SENSE. 



gans by wliich we become acquainted with furrounding 

 objeAs, by which external bodies imprefs our frame, fo as 

 to communicate to us a knowledge of their properties. 

 They are five in number, viz. the eyes, ears, nofe, tongue, 

 and fliin ; for the anatomical and phyfiological account of 

 which, we refer to thefe articles. Thefe are often called 

 the external fenfes ; while the internal organs, the parts of 

 the brain which are concerned in knowing and reflefting, 

 have fometimes been called the internal fenfes. See Mental 



PHILOSOPHy. 



Dr. Hutchefon gives us a more extenfive and philo- 

 fophical notion of feiife. On his principle, fenfe is defined, 

 a power of perception, or a power of perceiving ideas ; at 

 leaft if what is abfolutely pallive may be properly called a 

 power. 



On fome occafions, inflead of power, he chufes to call it 

 a determination of the mind to receive ideas ; and the ideas 

 thus perceived, or raifed in the mind, he calls fenfatiotis. 



Senfe, he confiders, either as natural or moral ; and the 

 natural, either as external or internal : though the diftribu- 

 tion is chiefly founded on the common ways of conceiving ; 

 for, in reality, they appear to be all natural and neceflary. 

 Some reafons, however, for the diflinftion, will be (hewn 

 under the feveral articles of it. 



External fenfes, then, are povvers of perceiving ideas, 

 upon the prefence of external objefts. On fuch occafions, 

 we find the mind is merely paffive, and has not power di- 

 reftly to prevent the perception, or idea, or to vary it at its 

 reception ; as long as the body is continued in a Hate fit to 

 be afted upon by the external objeft. 



When two perceptions are entirely different from each 

 other, or agree in nothing but the general idea of fenfation, 

 the powers of receiving thofe different perceptions are called 

 different fenfes. Thus, fc 'ng and hearing denote the dif- 

 ferent powers of receivingl le ideas of colours and foands. 

 And though colours, as wed as founds, have vaft differences 

 amongll themfelves ; yet is there a greater agreement among 

 the moil oppofite colours, than between any colour and a 

 found ; and hence all colours are deemed perceptions of the 

 fame fenfe. 



All the feveral fenfes feem to have their diftinfl organs, 

 except feeling, which is, in fome degree, diffufed over the 

 whole body. Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of 

 Beauty and Virtue, p. 2. 8vo. 1726. 



In another place, the fame writer defines the external 

 fenfes to be thofe determinations of nature, by which certain 

 perceptions conftantly arife in the mind, when certain im- 

 prefiions are made upon the organs of the body, or motions 

 raifed in them. Some of thefe perceptions are received folely 

 by one fenfe ; others may be received by two or more. Of 

 the former clafs are thefe five forts ; vis. colours, founds, 

 taftes, fmells, cold, or heat. Some ingenious authors 

 reckon more : thefe we may call the proper ideas of fenfa- 

 tion. Syftem of Moral Philofophy, vol. i. p. 4. 



Internal fenfes are powers or determinations of the mind 

 to be pleafed with certain forms and ideas, which occur to 

 our obfervation, in objefts perceived by the external fenfes. 

 Of thefe there are two different fpecies, diftinguiflied by the 

 different objeds of pleafure, tiiz. pleafurable or beautiful 

 forms of natural things, and pleafurable or beautiful ac- 

 tions, or charafters of rational agents : whence the internal 

 fenfes become divifible into natural and moral ; though what 

 others call the internal natural fenfe, our author calls fimply, 

 and by way of eminence, the internal fenfe. 



In reflefting on our external fenfes, we plainly fee, that 

 our perceptions of pleafure and pain do not depend direAly 

 on our will. Objefts do not pleaie us, according as we iii> 



clme they (hould : the prefence of fome objeds neceffarily 

 pleafes us, and the prefence of others as neceffarily difpleafes 

 us ; nor can we by our will any otherwife procure pleafure, 

 or avoid pain, than by procuring the former kind of objeas, 

 and avoidmg the latter. By the very frame of our nature, 

 the one is made the occafion of delight, and the other of dif- 

 fatisfadion. In effed, our fenfitive perceptions, are plea- 

 fant, and painful, immediately, and without any knowledge 

 of the caule of this pleafure and pain, or of the manner how 

 they exeite it, or are occafions of it, or without our feeing 

 to what farther advantage, or detriment, the ufe of fuch 

 objefts might tend. Nor would the mod accurate know- 

 ledge of thefe things vary either the pleafure, or the pain, 

 of the perception : however it might give a rational pleafure, 

 diftihdl from the fenfible ; or might raife a dilUnft joy, from 

 profped of farther advantage in the objeft, or another aver- 

 fion, from apprehenfion of evil. There is fcarcely any objeft 

 which our minds are employed about, but is conllituted the 

 neceilary occafion of fome pleafure or pain. Thus, we Ihall 

 find ourlelves pleafed with a regular form, a piece of archi- 

 tefture, or painting, a compofition of notes, a theorem, an 

 aftion, an affedion, a charafter ; and we are confcious, that 

 this pleafure naturally arifes from the contemplation of the 

 idea then prefcnt to the mind, with all its circumftances, 

 though fome of thofe ideas have nothing of what we call 

 fenfible perception in them ; and in thofe which have, the 

 pleafure arifes from fome uniformity, order, arrangement, 

 and imitation ; and not from the fimple ideas of colour, 01 

 found, or mode of extenfion, feparately confidered. 



It feems hence to follow, that when initruftion, educa- 

 tion, or prejudice of any kind, raife any defire or averfion 

 towards an objeft ; this defire, or averfion, is founded on 

 an opinion of fome perfection, or deficiency, in thofe qua- 

 lities, for perception of which we have the proper fenfes. 

 Thus, if beauty be defired by one who has not the fenfe of 

 fight ; the defire mull be raifed by fome apprehended regu- 

 larity of figure, fweetnefs of voice, fmoothnefs, foftnefs, or 

 fome other quality, perceivable by the other fenfes, without 

 relation to the ideas of colour. 



The only pleafure of fenfe, which our philofophers feem 

 to confioer, is that which accompanies the fimple ideas of 

 fenfation ; but there are vaftly greater pleafures in thofe 

 complex ideas of objefts, which obtain the names of beau- 

 tiful and harmonious. The power, then, by which we re- 

 ceive ideas of beauty and harmony, has all the charafters of 

 a fenfe. It is no matter, whether we call thefe ideas of 

 beauty and harmony, perceptions of the external fenfes of 

 feeing and hearing, or not : we (hoald rather choofe to call 

 thefe ideas an internal fenfe, were it only for the convenience 

 of diftinguifhing them from other fenfations of feeing and 

 hearing, which men may have without perception of beauty 

 and harmony. Hutchefon's Inquiry, &c. Preface, and 

 p. 3, &c. 



For the general maaner in which our i'enfes ad, or, more 

 properly, the manner in which we become fenilble, that is, 

 perceive external objefts, fee Se\sation. 



For the particular fenfes, or, more properly, the parti- 

 cular manner in which we become fenfible, by the parti- 

 cular organs of fenfe, fee Hearing, Seeing, Smelling, 

 &c. 



For the feveral organs of fenfe, miniftering to the feveral 

 manners of fenfation, fee Evk, Ear, Nose, &c. 



Pliny obferves, that of all the fenfes, feeling and tailing 

 are thofe whi^h man enjoys in the greateft perfedion. As 

 to feeing, he fayi, he is excelled by the eagle, &c. ; as to 

 fmelling, by the vulture, &c. ; and as to hearing, by the 

 mole, even when hid under ground. 



li * The 



