B R U 



fr'om that princfple of his pUilofophy, that tlie eflfence of the 

 foul coiifills in tliiiikinir ; To that, iuppofiuo; knowledge and 

 thought ill hnites, they mull have foiili hke ihofe of men ; 

 the fenfitive foul of tiie Avillotclians being held by hiin a 

 mere chimera. But Pereira does not appear to have been 

 the firft; inventor of the doClrine ; fomething like it having 

 been held by fomt of the ancients, as we find from Plutarch 

 (De Placit. Pliil. 1. v. c. 20.), and St. Anguftin (de Q^uant. 

 Animos. Pafch. Invent. Nov. Antiq. c. 3.). Des Cartes was 

 probably led to adopt this opinion of the mere mechanifm of 

 brute* in order to obviate two great objeitions ; one againil 

 the immortality of the fouls of brutes, if they were allowed 

 to have any ; and the other againil the goodncfs of God, in 

 fufFering creatures who had never finned to be obnoxious to 

 fo many evils. In favour of this opinion it has been argued, 

 that many human aClions are merely mechanical, being per- 

 formed without the perception of the agent, and any direc- 

 tion from his will ; and thtfe miiil be afciibed to the impref- 

 fion ofobiefts, and the original difpofition of the machine, in 

 which the influence of the foul has no concern : fo that in 

 fuch circumllances often occurring with regard to aftions 

 that are habitual, human beings are no better than automata. 

 '2. Some natural movements of the body arc fo involuntary, 

 that we cannot rellrain them, and feers to depend altogether 

 on mechanifm. 3. To this mechanifm we are alfo to attri- 

 bute thofe likings and antipathies for and againil particular 

 obje£ls, which precede knowledge and dilcriniination, and 

 which in advanced life baffle and cont'oul reaion ; and they 

 furnilh llriking proofs of that irrefilliblc influence which cer- 

 tain objeds have on the human frame. 4. Our paffions are 

 known to depend on the motion of the blood, and the reci- 

 procal imprefrions caufed by the animal fpints between the 

 heart and brain, that are fo intimately connected by their 

 nerves ; and hence it is inferred, that if effefts of this kind 

 may be produced by fuch fimple mechanical means as the 

 mere increafe of motion in the blood, without any diredlion 

 of the will, we need not wonder that the aftions of brutes 

 ftiould refult merely from a refined mechanifm, without 

 thought or perception. 5. It has been further urged, that 

 human ingenuity has produced many furprifing phenomena 

 by mechanical means, fuch as are exhibited in automata of 

 human contrivances ; and as the mechanifm of the body of 

 the meaneft animal mull infinitely furpafs that of the motl 

 curious machines of this nature, the efFedls produced by it 

 muft be proportionably more lurprifing. In reply to thefe 

 arguments, it has been alleged, that they only prove, if we 

 allow their full force, the poflibility of the cafe, that brutes 

 are mere machines, or that the power of God might produce 

 certain a&ions by mechanifm, but not that he has actually 

 done fo ; and, moreover, that if they be admitted, they will 

 prove too much, or that human beings may be mere machines, 

 and not only irrational but inlenfible too. To the Cartefian 

 hypothefis it has been more diredlly objedled, that the phe- 

 nomena of perception, forefight, memory, volition, and 

 fpontaneous exertion, and of various paffions of joy, forrow, 

 fear, anger, gratitude, love, &c. exhibited by brutes, are in- 

 explicable by any mechanical principles and laws. We have 

 the fame evidence in many cafes of the fenfibility of brutes 

 which we have of that of mankind ; and that they are alfo 

 endowed with the powers of refleftion and reafoning, as well 

 as with fenfation. If beads were automata or machines, they 

 could have no perception of pleafure or pain, and confe- 

 quently no cruelty could be exercifed towards them ; which is 

 contrary to the common fenfe and obfervation of mankind, 

 and feemingly contrary to thofe declarations of fcripture, 

 which obvioufly intimate that they are the objects of fcvere 

 Voi.V. 



B R U 



nnd of mild and merciful treatment. Prov. xii. 10. Ray's 

 Wifdom of God in the Creation, p. ffi. 



The late profen()r Bergmann, in an ingenious treatife, writ- 

 ten in German, and entitled" Inaugurallragc, &c." or" Re- 

 fcarches defigned to Ihew what the Brute Animals certainly are 

 not, and, alio, what they probably r/cc, &c." Svo. Mcntz, 1^85, 

 has produced a variety of arguments in order to prove that 

 brutes are not machines. But if they are not mere machines, 

 what are they ? manifeftly, ienfitivc beings, with an immaterial 

 principle ; and thinking, or reatoning being?, to a ceiinin 

 tlegree. In certain clades of animals this appears evident to 

 the profelTor, who fecms to have obferved, «ith great f;iga- 

 city and attention, their various operations and proceidings, 

 their ways and means. &c. He thinks it inipufTiblc to de- 

 duce this variety of attion in any animals (if we except thole 

 of the lowell clalfes in the gradation ot iiitelligcuee) from a 

 general and unilorm inllmct : for they accommodate their 

 operations to times and ciicunillances. They combine ; they 

 choofe the favourable moment ; they avail themfelves of the 

 occafion ; and fecm to receive inllrnc^tiou by experience. 

 Many of their operations announce refleftion ; the bird re- 

 pairs a fhattered nelt, inllead of conllrufting, inllinftivcly, 

 a new one ; the hen, who has been robbed of her eggs, 

 changes her placie, in order to lay the remainder with more 

 fecurity ; the cat difcovers both care and artifice in conceal- 

 ing her kittens. Again, it is evident, that, on many occa- 

 fions, animals know their faults and millakes, and correA 

 them : they fometimes contrive the mod ingenious methods 

 of obtaining their ends ; and when one method fails, have re- 

 courfe to another ; and they have, without doubt, a kind of 

 language for the mutual communication of their ideas. How 

 is all this to be accounted for (fays Bergmann) unlefs we 

 fuppofe them endowed with the power of perceiving, think- 

 ing, remembering, comparing, and judging ? They have 

 thefe powers, indeed, in a degree, inferior to that in which 

 they are poilefTed by the human fpecies, and form clafles be- 

 low them in the graduated fcale of intelHgent beings. But 

 though it feems to him unieafonable to exclude them from 

 the place which the principles of found philofophy, and fafts 

 afcertained by conilant obfervation, aflign to them in the 

 great and diverfified fphere of hfe, fenfation, and inteUigence ; 

 he docs not, however, confider them as beings, whofe adtions 

 are directed to mora! ends, nor, confequently, as accountable 

 and proper fubjeCts for re-ward ox puinjbment in a future world. 



That brutes pofl'efs refleftion and fentiment, and are fuf- 

 ceptible of the kind as well as the irafcible paffions, isde- 

 pendently of fexual attachment and natural afleCtion, is evi- 

 dent from the numerous inftances of aifeftion and gratitude 

 daily obfervahle in different animals, particularly the dog. 

 Of thefe, and other fentiments, fuch as pride, and even a 

 fenfe of glory, the elephant exhibits proofs equally furprifing 

 and unqueilionable ; for which we refer to the article Ele- 

 phant. The brute creation manifells alfo a wonderful 

 fpirit of fociality, independent of fexual attachment. It is 

 well known that horfes, which are perfectly quiet in com- 

 pany, cannot be kept by any fences in a field by themfelves; 

 oxen and cows will not fatten by themfelves, but negleft the 

 fineil pallure that is not recommended by fociety ; fheep con- 

 ftantly flock together. Nor is a propenfity to affijciate re- 

 ilrifted to animals of the fame kind and fize. Inllances to 

 this purpofe are enumerated in White's Natural Hiftory of 

 Selborne, to which we refer the reader. From thefe inftances 

 we may conclude that Milton, when he puts the following 

 fentiment in the mouth of Adam, feems to have beenmillakens 

 " Much lefs can bird with beail, or fi(h with fowl 

 So well converfe, nor with the ox the ape." 



3 H Mr. 



