R E A 



R E A 



But fince reafon and faitli are by fonie men oppofed to one 

 another, it may be necedary to confidcr them together. 

 ' Rcal'oji, as contradiltinjruiflied to faith, is the dilcovery 

 of the certainty or probabihty of fuch propofitions, or 

 trutlis, vvhicli it has got by tlic ufe of its natural faculties ; 

 vJz. by fenfation, or reflcdtion. 



Faith, on the other hand, is the afl'ent to any propofition 

 upon the credit of the ijropofer, as coming immediately 

 from God ; which we call revelation, which fee. 



Reason, in Logic and Rhetoric, denotes a neceffary or 

 probable argument ; or an anfvver to the queftion, cur cjl^ 

 •why is it ? 



As if it be inquired, why do the fubjeft and predicate 

 agree ? and it is anfwered, becaufe they are fpoken of the 

 fame thing : this lall enunciation is a reafon. Hence, fay 

 the fchoolmen, becaufe yuia is the fign or charafter of a 

 reafon, as tion, tiorof '•>■ negation, and e/l, is, of an affirma- 

 tion. 



They make three kinds of reafons, rafiones ; viz. ratio ui, 

 that ; nc, hjl ; and quia, hecaufc. For, anfwering to a quel"- 

 tion, cur, why, we begin with becaufe, quia ; as, why do 

 you fludy ? that I may become learned ; which is \.\\e'ratio 

 ut. Again, why do you ftudy ? left I Ihould be ignorant ; 

 which is the ratio tie. Laitly, why is a body tangible ? be- 

 caufe matter is impenetrable ; which is the ratio quia. 



The reafon ut properly denotes the end, or linal caule ; 

 and reafon ne the beginning : accordingly the one is called 

 the beginning, the other end ; fo that the reafon quia is left 

 the only reafon, properly fo called. 



Reason, among Metaphyficians, is ufed in the fame fenfe 

 with effence ; or that by which any thing is what it is. 



This is fometimes alfo called formal reafon, as reprcfent- 

 ing the thing under that form or nature under which it is 

 conceived. 



Reason, in Mathematics. See Ratio. 



Reason of State, Ratio Status, in Matters of Policy, de- 

 notes a rule or maxim, whether it be good or evil, which 

 may be of fervice to the ttate. 



The phrafe is borrowed from the Italians, who firft ufed 

 ragione diflato in this fenfe. 



Reafon of ftate is properly underftood of fomething that 

 is neceffary and expedient for the intereft of the government, 

 but contrary to moral honefty, or juftice. 



Politicians have a long time difputed about the ratio fla- 

 tus ; whether dates and governments are tied down to the 

 fame laws of morality with individual perfons ; or whether 

 things, otherwife immoral and unlawful, may not be prac- 

 tifed on urgent occafions, by way of reafon of ftate ? 



The queftion is, whether any thing be unlawful, or pro- 

 hibited a ftate, that is necefl'ary to the prefervation of that 

 ftate, or whether it be allowed to preferve itfelf on any 

 terms ? 



Reason, Challenge upon. See Challenge. 



REASOTi frfficient of Leibnitz. See Leibnitzian Philo- 

 fophy. 



REASONABLE Am, a duty which the lord of the 

 fee anciently claimed of his tenants, holding in knight's fer- 

 vice, or on focage, towards the marrying his daughter, or 

 the making his eldeft fon knight. 



This is taken away by ftat. 2 Car. II. See Aid. 



REASONING, Ratiocination, the exercife of that 

 faculty of the mind called reafon: or, it is reafon deduced 

 into flfcowfe ; which fee. 



The agreement or difagreement of two ideas does not ap- 

 pear from the bare confidcration of the ideas themfelves, 

 unlefs fome third be called in, and compared> either fepa- 



rately, or conjointly with it : the adl, then, by which, (torn 

 ideas thus difpofed and compared, we judge this or that Ui 

 be fo, or not fo, is called reafoning. Or, it is that opera- 

 tion of the mind, by which we infer one thing, i. e. one pro- 

 pofition from two or more propofitions premifed. Or, 

 again, it is the drawing of a conclufion, which before was 

 either unknown, or dark, or doubtful, from fome propofi- 

 tions which arc more known and evident. It is the narrow- 

 nefs of the human mind which introduces the necedity of 

 reafoning ; for if the mere perception and comparifon of 

 two ideas would always (hew us whether they agree or dif- 

 agree, then all rational propofitions would be matters of in- 

 telligence, or firft principles, and there would be no ufe of 

 reafoning, or drawing any conicquences. But when we are 

 unable to judge of the truth or falfehood of a propofition 

 in an immediate manner, by the mere contemplation of its 

 fubjeft and predicate, we are then conftrained to ufe a me- 

 dium, and to compare each of them with fome third idea, 

 tliat by feeing how far they agree or difagree with it, wc 

 may be able to judge how far they agree or difagree among 

 themfelves. Watt's Logic, part iii. chap. i. 



Roiiault defines reafoning to be a judgment depending 

 on fome antecedent judgment : thus, having judged that no 

 even number can be compofed of five uneven numbers, and 

 that ten is an even number ; to conclude, that ten cannot 

 be divided into five uneven parts, is a ratiocination, or rea- 

 foning. 



This agrees with father Malebranche's doArine, one of 

 the great points of which is, that reafoning, on the part of 

 the underllanding, is only a mere perceiving. 



That ingenious author endeavours to (hew, that, as to 

 the underftanding, there is no difference between a limple 

 perception, a judgment, and a reafoning, except in this, that 

 the underftanding perceives a fimple thing without any re- 

 lation to any thing elfe, by a Umple perception ; that it per- 

 ceives the relations between two or more things in 3. judg- 

 ment ; and, laitly, that it perceives the relations that are 

 between the relations of things, in a reafoning. So that all 

 the operations of the underftanding are no more than mere 

 perceptions. 



Thus, e. gr. when we conclude, that 4 being lefs than 6, 

 twice 2 being equal to 4, are of confequence lefs than 6, 

 we do no more than perceive the relation of the inequality 

 between the relation of twice 2 and 4, and the relation of 

 4 and 6. 



' The manner of proceeding juftly in reafoning ; fo as to 

 arrive with the greater fafety at the knowledge of truth, 

 makes what we call method. 



For the real benefit of logic to reafoning, fee Logic and 

 Syllogism. 



RE-ATTACHMENT, in Law, a fecond attachment 

 of him who was formerly attached, and difmiflcd the court 

 without day, by not coming of the juftices, or the like 

 cafualty. 



Brook makes re-attachment either general or fpecial. Ge- 

 neral is where a man is re-attached for his appearance on all 

 writs of affize lying againil him : fpecial, for one or more 

 certain writs. 



REAU, in Geography, a town of Germany, in the prin- 

 cipality of Culmbach ; 9 miles S.E. of Hof. 



REAVE, in Rural Economy, a provincial term, ufed to 

 fignify the unroofing of difturbing the thatch or other cover- 

 ing of a building by winds, &c. 



REAUMUR, Rene-Antoike Ferchault, Sieur de, 

 in Biography, was born in 1683 at Rochelle. He was 

 brought up to the ftudy of the law, which he quitted for 



that 



