R E L 



R E L 



miiiatcd arc- referred to fomc llaiitlards, with whicli we com- 

 pare them : thus, we call an apple ^rmi, which is bijrgcr 

 than the ordinary lorl of ihofc we have been ufcd to ; ai»d 

 a man -weak, that has not lo much Itrength or power to 

 move as men uiually have, or as others of his own fize 



Authors give various divifions of relations. The fchool 

 pliilofophers commonly divide them into thofe of originfitlon, 

 under which arc comprelunided the relations of caufe and 

 elfca ; thofe of negation, which are between oppofite things ; 

 snd thofe of affirmation, which are relations of agreement 

 between whole and part, tlic fign and thing fignified, the 

 adjunft and fubjeft. This divifion is founded upon this, 

 that the mind can only compare things three ways ; wz. by 

 inferring, denying, and affirming. 



Others divide relations into thofe of origination ; thofe of 

 agreement, e. gr. fimilitude, parity, &c. ; thofe of dlverftty ; 

 and thofe of orders, as priority, polleriority, &c. 



Others divide them into predicamental and tranfcendcntal. 

 Under the (irft come thofe relations between things that be- 

 long to the fame predicament, e. gr. between father and fon. 

 To the latter belong thofe which are more general than the 

 predicaments, or are of different predicaments ; as the rela- 

 tions of fubftance and accident ; of caufe and effeft ; and of 

 Creator and creature. 



Mr. Locke gives us a diftribution of relations on a differ- 

 ent principle. All fmiple ideas, he obferves, in which are 

 parts or degrees, afford an occafion of comparing the 

 fubjefts in which they are to one another, in refpedl of 

 thofe fimple ideas ; as whiter, fweeter, more, lefs, &c. 

 Thefe, depending on the equality and excefs of the fame 

 fimple idea, in feveral fubjed s, may be called proportional 

 relations. 



Another occafion of comparing things being taken from 

 the circumilances of their origin, as father, fon, brother, 

 &c. thefe may be called natural relations. 



Sometimes the foundation of confidering things is fome 

 aft, by which any one comes by a moral right, power, or 

 obligation, to do fomething : fuch are general, captain, 

 burgher : thefe are itijlituted and -voluntary relations, and may 

 be diftinguifhed from the natural, in that they are alterable 

 and feparable from the perfons to whom they fometimes be- 

 longed, though neither of the fubftances fo related be 

 deflroyed. But natural relations are not alterable, but are 

 as lading as their fubjecls. 



Another relation is the conformity or difagreement of 

 men's voluntary actions to a rule, to which they are re- 

 ferred, and by which they are judged of: thefe maybe 

 called moral relations. 



It is this conformity or difagreement of our aftions to 

 fome law (by which good or evil is drawn on us from the 

 will and power of the law-maker, and is what we call re- 

 ward or punifljment) ihzt renders our actions morally good 

 or evil. 



Of thefe moral rules or laws there feem to be three forts, 

 with their different enforcements. Firft, the divine law ; 

 fecondly, civil law ; thirdly, the law of opinion or reputa- 

 tion. By their relation to the firit, our actions are either 

 fins or duties ; to the fecond, criminal or innocent ; to the 

 third, virtues or vices. Locke's Eflay, vol. i. chap. 25, 



^'^' 33- . . . 



Relation, in Logic, is an accident of fubftance, ac- 

 counted one of the ten categories or predicaments. 



Each fubftance admits of an infinity of relations. Thus 

 the fame Peter confidered with regard to Henry, is iu the 

 relation of a mafter ; with regard to John, in that of a 

 tenant-; with regard to Mary, in that of a hufband, &c. 



Again, with regard to one perfon, he is rich ; with regard 

 lo another, poor ; with regard to another, he is far, nev, 

 tall, (hort, a neighbour, llranger, learned, unlearned, 

 good, bad, equal, &c. It is difputed among t.he fchool 

 philofophers, whether or no the relation be a thing for- 

 mally and really diftindt from the foundation of the fub- 

 ftance. 



Relation, Relatio, in Rhetoric, is (ometimes ufed lo 

 fignify the fame with recrimination ; which fee. 



Rllation is alfo ufed, in the School Theology, to denote 

 certain of the divine perfections, caWed per/o/ial ones; be- 

 caufc by thefe one Divine Perfon is referred to another, and 

 dillinguiftied from it. 



Hence the fchoolmen teach, that in God there is one 

 nature, two proceffions, three perfons, and four relations. 



Thefe relations are paternity, filiation, aftive fpiration, 

 and paflive fpiration. 



Rklation, in Geojnetry, Arithmetic, &c. is the habitude, 

 or refpedt of two quantities to one another, with regard to 

 their magnitude. This we more ufually called ratio or 

 reafon. See Ratio. 



The equality or famenefs of two fuch relations we call 

 proportion ; which fee. 



Relation, in Grammar, is the correfpondence which 

 words have to one another in ccnjlru8ien ; which fee. See 

 alfo Regimen and Syntax. 



Faulty and irregular relations are the things chiefly to 

 be guarded againft in writing corredtly ; they make the 

 fenfe obfcure, and frequently equivocal. Thus : the orator 

 was attended to with a coldnefs, which was the more re- 

 markable, as the audience were under fome emotion before 

 he began. Here coldnefs being put indeterminately, the 

 relative -which can have no jull and regular relation to it. 



Relation is alfo frequently ufed for analogy, or what 

 feveral things have in common. See Analogy. 



In painting, architefture, &c. a certain relation of the 

 feveral parts and members of the building, or pifture, con- 

 ftitutes what we cvW fymmetry ; which fee. 



Relation, in Laiv, is where two things, as times, &c. 

 are confidered as if they were one; the thing fubfeqaent 

 being confidered as taking effeft, by relation, at the time 

 preceding. 



As if A dehver a writing to B, to be delivered to C, 

 as the deed of A ; the writing fhall be deemed to be 

 delivered to C, at the time when it was given to B, by 

 relation. 



When the execution of a thing is done, it hath relation 

 to the thing executory, and makes all but one aft to record, 

 although performed at feveral times, (i Rep. 199.) Judg- 

 ment fhall have relation to the firft day of the term, as if 

 given on that very day, unlefs there is a memorandum to 

 the contrary ; as where there is a continuance till another 

 day in the fame term. (3 Salk. 212.) A verdift was 

 given in a caufe for a plaintiff, and there was a motion in 

 arreft of judgment within four days ; the court took time 

 to advife, and in four days afterwards the plaintiff died : 

 it was adjudged, that the favour of the court ftiall not 

 prejudice the party, for the judgment ought to have been 

 given after the firft four days ; and though it is given after 

 the death of the party, it (hall have relation to the time 

 when it ought to have been given, (i Leon. 187.) Rule 

 was had for judgment, and two days after the plaintiff died ; 

 yet the judgment was entered, becaufe it ftiall have relation 

 to the day when the rule was given, which was when the 

 plaintiff was ahve. (Poph. 132.) Judgment againft an 

 heir of the obligation of his anceftor fhall have relation to 

 the time of the writ. Jir/l purchafed ; and from that time it 



wUl 



