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in I "40, that the expedient of blockaJing fortrefles of the 

 moll iuimidable llreiii^tti, haj been preferred to the lefs 

 teJions, biU.more dell ruclive plan of carrying them by a 

 regular fiege. In the latter cafe, every outwork belonging 

 to the place mnft be taken, or battered down inch by inch, 

 with an inirncnre lofs to tlie belitging array, and fre- 

 fjuently at the liazard of its being fo reduced in numbers, 

 as not to be capable of undertaking any aftion of moment 

 during the reinanider of the campaign. On the other hand, 

 p. blockade, well kept up, mull, foontr or later, reduce the 

 ^arrilon to the lail extremity for want of provifions, or 

 ammunition. The number of troops engaged in the enter- 

 prize is comparatively fmall. The lofs of men, neceffarily 

 coniiderable in the frequent and bloody attacks on the for- 

 tifications of a well defended place, is entirely avoided ; 

 and the major part of an army is ilill at liberty to con- 

 tinue its advances into the heart of the enemy's country, 

 and to follow up a previous fuccefs, without the tedious 

 procefs of ilopping to reduce every ftvong hold in its way. 

 The inconveniences which might otherwife r^fult from leav- 

 ing a hoftile garrifon in tlie rear, are, in a great mealure, 

 obviated, if the blockade is kept up with proper alacrity 

 and clofenefs. The enemy within tlie town have enough 

 to do to attend to procuring provifions for themfelve?, 

 without troubling the convoys deftiaed for the main army 

 oftiieir befiegers ; and by this means, the operations of a 

 campaign, fo far from being retarded, arc frequently ac- 

 celerated, by having recourfe to a blockade. Had the 

 allied powers, inllecd of mouldering away their armies 

 before the walls of Mayence and Valenciennes, and after- 

 wards completing their ruin, by the impotent and bloody 

 attempts upon Dunkirk ard Maubeuge, adopted this 

 method during the Summer of the year 1793, tliey pof- 

 fjbly might have made greater impreffion on the territory 

 of the French republic. Had, on the contrary, the generals 

 Jourdan and Pichegru endeavoured, in 1794, to carry 

 Landrecy, V'altiicieniies, Coiide, and Luxembourg, by 

 regular fieges, inftead of contenting themlelves with leav- 

 ing thofe fortrcfles in a ftate of blockade, it is very 

 evident that the fucceflcs of the French, during the lat- 

 ter part of that memorable campaign, would have been 

 by no means fo rapid and important as they adually 

 turned out. 



When the direftory formed, in 1796, the refolution of 

 invading Germany, their armies made no attempt to attack in 

 front the towns of Maiiheim, or Mayence, but proceeded to 

 cfTeft a palfage over the Rhine, at a diilance from thofe 

 places ; and, inftead of cunfuming their time, and wafting 

 their tlrength in long and tedioiii lieges, they advanced 

 rapidly into Suabia and Franc. >nia. They wifhed to be- 

 come matters of Ehrenbreilltein, Mayence, Manheim, and 

 "iiiiiplhurg, by the fame method by which, in 1794, they 

 had recovered the towns of Landrecy, Quefnoy, Valen- 

 ciennes, and Conde, and to atchieve, by a lingle manoeuvre, 

 that which would, in former times, have been the refult of 

 two or three fucceffive campaigns. Purluant to this fyftem, 

 they forbore to undertake any liege, and ventured to leave 

 fortified places at a great dillancc behind them. Their 

 jrenerals forefiw, that by carrying th« war away from thefe 

 towps, they fhoidd, by force, detach the enemy from them ; 

 and judged that if they could obtain and keep pofTefflon of 

 the country lituated beyond thefe fortreffes, they would, m 

 the end, fall into their hands perfectly undamaged, and 

 without having coft them either blood or treafure. They 

 propofed to acquire the fortiiied places, by making them- 

 felves matlcrs of tke furiounding country ; as formerly 

 'hefc countries were fecured by getftng poflellion of the 



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fortified places. Thefe had hitherto been the meanj of 

 conqueft ; they now meant to make them its refult. This 

 method, by which the French acquired fo great a number 

 of fortified towns in 1794, met not with the fame furcefs 

 in 1796; but their failure did not arife from the ftrong 

 places which they left behind them ; and as thefe had not 

 impeded the progrcfs of Jourdan and Moreau, neither were 

 they the caufes of their firlt difallers. If the troops of the 

 republic had been viftorious at Amberg, or at Wurtzburg, 

 the fortreffes of Ehrenbreitllein, Manheim, Mayence, and 

 Philiplburg, would, no doubt, have ultimately fallen, as Lux- 

 embonrg did in 1795. Hift. of the Camp, of 179'J, Lond. 

 1796, 8vo. 



As a proof of the little danger attending this method of 

 carrying on war, we (hall only add, that the garrifons of 

 Philipfbourg and Mayence remained fo clofely blockaded 

 by a fmall part of the French forces, as not to be capable 

 of affording the archduke any effential afTiflance in cutting 

 off the retreat of the invaders, notwithftanding the rapid 

 and diforderly manner in which more particularly that of 

 Jourdan was condufted. During the fame year, Buona- 

 parte, although the reduction of Mantua was the principal 

 objeft of the campaign in Italy, did not for a moment dif- 

 continue his other operations in the field. Oa the con- 

 trary, this did not hinder him from canning his arms into 

 the middle flates of that beautitul country ; from laying* 

 Parma and Modena under contribution ; obliging the pope 

 and duke of Tufcany to agree to a neutrality ; forcing the 

 Englifh from Leghorn, and fighting the imperialills almoft 

 inceffantly, on every point of a very extended line, to the 

 deltruftiQU of no lefs than four of their armies fucceffivcly 

 detached againft him. 



Notwithftanding the tardy proceedings of a blockade are 

 far from being congenial to French vivacity, yct,«where the 

 flrength, or peculiarly inaccelllble fituation of a fortrefs, 

 have precluded all hopes of fuccefs from a coup de main, they 

 have often had recourle to this means. That they are pof- 

 felTed of fufficient perfeverance on thefe occaiions, the three 

 blockades of Luxembourg, Mantua, and lihrenbreitftein, in 

 1795, 1796, and 1798, are convincing proofs. 



The moit famous blockades which, during the laft cen- 

 tury, have diftinguilhed the military hiftory of Europe, are 

 the following : That of Prague by the Auftrians in 1742, 

 is renowned for the gallant defence made by the F'rcnch 

 forces under the marlhals Bellifle and Broglio, for the fpacc 

 of five months, during which time they were driven to the 

 laft necefTity for want of provilions ; and for the daring re- 

 treat by which the former of thefe generals preferred the 

 - remains of his army from falling into the hands of the 

 enemy. The late war lias produced fcveral remarkable 

 inftances. The two already mentioned of Luxembourg and 

 Ehrenbreitftein refleft equal honour on the befiegers, whom 

 no obftacle could deter from continuing, with invincible 

 patience, their plan of reduction ; and the gamfons, whofe 

 refiflance was in tlic higheft degree meritorious. 



In 1796, public attention was every where engroffed by 

 the blockade of Mantua, which gave occafinn for the 

 utmoft exertion of that military talent by which the firft 

 conful of Francc«> has fo eminently diftinguifhed himfclf, 

 and for the veteran marfhal Wurmfer to add frelh laurels to 

 thofe he had already acquired, and draw even from his 

 conqueror a Mattering acknowledgment of the ability he had 

 difplayed in its defence. The different exploits of thefe 

 generals ; the entire deftruftion of four imperial armies, in 

 vain attempts to relieve the place ; the bloody battles of 

 Caftighone, Roveredo, Arcole, and Rivoli, the refult of 

 thofe attempts; acd the conqveft of all Italy by the 



French, 



