GOD. 



«15i-s; nor do tUey nnclergo any n-fillance from liis omniprc- 



I'ence. 



" It is confefTc-d, that Cod i-m(Is nccellarily ; and by tlie 

 lame necciruy he exills always, and every where. Hence, 

 alfo, he muil be perfedly (imilar ; all eye, all car, all brain, 

 all arm, all the power of perceiving, underftandnig, and 

 aifting ; but after a manner not at all corporeal, after a man- 

 ner not like that of men, after a manner wholly to us un- 

 known. 



" He is deditutc of all body, and all bodily fliape ; and 

 -therefore cannot be feen, heard, or touched ; nor ought to 

 be worlhipped under the reprefentation of any thing corpo- 

 real. 



" We have ideas of the attributes of God, but do not 

 know the fubllaiice even of any thing : we fee only the 

 fiTures and colours of bodies, hear only founds, touch only 

 tlie outward furfaces, fniell only odours, and talk taftes ; and 

 do not, cannot, by any fenfe,'or any reflex ac't, know their 

 inward fubftances '; and much lefs can we have any notion of 

 the fublhuicc of God. 



" We know him by his properties and attributes ; by 

 the molt wife and excellent llructure of things, and by tinal 

 caufes ; but we adore and worihip him only on account of 

 his dominion : for God, felting aiide dominion, providence, 

 and final caufes, is notiiing elfe but fate and nature." Newt. 

 Philof. Nat. Princip. Math, in cake. 



An ingenious divine has wrought thefe thoughts of that 

 admirable philofopher into form, and ripened them into a 

 more exprefs fyllem, in a difcourfe on this fubject. Max- 

 well's Difc. concerning God. 



We Ihall her.: fnbjoin a compendious abftract of the prin- 

 cipal arguments that luwc been alleged in proof of tiie ex- 

 illence of God. The admirable metaphyfician and divine, 

 Dr. Clarke, has demon llrated this truth, with that clearnefs 

 and force of rcafoning, for wliich he it fo eminently dil- 

 tim^uillied, by a feries of propofitions, mutually connetted 

 and dependent, and forming a complete and uiianfwerable 

 ar<;umcnt in proof both of the being and attributes of the 

 "Deity. I. Something has exilled tnjm all eternity ; for, 

 iince foir-.-thing now is, fomething always was : otherwile the 

 things that now are mull have been produced out of nothing, 

 ubfoluttly and without caufe ; wliich U plain contradiction 

 in terms. 2. There has exilled from eternity fome one un- 

 changeable and independent being : or elfe, there lias been an 

 infinite fucceiiion of changeable and dependent beings pro- 

 duced one from another in an endlefs progreffion, without any 

 orio-iiial caufe at all. From without, this ieries of beings 

 can have no caufe of its cxiilenee, becaufe it includes all 

 things that arc or ever were in the univerie : nor is any one 

 bein"- in tliis infinite fucceiiion felf-exilleut or necelTary, and 

 therefore it can have no reafon of its cxillcnce witliin itfelt ; 

 and it was ciiually potfible, that from eternity, there fhould 

 never have exiileJ any thing at all, as that a fuccefiion of 

 fuch beings fhoukl have exilted from eternity. Confequent- 

 Iv, their exillence is determined by nothing ; neither by any 

 iiccefrity of tlijir own nature, becaufe none of them are ielt- 

 -txillent ; nor by any other being, becaufe no other is fup- 

 pofed to exill. 3. Th?.t unchangeable and independent be- 

 :ug, which has exilted from eternity, without any external 

 caufe of its exillenc; mull be feif-exillent, i. e. it mnll exill 

 ,bv an abfolute necelTity originally in the nature of the thing 

 itfelf, and antecedent in the natural order of our ideas to our 

 fiippofition of its being. For whatever exills muit either 

 have come into being out of notiiing without caufe ; or it 

 inull have been produced by fome external caufe ; or it inn it 

 be fcH-exilteut : but tLe tiVo former hippofitions are contrary 



to the two firft propofition.^. From tliis laft propolition it 

 follows, that the only true idea of a felf-cxiftent, or neCelTa- 

 rily txilliug being, is the idea of a being, the fuppolition <)f 

 whofe non-exiilence is au exprefs contradiction ; and this 

 idea is that of a moll fimple being, abfolutely eternal and in- 

 finite, original and independent. It follows alfo, that no- 

 thinn- is fo certain as the exiltence of a fupreme independent 

 cau£ ; and likewife that the' material world cannot poiTibly 

 be the firft and original being, iincreattd, independent, and of 

 itfelf eternal ; becaufe it does not exill by an abfolute ne- 

 cefPitv in its own nature, fo as that it mull be an exprels con- 

 tradiction to fuppufe it not to exift. With refpect both to 

 its form and matter, the material world may be conceived 

 not to be, or to be in any refpect different from what it is, 

 without a contradiftion. 4 and 5. The fubllaiicc or cffence 

 of the felf-exillent beiug is abfolutely incomprelienlible by 

 us ; neverthelefs, many of the eflential attributes of his na- 

 tiu-e are ilrictly demonftrabte, as well as his exiftence. The 

 felf-exillent being, having no caufe of its exiftence but the 

 abfolute neceffity of its own nature, mull of Becefilty have 

 exifted from everlafting, without beginning : and mull 

 of necefilty exift to everlafting, without end. 6. The felt- 

 exiltent beiug muft of neceffity be infinite and omriprefent. 

 Sach a being muft be everv where, as well as always, unal- 

 terablv the fame. It follows from hence, that the felf-ex- 

 illent iieing mull be a moft iimple, unciiangeable, incorrupt- 

 ible being ; without parts, figure, motion, divifibility, and 

 other properties of matter, which are utterly inconfillent 

 with complete infinity. 7. The felf-cxiftent being, muft of 

 necelfitv be but one ; becaufe in abfolute necefiity there can 

 be no difference or diverfity of exiftence ; and, tlieref ire, it 

 is abfolutely impolhble, that there flunild be two indepen- 

 dent felf-exifteut principles, fuch e. g. as God and matter. 

 8. Tlu' felf-exillent and original caufe of all things muft be 

 an intelligent being. This propofition cannot be demon- 

 ftiated ilrictly and properly t) piljri ; but a p'J}eriori, the 

 world ailords uiukniable argum.ents to prove that all things 

 ;;re the effects of an intelligent and knowing caufe. The 

 caufe muft be always more excellent than the effect ; and, 

 therefore, from the various kinds of powers a!id degrees of 

 excellence and perfection, which vifiblc objefts polTefs ; from 

 the intelligence of created beings, which is a real diftinCt qua- 

 lity or perfeftion, and not a mere effect or compofition of un- 

 intelligent figure and motion ; from the variety, order, beau- 

 ty, wonderful contrivance, and fitnefs of all things to their 

 proper and refpeflive ends ; and from the original of inotionj 

 the felf-exillent creating being is demonftrated to be intelli- 

 ligent. 9. The felf-cxiftent and original caufe of all things 

 is not a neceflary agent, but a being endued with liberty and 

 choice. Liberty is a neceflary confequent of intelligence : 

 without libertv, no being can be faid to be an agent, or 

 caufe of any thing ; fince to afl neceffarily is really and pru- 

 perly not to aft at all, but to be ac\ed upon. Befides, it 

 the fupreme caufe be not endued with liberty, it will follow, 

 that nothing which is not could poffibly have been ; that 

 nothing which is could poiTibly not have been ; and that 

 no mode or circumltance of the exiftence of any thing could 

 poiTibly have been in any refpeft otherwife than it now actu- 

 ally is. Farther, if there be any fiiml caufe in the univerie, 

 the fupreme caule is a free agent ; and on tlie contrary fup- 

 poiltlon, it is impoifible that any efleft fliould be finite ; 

 and in everv effeft, there mull have been a progrellion of 

 caufes ;n irif.nltum, without any original caule at all IC. The 

 felf-exiiler.t being, the fupreme caufe of all things, muft of 

 necefiity have infinite power; fince all things were made 

 by him, and arc entirely dependent upon him ; and all the 

 p jwcrs of all things are lierived irom bini, and pcrfti^tly fub- 

 7 j'-'i^ 



