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B O U 



ticular opinion. In endeavouring to (heirr, tliat tlic en- 

 lianccineiit of price, occafioncd in the liome market by the 

 bounty, miift rcftrain the papulation or the indullry of the 

 country, he proceeds upon the ahovc-mcntioucd adumption, 

 that the bounty occafions an iir.mediate rife "f the money- 

 price of com ; and mull, therefore, cither reduce the lublill- 

 ence of ihe labourers, or, if waives rife, the ability of their 

 employers to give them work. If that rife of money-price, 

 however, is confequent, as the anonymous writer arj;ues, 

 to an cxtcufixii of demand in the foreign markit, it will at 

 firll increafe the ability of thofc employers ; and though it 

 will likcwifc reduce at full the fnblilieiicc of the labourers, 

 their wages mull foon rife to their tr;ie rale ; and this rife 

 in the money-price of labour, will onlv reduce the ability of 

 the employers to its former Lvtl. 



The anr-ymous writer, after llitjfe critiiifms on the na- 

 foning of Dr. Smith, proceeds to fpccify fome of the enorj 

 into which the advocates for the bounty have fallen, whicii 

 are of a more palpable kind, aiid which proceed from an im- 

 perfect acquaintance with the principles of politicpl economy. 

 \i the ^rj! place, they have mifunderllood Dr. Smith's 

 important doctrine, that the variations of the nio;:ey-price of 

 com are communicated ultimately to that of labour, and 

 other commodities. Whilll they infifl, that the price of 

 commodities and labour is liuble to be affefted by many 

 other circunirtances, bcfidis the price of com, they advance 

 a truth, in itfelf unqueflionable, and not incompatible with 

 Dr. Smith's propofition, which merely alTerts, that every 

 change which the bounty may occafion in the money-price 

 of com, will communicate itfelf, firll to the moiiey-wjges 

 of labour, and, through them, to the money-price of all 

 other articles ; and thus, the real price of corn wi'.l be 

 maintained the fame, notwitlillanding a nominal variaticm. 

 In the frcond jilace, they Icein very i.mperfectly aware of 

 the manner in wh'ch the principle of competition operates 

 upon profits, and upon exchangeable value : and, on this 

 account, many of their remarks arc inconfillent as well as 

 unfounded. They have fuppofcd, with Dr. Smith, that the 

 fum of the bounty is immediately added to the former money- 

 price even in the home-market, and, at the fame time, 

 contend, that the average-price in that market will be 

 lowered. It is alfo their opinion, that the real price of 

 corn will, upon the whole, be rendered cheaper to the con- 

 fumers, and that the fame real price of corn will be maintained 

 permanently higher to the farmer ; though thclc two politions 

 arc, in direifl terms, contradictory to each ether. IJr. 

 Malthus obfervcs, that ^hc bounty greatly lowers the price 

 of com, by producing a growth confiderably above the 

 wants of the aAual population ; whilll lie forgets, that a 

 greater growth can only be oecafioned by a greater demand, 

 to which it will be always adjiilled ; and, keeping the fiipply 

 and the demand always in the fame ratio, will in other 

 words keep the price always at the fame rate. I'nt the 

 advocates for the bounty have betrayed a much lefs pardon- 

 able inattention to the neceffary action of the principle of 

 competition, when they conceive, as fome of ver)' hi^h 

 authority have done (See Reports of the comm'ttee of the 

 houfe of commons refpefting the corn trade, ordered to be 

 printed May l-Jth and June 14th i S04), that the averap^e price 

 of grain in the home market may be fo low as not to yield a 

 fair and reafonable profit to the grower. Befides, Dr. Smith 

 and his opponents have pronounced, tliat, in vcars of extra- 

 ordinary abundance, the boimty will prevent the money-price 

 of corn in the home-market from falling quite fo low, as it 

 would fall if there were no bounty. Dr. Smith, indeed, is 

 confident with himfelf, b?caufe he uniformly maintains, that 

 the bounty can have no effett in rendering the annual produce 



B O IT 



larger than it othervvife would be. Bnt thofe who afTcrt 

 this pofiron, and afliimc that the bounty increafes the 

 produce, and occafions a furphis growth above the annual 

 confumption, evidently incur the charge of inconfillency. 

 For this furplus will, in a year of extraordinaiy abundance, 

 psrtnkc of the extraordinary increafe ; fo that over and 

 above th.e ufual home fupply, there will, in fuch a year, be 

 reaped not only the extraordinary increafe upon that fupply, 

 togethtr with the ufinil fnrplus for exportation, but like- 

 wife the extraordinary increafe upon that furplus. Of thefe 

 four portions of the crop, therefore, not only the fecond, 

 but the fourth alfo, will be thrown as an exccfs upon the 

 home-market ; and the price in that market will confe- 

 quently be lowered much more by the whole of this 

 excefs, than it would have been by the former part of it 

 alone. 



The ingenious writer, to whom we are indebted for thefe 

 remarks, fuggclls that a bounty upon export may, in a 

 particular manner, afford fome temporary encouragement to 

 tillaii-e ; and thus, to a certain degree, force the produftion 

 of a furphis, which may be referved for the home-market in 

 deficient years. By preventing, in fuch yars, the tempo- 

 rary price from rifing fo high as it othervvife would, it may 

 be conlidered as rcftraining a little on one fide the occafional 

 flnftnations of the price of corn ; but, by overltocking the 

 home-market in plentiful years ftill more than it woiild 

 othcrwife be overliockcd, it mufl be confidered as giving a 

 flill greater range to the findtuation of the temporary price 

 on the other fide. Whilll the bounty has this influence upon 

 the temporary changes of real price, its effefls upon the _« 

 nominal price of corn will be to raife and keep it higher than 

 it otherwife would be. If the encouragement to tillage, 

 derived from a bounty, (liould be deemed a fnfficient benefit 

 to induce a great nation to cllablifli it ; it fiiould be remem- 

 bered, that, though it may indireftly fecure a more certain 

 fupply of corn, it neceffarily retards, upon the whole, 

 the growth of national opulence and indullry. It forces a 

 part of the national capital into a branch of trade, which is 

 unavoidably a lofing one, and v.hich does not return the 

 whole of the capital that is employed in it ; for the whole 

 fum giitntcd in bounties, together with the expences of 

 collecting the tax for defraying them, is a part of the 

 national capital thrown into that trade without any return. 



After eliimating to its full amount the pofllble benefit to 

 be derived from fi;eh an artificial contrivance as the bounty, 

 we fliould not only weigh againit that, both the immediate 

 facrilice and all the fubfequent difadvantages, but we ought 

 alfo to confider whether the very benefit propofed, at lead: 

 in one point of view, might not be better obtained in 

 another way ; as by the removal of any cxilling impediments 

 to cultivation, to the frte commerce of land, the free 

 employment of capital, or the free transference of labour. 

 Befides the facrifice of capital that is incurred by bounties, 

 there is a difadvantage arifing from that conllant dimir.ution 

 of the real wages of labour, which is oecafioned by the 

 progrefiive rife of the price of corn in the home market ; 

 other difadvantages are incurred from the conllant enhance- 

 ment of the money-price of labour and all other commodities, 

 both in the depretiation of fixed pecuniary returns, and in 

 the injury to domellic mannfadures, with regard to their 

 competition againll foreign indullry. Moreover, another 

 difadvantage, perhaps ilill greater, confi'ls in the uncertainy 

 and derangement to which interferences of law fubjeft 

 the capital that is veiled in the trade of grain, and the 

 obllacle oppufed by them to the free enlargement and 

 confolidation of this moll important fyflcm of commerce. 

 On the other hand, it fliuuld be confidered, that the encou- 



