B O U 



B O U 



This fecond tax is by much the heavieft of the two ; amount- the real, as tlie nominal price of our corn ; as it augment:, not 



ing, for every five thillings per quarter of wheat contributed the quantity of labour which a ccrtahi quantity of corn can 



towards the payment of the tirll tax, to 61. ^s. towards maiiUnln and employ, but only the quantity of filver which it 



the payment of the fecond. This heavy tax, relb'ng upon will exchange for; difcoiiragts ourmanufafturcs, without rcn- 



the firll nccelfary of life, mull cither reduce the fubhllcnce dcrmg aiiy conhdtrable fci-vice to our farmers or counlry- 



of the labouring poor, or it mull occafion fome augmenta- 

 tion in their pecuniary wages, proportionable to that in the 

 pecuniary price of their fiibfilUnce. In the one way, it mult 

 tend to rellrain the population of the country, as it reduces 

 the ability of the labouring poor to bring up their children ; 

 and in the other, it mull tend to rellrain the indullry of the 

 country, as it reduces the ability of the employer.? of the 

 poor to employ fo great a number as they othenvife might 

 do, in proportion to the degree of its operation in both re- 



gentlemen. Although it puts a little more money uito 

 the pockets of both, yet if tiieir money fjnks in its'vahie, 

 as to tiie quantity of labour, prowfious, and home-undc 

 commodities of all different kinds, which it is capable of 

 puichaling, as much as it rifts in its quantity, the benefit 

 accruing from it will be little more than nomiii; 1 and imagi. 

 nary. There is, indeed, one clafs of men, to whom the 

 bounty may be efFcntially fcrviccable ; and this confills of 

 the corn-merciiants, tlie exporters and importers of corn, 



be the cafe if the effeCL of the bounty was to ralfe the 

 real price of corn, or to enable the farmer, with an equal 

 quanticy of it, to maintain a greater number of labourers 

 in the fame manner, whether lioeral, moderate, or Icanty, 

 than other labourers are commonly maintained in his neigh- 

 bourhood. But neither the bounty, nor any other human 



fpeAs. " The extraordinary exportation of corn, there- who are molt anxious for the continuance or renewal of the 

 fore, occafinned by the bounty, not only in every particular bounty. 



year, diminiflies the home, jult as much as it extends the Bounties upon the exportation of any home-made commo- 

 foreign market and confumption, but by rellrainiiig the po- dity are liable to the general objettion, that may be made to all 

 pulatiou and ind.r.lry of the country, its final tendency is to the different expedients of the mercantile fylttm, which is that 

 itunt and re!train the gradual extenfion of tlie home market; of forcing fome part of the indullry of the country into a 

 and thereby, in the long run, rather to diminiHi, than to channel Itfs advantageous than that into which it would run 

 augment, the whole market and confumption of corn." of its own accord, and alfo to the particular objeftion of fore- 



It has been thought, however, that the enhancement of ing it into one tiiat is artually difadvantageous ; the trade, 

 the money price of corn mull neccff.uily encourage its pro- which Cflnnot be carried on othtrwife than by means of a 

 duftion, by rendering that commodity more profitable to the bounty, being neccfTarily a lofing trade. The bounty upou 

 farmer. To this plea Dr. Smith replies, " that this might the exportation of corn is" liable to this farther objeAion, 



that it can in no refpccl promote the raifing of tiiat parti- 

 cular commodity, of which it was meant to encourage the 

 produtlion. With a view of encouraging the production of 

 any commodity, a bounty upon produdtion would operate 

 more dircClly than one upon exportation ; and it would have 

 the advantage of impofing only one tax upon the people, or 

 inflitution, can have any fuch effcfl. It is not the real, but that which they mull contribute in order to pay the bounty, 

 the nominal price of corn, which can in any conliderable Bounties upon produdion, however, have been very rarely 

 degree be afTeftcd by the bounty. And though the tax, granted. The prejudices ellabhihed by the commercial 

 which that inilitution impofes upon the whole body of the iyftem have taught us to believe, that national wealth 

 people, may be very burdenfmie to thofe Vtiho pay it, it is arifes more immediately from exportation than from pro- 

 of very little advantage to ihofe who receive it. The real dnftion ; and accordingly, it has been more favoured, as 

 effeft of tlie bounty is not fo much to raife the real value of the more immediate means of bringing money into the 

 corn, as to degrade the real value of filver, or to make an country. It has been alfo faid, that bounties up,;n pro- 

 equal quantity of it exchange for a fmallcr quantity, not dudlion have been found more liable to frauds than thofe 

 only of corn, but of all other home-made commodities ; for upon exportation. The latter, however, have not been alto- 

 the money price of corn regulates that of all other home- gether exempt trom this charge. A bounty upon exporta- 

 made commodities." The money price of corn regulates tion has fometimes enabled the merchant and manufacturer 

 the money price of labour, and of all the other parts of the to fend abroad the furplns goods of an overllocked market, 

 rude produce of land, which, in every period of improve- and to keep up the price of what remains in the home- 

 ment, muft bear a certain proportion to that of corn, though market; and, therefore, inftances have occurred, in which 

 the proportion in different periods may be different. In this the undertakers of particular works have privately agreed 

 latter way, it alfo regulates the money price of the materials to give a bounty out of their own pockets upon tb.o ex- 

 of almo'ii ail manufaftures, and that of manufadnring art portation of a certain portion of the goods, in which they 

 and indullry. Though in conftquence of the bounty, the have dealt; and this expedient has anfwcred the purpofe, 

 farmer Ihould be enabled to fell his corn at an advanced by doubling the price of their goods in the home market, 

 price, and to pay his landlord a proportionable advanced notv/ithllanding a very coiifidtiable iucr,.afe in the pro- 

 rent ; yet if, in confequence of this rife of the price of duce. 



corn, the money thus obtained will purchafe uo more Something likeabounty uponprodnflion, however, hasbeen 

 ! ome-made goods of any other kind, than the lower price granted upon fome particular occafions. Of this nature arr 

 wou'd have done before, neither the circumilanccs of the the tonnage-bounties given to the wlute-herriiig and whale- 

 farmer, nor thofe of the landlord, will be much mended filheries. Thefe, it may be fuppofed, have a direCl tendency 

 by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate to render the goods cheaper in the home-market t!ian they 

 much better : the landlord will not be able to live much otherwife would be. In other relpeCts, their efftAs are the 

 better. In the purchafe of foreign commodities, this en- fame as. thofe of bounties upon exportation. By means of 

 hancement in the price of corn might give them fome little them a part of the capital of the country is employed in 

 advantage ; but in that of home-made commodities, which bringing goods to market, of which the price does not repay 

 conftitute the whole expence of the farmer, and the far the coft, together with the ordinary profits of flock. But 

 greater part even of that of the landlord, it can give them though the tonnage bounties on the filheries do not contri- 

 none at all. bute to the opulence of the nation, yet they may be thought 



The bounty, as it raifes in the home market, not fo ciuch to contribute to its defence, by augmentmg the number of 



8 iti 



