SENSE. 



V?Duld be eafier to imagine half mankind run mad, and joined 

 precifely in the fame fpecies of folly, than to admit any 

 thing as truth, which (hould be advanced againft fuch natural 

 knowledge, fundamental reafon, and common fenfe ;" and 

 on taking leave he adds ; " and now, my friend, (hould you 

 find I had moralifed in any tolerable manner, according to 

 common fenfe, and without canting, I fhall be fatisfied with 

 my performance." After citing other numerous teftimonies 

 in vindication of common fenfe, as a principle of knowledge, 

 our author concludes with obferving, that it is abfurd to 

 conceive that there can be any oppolition between reafon 

 and common fenfe. To reafon we afcribe two offices, or 

 two degrees. The firlt is to judge of things felf-evident ; the 

 fecond to draw conclufions that are not felf-evident from 

 thofe that are : the firft of thefe is the province, and the 

 fole province, of common fenfe ; and therefore it coincides 

 ■witli reafon in its whole extent, and is only another name for 

 one branch or degree of reafon. The firli is purely the gift 

 of heaven ; the fecond is learned by practice and rules, when 

 the firft is not wanting. 



Our author further obferves, that the province of com- 

 mon fenfe is more extenfive in refutation than in confirmation. 

 A conclufion drawn by a train of juil reafoning from true 

 principles, cannot poffibly contradift any decifion of common 

 fenfe, becaufe truth will always be confiftent with itfelf. 

 Neither can fuch a conclufion receive any confirmation from 

 common fenfe, becaufe it is not within its jurifdiftion. But 

 it is poflible that, by fetting out from falfe principles, or by 

 an error in reafoning, a man may be led to a conclufion that 

 contradifts the decifions of common fenfe. In this cafe, the 

 conclufion is'within the jurifdiftion of common fenfe, though 

 the reafoning on which it was grounded be not ; and a man 

 of common fenfe may fairly rejeft the conclufion, without 

 being able to (hew the error of the reafoning that led to it. 

 After thefe preliminary remarks, we obferve that the term 

 common fenfe hath in modern times been ufed to fignify 

 that power of the mind which perceives truth, or com- 

 mands belief, not by progreflive argumentation, but by 

 an inllantaneous, inftuiftive, and irrefiitible impiilfe ; derived 

 neither from education nor from habit, but from nature ; 

 afting independently of our will, whenever its objeft is pre- 

 fented, according to an eftabli(hed law, and, therefore, 

 called y}n/f; and afting in a fimilar manner upon all, or at 

 leaft upon a great majority of mankind, and, therefore, 

 called common fenfe. The firft among the moderns who took 

 notice of this principle as one of the fprings of our know- 

 ledge, was Biiffier, a French philofopher of the lalt cen- 

 tury, in a book entitled " Traite des Premieres Veritez ;" 

 and this doftrine hath lately, in our own country, been illuf- 

 trated and maintained by Drs. Reid, Beattie, Ofwald, and 

 Campbell. 



In order to evince that there is a real and effential dif- 

 ference between this faculty and that of reafon, it is ob- 

 ferved, that we are confcious, from internal feeling, that the 

 energy of underftanding, which perceives intuitive truth, 

 is different from that other energy which unites a conclnfion 

 with a firft principle, i)y a gradual chain of intermediate 

 relations ; that we cannot difcern any neceflary conneftion 

 between reafon and common fenfe ; that the one is more in 

 our power than the other ; the faculty of reafoning being 

 improveable by culture, whereas common fenfe, like other 

 inftinfts, arnves at maturity with almoft no care of ours, 

 and it is impofhble to teach common fenfe to one who wants 

 it ; though this, hke otlier inftinfts, may languifh for want 

 of exercife ; and that a diftinftion, fimilar to that which is 

 here maintained, is acknowledged by the vulgar, who fpeak 

 ef mother-wit as fomething different from the deduftions of 



reafon, and the refinements of fcience. All found reafoning, 

 it is faid, mud ultimately reft on the principles of common 

 fenfe ; that is, on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively 

 probable ; and, confequently, common fenfe is the uhimate 

 judge of truth, to which reafon muft continually aft in 

 fubordination. Thus the advocates for this faculty, as an 

 original and diftinft power of the human mind, alTign to it 

 a very extenfive empire, and an authority that is fupreme and 

 abfolute. And they have proceeded fo far as to fubftitute, 

 in the room of Mr. Locke's abftraftion, this faculty as the 

 charafteriftic of rationahty. To this they refer the evidence 

 of mathematical truth, of external and internal fenfe, of 

 memory, of reafoning from the effeft to the caufe, of pro- 

 bable or experimental reafoning, of analogical reafoning, of 

 faith in teftimony, and, indeed, of all primary truths. To 

 common fenfe, therefore, all truth muft be conformable : 

 this, they fay, is its fixed and invariable ftandard. And 

 whatever contradifts common fenfe, or is inconfiftent with 

 that ftandard, though fupported by arguments that are 

 deemed unanfwerable, and by names that are celebrated by 

 all the critics, academics, and potentates on earth, is not 

 truth, but falfehood. In a word, the diftates of common 

 fenfe are, in refpeft to human knowledge in general, what 

 the axioms of geometry are in refpeft to mathematics : on 

 the fuppofition that thefe axioms are falfe or dubious, all 

 mathematical reafoning falls to the ground ; and on the 

 fuppofition that the diftates of common fenfe are erroneous 

 or deceitful, all truth, virtue, and fcience, are vain. And 

 hence it appears, that, according to this fyftem, common 

 fenfe is not only the teft of truth, but the ftandard of moral 

 obligation. 



Dr. Prieftley, in his attack upon this fyftem, has charged 

 the abettors of it with an unnecedary innovation in the re- 

 ceived ufe of a term ; as no perfon ever denied that there are 

 felf-evident truths, and that thefe muft be aifumed as the 

 foundation of all reafoning. But they alfo recommend par- 

 ticular pofitions as axioms, not as being founded on the per- 

 ception of the agreement or difagreement of any ideas, 

 which is the great doftrine of Mr. Locke, and which makes 

 truth to depend upon the necelfary nature of things, to be 

 abfolute, unchangeable, and everlafting ; but merely fome 

 unaccountable inftinftive perfuaiions, depending upon the 

 arbitrary conftitution of our nature, which makes all truth 

 to be a thing that is relative to ourfelves only, and confe- 

 quently to be infinitely vague and precarious. This fyltem, 

 he fays, admits of no appeal to reafon, properly confidered, 

 which any perfon might be at liberty to examine and difcufs ; 

 but, on the contrary, every man is taught to think himfelf 

 authorized to pronounce decifively upon every queftion, 

 according to his prefent feeling and perfuafion ; under the 

 notion of its being fomething original, inftinftive, ultimate, 

 and incontrovertible, though, if llriftly analyfed, it might 

 appear to' be a mere prejudice, the offspring of iniftake. 

 Some of the maxims which they have adopted as felf-evident 

 truths, and which they have multiplied without neceflity, 

 are fo far from being felf-evident, that, in the judgment of 

 many fober and candid enquirers after truth, they are not 

 true, but capable of a fatisfaftory refutation. 



At the fame time, fince no man can pretend to any natural 

 right to fix the principles of faith for another, they teach un- 

 believMS, and by their example authorize them, to rejeft 

 the principles of religion by the fame fummary and fup^r- 

 ficial procefs, as what appear to them to be, at iirlt fight, 

 too abfurd and ridiculous to be admitted as true and divine. 



Dr. Prieftley apprehends, that the inconveniences above- 

 mentioned, may attend even the calling of that faculty by 

 which we difcern truth by the name oi fenfe. By this terra, 



philofophera 



