KEVOU'TION. 



ful fnperlnti ndai) • of the poEc ; fo tlut nothing could b- 

 printed, but what government thought proper to allow and 

 [auction. This has always been the object in defpotic 

 countries; but it was obtained with great difficulty, and 

 never with fuch perfect fuccefs as was defired. By dimi- 

 riifhing tiic number of printers, Bonaparte removed the 

 chief difficulty towards destroying the liberty of the prels, 

 and fucceeded in placing France in a date of mental bon- 

 dage, perhaps without a parallel in the hiftory of the 

 world. 



During this period the emperor of France was employ- 

 ing his troops in Spain, with a view of fubjugating that 

 countrv and Portugal, and uniting the whole peninfula to 

 his already too vail empire. By the exertions chiefly of 

 Great Britain his plans were frustrated. Bonaparte teems, 

 indeed, to have been completely thrown out of his expec- 

 tations and calculations with refpect to the refiftance, 

 which he met with in his defigns on the independence of 

 Spain ; and the protracted and obllinate nature of the con- 

 teft proved that for a confiderable length ot time he carried 

 oh the war there in a delultory manner, by armies appa- 

 rently unconnected with each other, and by means not act- 

 ing in concert and co-operation. About the beginning of 

 181 1, however, a regular plan appears to have been formed 

 by Bonaparte for conducting the war in Spain. The 

 principal feature in this plan was the occupancy of the 

 chief cities in the peninfula : and at the end of the year the 

 French had made confiderable progrefs, they had taken 

 poiTefhon of molt of the chief towns in Spain ; their pro- 

 grefs had been flow, attended with great difficulty, inter- 

 rupted with many reveries, and purchafed at heavy ex- 

 pences ; it ill they had made progrefs, and the emperor, if 

 he could accomplilh his objects, never regarded the colt. 



In the domeltic hiftory of France, the only thing that 

 occurred worthy of notice was the birth of a fon to the 

 emperor, who was immediately defignated as king of Rome, 

 and in that character received the fervile homage of the 

 legislators of the empire. It was the iubject of frequent 

 remark, that after the fecond marriage of Bonaparte, he 

 for many months feemed to abandon his reltlefs and am- 

 bitious projects (with the exception of his attempts on 

 Spain), or that he took much longer time for their execu- 

 tion. During the year 1811, rumours of war between 

 France and Ruflia frequently arofc, and as frequently fub- 

 fided without any act of holtility on either fide. It was 

 not till the fpring of 18 12 that the war commenced, which 

 was ultimately the caulc of the overthrow of the French 

 emperor. 



On the 9th of May, 18 1 2, Bonaparte fet out from St. 

 Cloud, on the 6th of June he eroded the Viflula, and 

 on the 22d of that month he formally declared war againlt 

 Ruffia ; two days after this he eroded the Niemen, entered 

 the Ruffian territories, and immediately commenced holti- 

 111 by the capture of Kowno, and on the 2.SU1 he en- 

 tered Wilua, the capita] ^>( Ruffian Poland. In this war 

 he expected confiderable aliittance from the Pole'. ; he knew 

 their rooted enmity to Ruflia, and though he hud already 

 ,! 1 ived them, in the expectations which he had led them 

 to form of Ins erecting Poland again into a kingdom, yet 

 lie well knew how to infpire them again with confidence in 

 him: as loon, therefore, as he had entered Poland, his 

 iirlt public act was to proclaim it anew. A diet was im- 

 mediately aflembled, a conltitution framed, and the name 

 and form ot liberty were rellored to the Pole;. 



Bonaparte had not been long m Ruffia before lie began 



to experience the difalters of the climate. In the month 



, a id when his army was not much farther north 



than Wilna, a tremendous tempeit arofe ; torrents of rain 

 t . ; 1 ; thoufaod 1 his horfes periftied, and many pieces of 

 artillery were buried in the mud. His difappointment and 

 chagrin began to manifeft themfelves; he broke out into 

 on the barbarity of the Ruffians for laying waite 

 their country in their retreat. Although many fevere 

 battles were fought, dill the Ruffians refuted to hazard a 

 [eneral at. Their perfeveran.ee in the plan of 



retreating aftonifhed the world, and mortified, beyond con- 

 :on, their enemies, who had no means of preventing 

 this kind of warfare. It was imagined, that for a fhort 

 time only they would follow up this fyftem, and that their 

 (teadinefs, paflive courage, and patriotifm would give way, 

 when they perceived the enemy advancing, notwithltauding 

 then obllinate perfeverancc, the advanced date of the feafon, 

 and the defolation of the country. But Ruffia was ani- 

 mated with one foul, the dread and deteltation of the 

 French role l'upcrior to every feeling : coniiderations of 

 perfonal intereit or comfort, even the fight of their families 

 driven from their homes, and thofe homes abandoned to 

 the enemy or the flames, had no room in the bread of the 

 Ruffians: there dwelt only the determination to expel the 

 French, and to obey every command of their foverei rn, 

 iffued by him or his generals for that purpofe. The pro- 

 clamations of Alexander encouraged the enthufiafm and 

 animated the patient and heroic fufl'eriiigs of the people ; 

 they laid, that the emperor was determined to make no 

 peace with Bonaparte, while his legions polluted the foil 

 of Ruffia : that he would facrifice all, even Petersburg 

 and Mofcow, rather than they fhould fall into the hands 

 of the enemy. In all the proclamations of Alexander 

 there was no irrefolution, no defpondence, no expreflion, 

 that could lead Bonaparte to indulge the hope, that he 

 would propofe, or even liften to terms of peace ; or his 

 fubjects to apprehend, that he would not perfevere in what 

 he had begun. New levies were ordered to be raifed ; the 

 Ruffian people were invoked by all thofe powerful feelings 

 and prejudices, which ignorance and fuperftition create ; 

 and when a Ruffian is told, that what he has to do, or to 

 fuller, is for the fake of his fovereign or his religion, he is 

 made infenfible to danger and mifery. 



Kutufofl' continued his retreat, at the head of the main 

 Ruffian army, till he arrived at Borodino, within a fhort 

 diftance of Mofcow. The polition here was extremely 

 favourable for defence ; though it did not cover the 1 

 tal, as there were other roads leading to it. On the 7th of 

 September the famous battle of Borodino was fought ; i< 

 continued from fix in the morning till night, when tl.r 

 French, though mailers of one part of the field, retreated. 

 The lofs on this occafion was immenfe ; not lefs than 60,000 

 men are fuppofed to have fallen on both fides. Both Gd 

 claimed the victory ; and at Peterfburg it was imagined, that 

 Mofcow was rendered perfectly fecure In the defeat ot t 

 enemy. The French, however, re treated, only for the purpofe 

 of meeting a ltrong reinforcement which was advancing, 

 which actually arrived within a day or two of tin 1 tl mi 

 dous engagement. At the head of thefe he put himfelf, and 

 prepared to march by another road for Mofcow. As loon 

 a t In- Ruffian general was informed that Bonaparte had h 

 reinforced, and that he was manoeuvring to get to Mofcow 



by turning the Ruffians, he refolveil to abandon that Capital 

 to its fate. Bonaparte therefore advanced to Mofcow un. 

 molefted, but on his entrance into the city, on the nth ol 

 September, he found its governor and inhabitants animated 

 with the true Ruffian fpirit. They rn, ; Je every refiftance 

 in their power to the entrance of the enemy : a great j 

 of the ciFcftive population was armed, and as foon as the 

 Q 2 advanced 



