea of any order of battle obfcrved among them ; 

 ■although the regular divifion of their numerous forces under 

 David, who diftributed them into twelve main bodies accord- 

 ing to their tribes, and each cf thefe into thoufands, or regi- 

 ments, into hundreds or companies, into tens, and even 

 into threes, induces us to imaguic, that they would not en- 

 tirely forget fuch minutix in the field. The Jewifli writers, 

 followed by the a'Jthor of the " DilTertation ftir la tacti- 

 que des Hebreux," afHrm, that they arranged ti;eir armies in 

 one fingle line, of confiderable depth, fometimes between 

 twenty apd thirty in file. Alonff the front of thtfe were 



Vol. IV. ^ 



BAT 



placed the light armed men, viz. the moft expert arcncr*, 

 fpearmcT, and (lingers, who began the onfet by a warlike 

 fhout, and with cafting thick (howers of darts and fionea 

 Kgriiult the enemy's front, in order to caufe terror and con- 

 f"non, and ftop the rulhiiig in of the chariots, vhi' h among 

 the Canaanitcs were very numerous, by wounding th.e horles 

 and drivers. This is the more probable, as it is a metlicd 

 common to moft of the Afiatic nations. Anc. Univ. Hift. 

 vol. iii. p. 184. 



The order of battle dcfcribed by Xencphon (Cyropsdra) 

 to have been ufed by Cyrus at the aftion of Thymbra, 

 though perhaps a vifionary one as applied in the text, may 

 ferve to give an idea of the method generally ufed by the an- 

 cient Perfians in drawing up their armies, with which Xeno- 

 phon m.uft have been well acquainted. The cavalry, in the 

 fituation which it is indifpenfibly necefTar)- for them to ob- 

 ferve, were ported en the wings. The heavy armed infantry, 

 carrying, bcfides the pike, a fword for clofe combat, and 

 drawn up twelve deep, formed the firft line. The fecond 

 confiftcd entirely of light armed, who threw their darts over 

 the heads of the former, and annoyed and difordered the enemy 

 in their approach. The third Une, deilined to the fame 

 purpofe as the fecond, was compofed entirely of archers ; 

 their bows, which were extrem.ely well bent and ftrung, car- 

 r)-ing far beyond the front ranks, fo as to excelTively incom- 

 mode the enemy. With thefe were fometimes ir.termixed 

 (lingers, who threw large ftones with great effcd:. tor this 

 purpofe the Rhodians afterwards fubftiSuted leaden balls. 

 The fourth line, confifting cf heavy armed, and fimikr to 

 the firft, was intended to fupport the preceding ones, and 

 prevent them from giving way. It alfo ferved as a rear- 

 guard and a ccrps-de-referve to repu'.fe the enemy who (liould 

 penetrate fo far. The Perfians alfo made ufe of m.ovei.ble 

 to'.vers, erefted on large carriages, each drawn by fixteen 

 oxen, and contaiui.'.g twei.ty m.en, v.ho threw ftones and 

 darts. Thefe were placed in line in the rear of all the army, 

 behind the corps de refe.-\c, and favored the rallying of 

 thofe troops which were puflied and thrown into confufion 

 by the enemy. They placed likewife great reliance in armed 

 chariots, which they drew up fometimes in front of the bat- 

 tle, and fometimes upon the flanks, when in fear of being 

 enveloped. 



Such was the extent of the military fcience of thofe na- 

 tions, who under Xerxes threatened Europe and the Well 

 with fubj ligation. But we fee no occafion on which they 

 knew how to profit by the advantage of the ground, to carry 

 the war, when necefTaiy, into a difiicuh country-, to make ufe 

 of defiles and ambufcades, either for the purpofe of covering 

 themfelves from the attacks of the enemy, or of annoying 

 him on his march ; or to protract an unequal campaign by- 

 avoiding a decifive action with a fuperior antagonift, and re- 

 ducing him to difticfs for want of forage and ammunition. 

 Neither do we obfer\-e that they paid the requifite attention 

 to the fupporting their flanks by rivers, mora{res, or heights, 

 when it would have been advantageous by givirg them an 

 equal front to an army much more numerous, and putting 

 them out of danger of being funounded. Rollin, Hift. Ar.- 

 cienne ; hv. iv. eh. 4. 



The Perfians made fome alterations in this fyflrra ; but 

 thev were far from being judicious. Artaxerxes Mnemon 

 at the battle of Cunaxa, threw all his forces into one line, 

 for the purpofe of furrounding or ( utSnnkipg thofe of his 

 brother Cyrus ; but he pteferved the clumfy order of fquare 

 battalions, whofc unwiilc.iucfs rendered it impofllble for them 

 to take advantage of a fuccefs with the neccflarj- prompti- 

 tude, to retreat with facility, or manoeuvre with any efteft. 

 The difpofition of Miicmr.on the Rhodian, in oppofing the 



D paf- 



