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bcriuty and d^rorniitv of a£\ions, '(rce " Revi-cw of ths prln- 

 c-ipal Qiicllions in Moral?," ch. i. and ii.) diilingiiilhts be- 

 tween mir perception of right and wrong, and our percep- 

 tion of beauty and deformity, in confidering the aftioi;s of 

 moral agents. He obftrves that, in contemplating fuch ac- 

 tions, we !nvc both a perception of tlie nnJcrftanding and a 

 feeling of the I'.cart ; and lliat the latter, or th.e cffeils in us 

 accompanying our moral perce;:tions, depend on two caufes; 

 partly on the politivc conlUtution of our natures, but princi- 

 pillv on tlie elTcnlial congruity or incongruity between iro- 

 ral ideas and our inttlleCfUial faculties. " Placet fuapte na- 

 tun-virtni," Seneca. " Etiamfi a nuUo laudelur, natura 

 «-ll laudabile." Tnlly. He apprelienda, that the abovj-men- 

 tioned author was led to derive all our ideas of virtue from an 

 i:nplanted fcnfe, in confeqnence of not duly coni:dcring the 

 difference between the " hoiielhim," and " pulehrum," the 

 " -%v.«i-.v," and " xaX«," of aclions ; or of not carefully dif- 

 tinifuifliing between the difcernment of the mind and ih.e 

 fcniations attending it in cur moral perceptions. With him 

 the yd^/it-.uL- cf an aAion is the fan-.e with \\.i, gratefitlncfs to 

 the obfcrver ; and wrong, the contrary. ' But what, fays 

 this writer, cnn be more evident, than tiiat right and plcafure, 

 tvrong and piuti, are as diiTerent as a caiife and its ef'ed ; 

 what is tindnjlo il and what is felt; ahfoh.itf truth, and its 

 c?rifallnejs to the mind. Mr. Balguy indeed (fee his 

 "Trails on the Foundation of Moral Goodnefs, p. 6i.") 

 ir, of opinion, that all beauty, whether natural or m.oral, is 

 a fpecies of abfolute truth ; as refuking frc:n, or confiding 

 in, tlie nccefl'ary relations and congruities of ideas. As to 

 rioral benutv, fays Dr. Price, one would think, that the 

 author iull cited mnll mean, though his meaning is not very 

 intelligible, that it denotes a real quality of certain aflionj. 

 But the word b.auty feems always to refer to the reception 

 of pleafure ; and therefore the beauty of an action, or cha- 

 racter, mull fignify its being fuch as pleafes us, or having an 

 aptnefs to pleale when perceived. Nor can it be jufl to con- 

 ceive more in the aftion itfelf, or to affirm more of it, than 

 this nplnrfs, or that objeflive goodnefs or reftitude on which 

 it depends. Beauty and lovclinefs arc fynur.ymous ; but an 

 oh]t.&. JiI/'-/ovf/y can only mean an object, by its nature, fitted 

 to en:;age lo^.-. It may be added, that the epithets beauti- 

 ful and amiable are, in Cv)mmon language, confined to adlions 

 and characters that plcafe us highly, from the peculiar de- 

 gree of moral worth and beauty apprehended in them. All 

 virtuous actions mull be pleafing: to an intelligent obferver ; 

 but they do not all pleafe to tiie degree neceifary to entide 

 them to ihefe epithets, as they are generally applied. Thefe 

 obfervations are applicable, as Dr. Price thinks, with a little 

 variation, to natural beauty ; the general fcnle of which, ac- 

 ccrdinsr to Dr. Hutchefon, is uniformity aniidfl variety. 

 if we alk, why this pleafes .' The proper anfvver is, that by 

 its nature it is adapted to pleafe. Tliere feems, as Dr. P. 

 obferves, no more occafion in this cafe to have recouifeto an 

 iniplant;.d f;;iile than in the former. Regular objtdls contri- 

 bute towards produeiuf,' the complacency of our minds, and 

 the preference we give thtm, beeaufe they are more ealily 

 viewed and con:iprehended by the mind ; beeaufe order and 

 fymmetry give objefts their liability and ftrength, and fub- 

 ferviency to any valuable purpole ; and beeaufe regularity 

 and order evidence art and dcfign. Brutes are incapable of 

 the pleafures of beauty, beeaufe they proceed from a com- 

 pai ifon of objects, and a difcernment of analogy, defign, and 

 proportion, to which their faculties do not reach. 



To Dr. Hutchefon's theory of beauty, which afcribes it 

 to uniformity amidll variety, it has been objected, that, 

 though it accounts in a fatisfaClory manner for the beauty of 

 niany fijurtf, yet when we endeavour to apply this principle 



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to beautiful objcfls of fome other kind, as to colour or 

 motion, it will be found irrelative. And even in external 

 figured objeifls, it is not juft, that their beauty is in propor- 

 tion to their mi.-.ture of variety with uniforn ity, as many 

 are highly beautiful and pleafe us much, which have no va- 

 riety at all, and ethers which pofTefs variety to a degree of 

 intiieacy. With refpeiSl to the opinion, that natural beauty 

 is a real qualitv of objects, it may be cbferved, that it feems 

 impofiible for any one to conceive the objects themfclves to 

 poff.fs more than a particular order of parts, and certain 

 powers, or an aflinity to our perceptive faculties, thence 

 arifing ; and if we call this beauty, then it is an abfolnte 

 inherent quality of certain objedls, and equally exifting, 

 whether our mind difccrns it or not. However, order and 

 rjgularity are, more properiv, the caufes of beauty than 

 bLa':ty itielf. 



Beauty, fays anoth.er ingcniotis writer, (fee Reid's Effay 

 on the Intelleftiia! Powers of Man, ch. iv.) is found in thinus 

 fo various and fo very different in nature, that it is difficult 

 to fay, wherein it confills, or what can be common to all 

 tilt obj-'Cls in which it is foi;nd. Of the objtfts of fenfc 

 we find beauty in colour, in faund, in form, in motion. 

 There are beauties of fpcech, and beauties of thought ; 

 beauties in the arts, and in the fcicnces ; beauties in acliions, 

 in affections, and in charadlers. In things fo different, and fo 

 unlike, is there any quality, the fame in all, which we may 

 call by the name ol beauty ? Why then fliould things fo 

 diiTercnt be called by the fame name ? Tiiey pleafe, and 

 are denominated beautiful, not in virtue of any one quality 

 common to them all, buf by means of feveral difTcreiit prin- 

 ciples in human nature. The agreeable emotion, excited 

 by them, and called beauty, is produced by different caufes. 

 However, though tliere be nothing common in the things 

 themfelves, yet the kinds of beauty, which feem to be as 

 various as the objects to which it is afcribed, mull have fome 

 co;:-!mon relation to us, or to fomethuig elfe, which leads us 

 to give them the fame name. All the objedls we call beau- 

 tiful, agree in two things, which (eem to concur in our 

 fenfe of beauty. Firft, when they are perceived, or even 

 imagined, they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling 

 in the mind ; and, fecondly, this agreeable emotion is ac- 

 companied with an opinion or belief of their having fome 

 perfection or excellence belonging to them. Whether the 

 pleafu-'e we feel in contemplating beautiful objedls may have 

 any neceffary conneftion with the belief of their excellence, 

 or whether that pleafure be conjoined with thi-- belief, merely 

 by the good pleafufe of our Maker, Dr. Rcid does not de- 

 termine. BeautiUil objtCls excite an emotion of a foothing 

 and enlivening kind, that fweetens the temper, allays angry 

 paflions, and promotes every benevolent affection, and dif- 

 pofes to other agreeable emotions, fuch as thofe of love, 

 hope, and joy. " There is nothing," fays Mr. Addifon, 

 " that makes its way more direftly to the foul than beauty, 

 which immediately diffufes a fecret fatisfa£lion and com- 

 placence through the im;^gination, and gives a finifliing to 

 any thing that is great and uncommon. The very firft dif- 

 covery of it (Irikts the mind with an inward joy, and fpreads 

 a chearfulnefs and delight through all its faculties." This 

 agreeable emotion, produced by beautiful objefls, is accom- 

 panied with an opinion or judgment of fome perfeftion or 

 excellence of thofe objeCls, adapted by its nature !or pro 

 ducing that emotion ; and this, according to Dr. Ileid, is a 

 fecond ingredient in our fenfc of beauty. To ailert, fays 

 this writer, that there is in reality no beauty in thofe ohjedls, 

 in wiiich all men perceive beauty, is to attribute to man fal- 

 lacious fenfes ; and thus to think difrefpett fully of the An- 

 thor of our being ; who has diffufed over all the works of 



nature 



