REVOLUTION. 



fake. Military difciplme, with the troops of molt other 

 nations, is a habit acquired late in life, irkfome and abhor, 

 rent to former habits, and broken through whenever it can 

 be done with fafety. But it is far otherwise with the 

 Ruffian foldier : he knows no habits ; he has no feeling or 

 fentiments incompatible with the drifted military difciplme : 

 on the contrary, all his other habits, feelings, and fentiments, 

 work to the accomplilhment of the fame end : all ferve and 

 contribute to render him an excellent foldier, fo far as 

 ftrictnefs of discipline is concerned. Knowing no difgrace 

 fo great as difobedieuce to the orders o( his officers, and 

 efpecially to the commands or even wifhes of his fovereign, 

 he never ftirs from his poll till he is exprefUy directed fo to 

 do : the idea of flight never enters his mind. But his 

 tteadinefs is not merely paffive ; endowed with great bodily 

 Itrength, and with a robuftnefs of constitution fuperior to 

 every fatigue or privation, he wearies out his more tkilful 

 and experienced opponent, by whom he may be out- 

 manoeuvred or ilain, but cannot be forced to fly. 



Hence Bonaparte never met with more obitinate re- 

 finance than he did from the Ruffians at the battle of 

 Eylau : his troops were weary with (laughter, but Hill 

 they could not defeat the Ruifians ; and had the French 

 emperor been a man who could be taught mortifying or 

 difagreeable truths by experience, after his iirtl campaign 

 againft the Ruffians, on the borders of their own country, 

 he never would have attempted to conquer them, in the 

 very heart of their empire, and in the midlt of a Ruffian 

 winter. 



In the fecond place, the character of the Ruffian generals 

 contributed not a little to the deleat of Bonaparte : his 

 avowed object in the invafion of Ruffia, was to compel the 

 emperor Alexander to adhere to the continental fyitem, 

 that was, to forbid all trade between Ruffia and England ; 

 but this would have been the ruin of the Ruffian nobility, 

 whofe incomes were almoft exclusively derived from this 

 commerce. Bonaparte, therefore, was making war upon 

 them, and they mult have regarded his invafion as pecu- 

 liarly directed againlt them. This feeling would contribute 

 to render them faithful and fteady to the caufe of their 

 country, and at the fame time itimulate them to put forth 

 all their activity and talents in the contelt. Beiides, the 

 Ruffian nobility partake with the common people in that 

 phyiical attachment to the foil and inltitutions of their 

 country, which excites their hatred molt ftrongly againlt 

 all invaders. Hence they were above the influence of 

 Bonaparte's promifes and bribes. 



In the third place, the plan of the campaign which the 

 Ruffian government had laid down, contributed very efl'en- 

 tially to the overthrow of Bonaparte's hopes and projects. 

 This plan was, on every occalion, where they could oppofe 

 Bonaparte, there to oppofe him, but never in fuch a 

 manner as might bring on a general action, or an action that 

 could be decilive againft themfelves. Thus, the farther he 

 advanced the weaker he became ; and after every engage- 

 ment, though he apparently fucceeded in driving back the 

 enemy, the real Hate of his affairs was rendered worfe : he 

 was led further from his relources, deeper into the heart of 

 a country utterly incapable of fupporting a large army, 

 and more completely furrounded by the Ruffians. 



In the fourth place, the character of the Ruffian peafantry 

 contributed much to the defeat of Bonaparte : thefe could 

 not be fedueed from their allegiance ; they uniformly, and 

 to a man, refufed to hold any communication with the 

 enemy : while Mofcow was in the hands of the French, 

 they brought no goods in for fale : they regarded it as a 

 polluted city, and would have fhuddered to have entered it. 



3 



To thefe caufes muft be added the firmnefs of Alexander ; 

 and the nature and climate of the country. 



The next clafs of caufes which contributed to Bona- 

 parte's dilcomfitnre and ultimate ruin, mult be fought for 

 in his own peculiar charafter, in which the molt predo- 

 minant and influential is his obltinacy. Accuftomed to fee 

 all his plans fuceeed, all his predictions, however extrava- 

 gant, verified, lie could ill-brook difappointment : he could 

 not even iuffer himfelf to admit that he had acted an im- 

 prudent and ralh part, and preferred perfeverance in error, 

 to the acknowledgment and reftification of it. His ob- 

 ltinacy operated in giving rife to the invafion of Ruffia, as 

 well as influencing his conduct during that invafion. He 

 probably unified forward into Ruffia notwithstanding the 

 loffes which he fultained, and afterwards continued in 

 Mofcow till winter had rendered his retreat almoft impof- 

 hble, under expectation, or at leail the hope, that Alexander 

 would be induced to propofe terms of conciliation. This 

 certainly influenced his conduct ; « but," fays a good writer, 

 " whoever has ltudied the chaiader of o'bltinate people, 

 mult be convinced that at lalt, when their obltinacy is got 

 to its greateft height, they perfevere in the courfe which 

 muft infallibly conduct to ruin, without even the molt 

 groundless hope of extricating themfelves. The impulfe 

 in this ftate of mental diforder, forfo it may be denominated, 

 is blind, and almoft mechanical. So it probably was with 

 Bonaparte, when he determined to remain fo Ions' at 

 Mofcow." 6 



How different were the affairs of this man at the com- 

 mencement of 1812, from what thev were at the fame 

 period m the following year. At the former every thing 

 was profperous, except perhaps the war in the peninfula ; 

 and that, it was generally believed, he could, at any time, 

 turn in his favour by fending a larger armv there. Ruffia, 

 though uneafy under the operation of the hard terms to 

 which (he fubmitted at the peace of Tillit, would fcarcely 

 have ventured to commence a new war ; while the fubfer- 

 viency of Pruffia to his will, his abfolute command of her 

 tortrelles which are on the confines of Ruffia, and his alliance 

 and family connexion with Aultria, feemed to promife him 

 the eafy conquelt of Ruffia whenever he fhould think proper 

 to attack her. At the latter period he no longer appeared 

 as the invincible conqueror, but as the fallen general, who 

 had fled to his capital with unexampled celerity, to avoid the 

 indignation of the fragments of that army which had been 

 iaenhced to the madnefs of his ambition. He who had 

 always detailed victories the molt fplendid, who had, in 

 direct language, held himfelf out as fuperior to all the ca- 

 lualties of war, was now obliged, in his own bulletins, to 

 coniels that his army was broken, and it was returning to- 

 wards France defeated and haraffed by the Tartars of Alia 



Thus changed in power, in feelings, and in profpects, the 

 i. anlians law their emperor at the beginning f the year 

 1813, and they, as well as Europe in general, were ex- 

 tremely anxious for the meeting of the legiflative body, in 

 order that they might be able to dev.lope^his future plans 

 At this meeting, on the 14th of February, lie declared it 

 to be his determination ltill to carry on the war, and to fa- 

 enhee nothing for the fake of obtaining peace: "The French 

 dyndty," fays he, "reigns, and will reign, in Spain. I am 

 latisned with all my allies ; I will abandon none of them • I 

 will maintain the integrity of their ltates ; the Ruffians ffiall 

 return to their frightful climate. I defire peace, but I will 

 never make any but an honourable peace, and one con. 

 formable to the interelts and grandeur of my empire " The 

 whole tone of his addrefs was warlike, and he immediately 

 let on toot a new coemption, which, by means of his gens 



d'armes, 



