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loiveJ to go wild, by giving them proper and abundant 

 cover, ;ind ("owing among it fuch licrbs and plants as they arc 

 particularly fond of, as tliofe of the crefs, clu-rvil, parfley, 

 thyme, and fomc other kinds. They have likrwife a ten- 

 dency to encourage and domeilicatc hares. Abundance of 

 fcarlefs game about a refidence, he thinks, give a peculiar 

 noblenefs, and appearance of freedom, whicii few things 

 elfe can communicate or afford. 



REASON, Ratio, a faculty or power of the foul, by 

 which it diftinguiflies good from evil, and truth from faKliood. 

 Or, reafon is that principle, by which, comparing feveral 

 ideas together, we draw confequenccs from the relations 

 they are found to have. 



Some of the later fchool-philolophers define reafon to be 

 the comprchenfion of many principles which the mind fuc- 

 ceffively can conceive and from which concluiions may be 

 drawn. 



Others conceive reafon as no other than the underltanding 

 itfelf, confidered as it difcourfes. 



Reafon, Mr. Locke obferves, comprehends two dillinft 

 faculties of the mind ; vix. fagachy, by which it finds inter- 

 mediate ideas ; and i/lalion, by which it fo orders and dif- 

 pofes of them, as to difcover what conneftion there is in 

 each link of the chain, by whicii the extremes are held to- 

 gether ; and by them, as it were, draws into view the truth 

 fought for. 



Illation, or inference, confifls in nothing but the percep- 

 tion of the conuedlion there is between the ideas in each ftep 

 of the deduftion, by which the mind comes to fee cither the 

 certain agreement or difagreement of any two ideas ; as in 

 demonftration, in which it amves at knowledge ; or their 

 probable, conneftion, on which it gives or withholds its 

 aflent ; as in opinion. 



Senfe and intuition reach but a little way ; the greateft 

 part of our knowledge depends upon deduftions, and inter- 

 mediate ideas. In thofe cafes, where we mud take propcr- 

 fitions for true, without being certain of their being fo, we 

 have need to find out, examine, and compare, the grounds 

 of their probability ; in both cafes, the faculty which finds 

 out the means, and rightly applies them to difcover certainty 

 in the one, and probability in the other, is that which we 

 call reafon. 



In reafon, therefore, we may confider four degrees ; firft, 

 the difcovering and finding out of proofs. See Inven- 

 rioN. 



Secondly, the regular and methodical difpofition of them, 

 and laying them in fuch order, as that their conneftion 

 may be plainly perceived. See Method. 



Thirdly, the perceiving of their conneftion (fee Judk- 

 MEXT.) And, 



Fourthly, the making a right conclufion. 



Reafon fails us in feveral inftances ; as, firft, where our 

 ideas fail. 



Secondly, it is often at a lofs, becaufe of the obfcurity, 

 confufion, or imperfection, of the ideas it is employed 

 about. Thus, having no perfeft idea of the leall extenfion 

 of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a lofs about the divifi- 

 bility of matter. 



Thirdly, our reafon is often at a (land, becaufe it pcr- 

 <:eives not thofe ideas which would ferve to fliew the cer- 

 tain or probable agreement or ' difagreement of any two 

 other ideas. 



Fourthly, our reafon is often engaged in abfurdities and 

 difficulties, by proceeding upon falfe principles, which, 

 being followed, lead men into contradidlions to themfelves, 

 and inconfillency in their own thoughts. 



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Fifthly, dubious words, and uncertain figns, often puzzle 

 men's reafon, and bring tlicm to a nonplus. 



Though the deducing one propofition from another be a 

 great part of the office of leafon, ajid that about wliicli it 

 is ufually employed ; yet the principal adt of ratiocination 

 is the finding the agreement or difagreement of- two ideas 

 one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, 

 by a yard, finds two houfes to be of the fame length, which 

 could not be brought together to meafure thuir equality by 

 juxta-pofition. Words have their coniequences as the figna 

 of fuch ideas and things agree or difagree with what they 

 really are ; but we oblerve it only by our ideas. 



Hence we may be able to form an idea of that ordinary 

 diflinftion of things, into fuch as are according to, thofe that 

 are alow, and thofe contrary to reafon. 



Thofe according to reafon are fuch propofilions, wliofe 

 truth we can difcover by examining and tracing thofe ideas 

 we have from fenfation and rcfleftion, and by natural de- 

 duftion find to be true or probable. 



Thoie above reafon are fuch propofitions, whofc truth or 

 probability we cannot by reafon derive from thofe prin- 

 ciples. 



Thofe contrary to reafon are fuch propofitions as are in- 

 confident with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and diflinft 

 ideas. 



Thus the exi deuce of one God, is according to reafon ; 

 the exidence of more than one God, is contrary to reafon ; 

 and the refurreflion of the body after death, above reafon. 



Above reafon may be alfo taken in a double fenfe ; 111%. 

 above probability or above certainty. 



They who difpute mod againd the power and privileges 

 of human reafon, do it becaufe their own reafon perfuades 

 them to that belief; and fo, whether the viftory be on their 

 or our fide, they are equally defeated. 



They feek to terrify us with the example of many great 

 wits, who, by following this ignis fatuus (fo they call the 

 only pole-dar God has given us to direft our courfe by), 

 have fallen into wild and ridiculous opinions, and increafed 

 tlie catalogue of herefies to fo great a number ; but thefe 

 men either followed not their reafon, but made it foUow 

 their will ; or elfe they firil hoodwinked it by intered and 

 prejudice, and then bade it fhew them the way ; or were 

 wanting in thofe neceffary diligences required for fo doubt- 

 ful a padage : or if, without any of thefe, the weaknefs of 

 their underdanding had deceived them, the error is neither 

 hurtful to themfelves, nor would be to others, if this doc- 

 trine of governing ourlelves by our ow'n reafon, and not by 

 authority and example, were generally edablifhed. Dif. 

 Concern. Hum. Reaf. 



It is not the ufe of fuch liberty, but the appropriating it 

 to ourfelves, that is the caufe of all the diforders charged 

 upon it ; for thofe who lay a redraint on ether men's reafon, 

 have fird made ufe of their own to fettle them, and to make 

 ufe of it in this very redraining of others. Ibid. 



ReasiOX, in Matters of Religion, is ufed in oppofition to 

 faith. 



This ufe of the word, Mr. Locke takes to be in itfelf 

 very improper ; for faith is nothing but a firm affent of the 

 mind ; which, if it be regulated, as it is our duty, cannot 

 be afforded to any thing but upon good reafon, and fo can- 

 not be oppofite to it. 



He that believes without having any reafon for believing, 

 may be in love with his own fancies ; but he neither feeks 

 truth as he ought, nor pays the proper obedience due to his 

 Maker, who would have him ufe thofe difcerning faculties 

 he has given him, to keep him out of midake and error. 

 3 S 2 But 



