REVOLUTION. 



of the foldiers, for they were compelled and glad to feed 

 on horfe flefli, had proceeded feebly and flowly on, or 

 dropped dead only, a few hundreds every day ; hut the 

 (irll day of the froft, nearly 30,000 perifhed. All poffibi- 

 lity of carrying forward their artillery was now at an end ; the 

 fpirits of the foldiers completely delerted them : they 

 crawled on, expofed to the mod dreadful cold, exhauited 

 with fatigue and hunger, emaciated, and almoit naked. 

 The road was literally blocked up with the dead and the 

 dying : they had no power to defend themfelves againft the 

 Coffacks, who coullantly hovered round them: they had no 

 inclination to do it : death to them would have been a blefl- 

 ing: at the fight of the Coflacks they hoped their, mil 

 would foon be terminated: but their enemies were not fo 

 merciful as to put them to death ; piercing them with 

 wounds, dripping oft the little covering they had, they left 

 them on the fnow, there bleeding and naked, expoled to the 

 rigours of a Ruffian winter. Whenever the French entered 

 any village where there was the kali; chance of repofe or 

 food, they exerted their little remaining ftrength, and 

 crawled on their hands and feet to leek it. Frequently, juft 

 as they had ilretched out their hands to fei/.e a little food, or 

 reached the threfhold of a wretched hut, under which they 

 looked for dicker from the weather, perhaps for a few 

 minutes deep, the remnant of their llrength failed them, 

 and they expired. 



\\ ith what feelings and fentiments did they now regard 

 Bonaparte! No longer the adored general, who fcemed to 

 have chained victory to his car, to be more than mortal, and 

 to be dellined to render all Europe fubfervient to the interells 

 and glory of France ; they curfed him as the author of all 

 the tnifery under which they were writhing ; on his pcrion 

 they willingly would have inflicted vengeance ; but feniible 

 ol their indignation, he had gathered round his perfon his 

 principal officers, mounted on ahnoll the only hories that re- 

 mained. For fome time he rode in a coach, till the dreadful 

 voice of hii foldiers commanded him to walk as they did, 

 and to (hare their fatigue ; he dill, however, defended him- 

 felf from the inclemency of the weather with a cloak ; " off 

 with your cloak" was another ftern command, that he durll 

 not difobey. Such was the fituation, — fueh the feeling 1 oi 

 the French army during their dr* Iful retreat, in which 

 every thing that could accumulate . . u mifery befet 



them. It ic. u-c.'Iy needed the pri an enemy to 



complete the work of dedructton ; the climate of Ruliia, 

 aided by hunger, waa amply fufficient. 



In fan, the French ■< aid no longer be faid to com- 



pofe an army ; they were draggling in all directions, anxious 

 indeed to avoid the Coflacks, fince from them they expe- 

 rienced only an aggravation of their mifery, but not unwil- 

 ling to fall in lar Ruffian troops, in the hope 

 of being taken prifon falling in battle. Their igno- 

 rance of the country, and the date of the roads, were (itch, 

 that the different d the French army could not 

 fupport one another ; and frequently when expecting to fall 

 in with the main body, they encountered the enemy and 

 were taken prifoners. On the 10th of November, before 

 they reached Smolensk, general Angercau, with zcoo men 



and 60 officers, iurrenilercd : > j this was the firlt 



inftance, during the prcfenl war, 1 t .1 whole corps laying 

 down their arms. It is 1 that in thi time, 



prior to that date, they loll 20,000 men, befides nearly 



20,000 more that fell in the p merits; nearly 



300 pieces of cannon had alfo either fallen into the hand 

 the Ruffians, or had been fprked and buried by the French. 

 But thefe lodes, enormous as they were, were only preludes 

 to greater ones. 



It is extremely difficult to form an eflimate of the lofs of 

 the French in this dreadful campaign. The Ruffian official 

 accounts date that they took upwards of 150,000 men; and 

 it was calculated that the number of killed, and of thofe who 

 perifhed by hunger, fatigue, and cold, amounted nearly 

 to 100,000; fo that reckoning that the French army when 

 it eroded the Niemen, and began the campaign, amounted to 

 300,000 men, fcarcely more than 50,000 efcaped out of 

 Ruffia ; and of thofe, a large proportion mud have fufl d 

 fo dreadfully as to be abfolutcly unlit for future fervice. 

 Such is a bare outline of this difallrous campaign, the con- 

 fequences of which have proved fo important to the liberties 

 of Europe. In it we have feen the lird general of Ins age, 

 at the head of one of the fined armies that was ever raifed, 

 and which placed in him the mod unbounded confidence, 

 flying, beaten, difgraced, bereft of the greatefl part of his 

 troops, and the object of deteftation to the remainder. 

 This is an event which, taken under all its circumftances, 

 cannot be parallelled in hillory. No war, ancient or modern, 

 exhibits fuch detraction and mifery ; more, no doubt, have 

 fallen in the field, in the courfe of a campaign ; but no army 

 ever perifhed with fuch lingering and varied mifery. The 

 caufe of the failure of the Ruffian campaign under the 

 aufpices of that fame general, who had on almoil all great 

 occafions been fuccefsful before, is the bufinefs of the hido- 

 rian to invefljgate, and will long afford matter for f peculation 

 and curious difcudion. " It has fcarcely ever fallen to the lot 

 of the hidorian or annalid," fays the intelligent writer in the 

 New Annual Regilter, " to narrate fuch difafters ; and 

 when we confider that thefe difafters befel a man who, from 

 a low dation in Fociety, had raifed himfelf to the very fummit 

 of power, to an extent of dominion and influence never be- 

 fore witneded in Europe; that this man, for the purpofe of 

 a mad, bloody, and defperate ambition, had trampled on all 

 the laws and triages of juftice and civilized fociety ; and that 

 he considered himlelf, and called upon the world to acknow- 

 ledge and tear l.iin, as abfolutcly beyond the reach of fate, as 

 fomething more than mortal ; when we moreover reflect on 

 the peculiar interelt which this country felt in all that befel 

 him, fince againft this country was his mod implacable and 

 deadly haired directed; and from that hatred, his ruin in- 

 directly originated ; when we take all thefe things into our 

 account, we mud acknowledge that we cannot examine too 

 clofely, or fcrutinize tob minutely, the caufee of his failure 

 in the Ruffian campaign." 



It appears, then, that thefe caufes may be claffed under 

 two general heads, wa. thofe which proceeded from the 

 nature of the country which he invaded, and the charac- 

 terise qualities of its inhabitants; ami thofe which ori- 

 ginated from the peculiar character of the invader. 



In the firlt place, the conftitution of the Ruffian army, 

 and the character of the Ruffian foldiers, contributed in no 

 fmall degree to the fate of Bonaparte-. Th ■ Ruffians, from 

 their infancy, are moll devoutedlv attached to their em- 

 peror, and to their nobility, l'luklophers may ridicule 

 the idea, or difbeheve the allcrtion, U1.1t the common people 

 of Rufiia are attached to thole who act towards them, in too 

 many in dances, as tyrants. But hiftory is convcrfant with 

 iot with theories and ("peculations ; and the fact is, 



that the Ruffian common people, even before they enter 



the army, are molt devoutly attached to their emperor and 



nobility. This attachment becomes dill more ftrong and 



when they enter the army : they then regard 

 themfelves, in a more fpectal manner, a9 entirely at the 

 fervice of their fovereignj and look upon it as the highefl 



honour which can befall them, to fuller any privation or 



miferv, or even death itfclf, at his command, and for his 



fake. 



