sou 



thing. The ground of their opinion is, that they allow of 

 nothing in brutes but what is material : and that they deny 

 fenfations and paffions to be any properties of matter. 



Some of the Peripatetics, on the other hand, mamtam 

 matter, when fubtilized, framed, ranged, nnd moved, in a 

 certain manner, to be capable of fenfation and paffion ; that 

 beads may feel and perceive, by means of the animal fpirits, 

 which are a matter thus modified ; and that even the human 

 foul itfelf only becomes capable of fenfation and paffion by 

 means of it. 



The maintainers of the contrary opinion urge that appear- 

 .ance of fenfe, of fear, caution, love for their young, ad- 

 mirable fagacity, both for their own prefervation and that of 

 their fpecies, vifible through the whole brute creation. 

 And It is true, that all the aiftions of beafts plainly exprefs 

 an underltanding, for every thing that is regular expredes 

 it, even a machine or watch exprefles it, and a plant much 

 more ; the radicle of the feed turning downwards, and the 

 item upwards, whatever fituation the feed is fown in ; the 

 young plant knitting from fpace to fpace to ftrengthen it, its 

 putting forth prickles, &c. to defend it, &c. mark a great 

 underltanding. All the motions of plants and brutes plainly 

 difcover an intelligence ; but the intelligence does not refide 

 in the matter thereof ; it is as diftinft 'from the beaft or 

 plant, as that which ranged the wheels of the watch is dif- 

 tinft from the watch itfelf. 



For, in effect, this intelligence appears infinitely great, in- 

 finitely wife, infinitely powerful ; and the fame which formed 

 us in our mother's womb, which gave us our growth, &c. 

 Thus, in brutes there is fiot cither underltanding or foul, in 

 the fenfe we generally ufe the word ; they eat vrithout plea- 

 fure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it. They fear 

 nothing, know nothing ; and if they aft in fuch manner as 

 (hews underltanding, it is becaufe God, having made them, 

 to preferve them, has formed their bodies fo as to avoid 

 whatever might hurt them mechanically. 



Otherwife it might be faid, that there is more underltand- 

 ing in the vileft infeft, nay, in the fmalleft grain, than in the 

 molt knowing men ; for it is evident, either of them con- 

 tains more parts, and produces more regular motions and 

 aftions, than we are capable of underltanding. Thus does 

 the great F. Malebranche argue againft the fouls of brutes. 

 (Recherche de la Verite, liv. vi.) On this fubjeft, fee 

 Brutes and Instixct. 



In connection with the interefting fubjeft of this article, 

 we fhail here introduce fom.e appropriate oblervations of an 

 acute and elegant writer. (See Stewart's Elements of the 

 Philofophy of the Human Mind.) This writer agrees with 

 Dr. Reid in fuppofing, that the notions we annex to the 

 words matter and mind, arc merely relative. If I am 

 afked, fays he, what I mean by matter ? I can only explain 

 myfelf by faying, it is that which is extended, figured, co- 

 loured, moveable, hard or foft, rough or fmooth, hot or 

 cold ; that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enu- 

 merating its fenfible qualities. It is not matter or body 

 which I perceive by my fenfes ; but only extenfion, figure, 

 colour, and certain other qualitiee, which the conditution of 

 my nature leads me to refer to fomething which is extended, 

 figured, and coloured. The cafe is prccifely fimilar with 

 refpeft to mind. We are not immediately confcious of its ex- 

 iftence, but we are confcious of fenfation, thought, and vo- 

 lition ; operations, which imply the exiltence of fomething 

 which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impreffcd 

 with an irrefiltible conviftion, that all thefe fenfations, 

 thoughts, and vohtions, belong to one and the fame being ; 

 to that being which he calls himfelf; a being which he is led, 



SOU 



by the conditution of his nature, to confider as fomething 

 didinft from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the 

 lofs or mutilation of any of his organs. From thefe confi- 

 derations it appears, that we have the fame evidences for the 

 exidence of mind, that we have for the exiftence of body ; 

 nay, if there be any difference between the two cafes, that 

 we have dronger evidence for it ; inafmuch as the one is fug- 

 geded to us by the fubjefts of our confcioufnefs, and the 

 other merely by the objefts of our perception. But as from 

 our earlied years the attention is engrod'ed with the qualities 

 and love of matter, thefe phenomena occupy our thoughts 

 more than thofe of the mind, and we are perpetually tempt- 

 ed to explain the latter by the analogy of the former, and 

 even to endeavour to refer them to the fame general laws ; 

 and we acquire habits of inattention to the fubjefts of our 

 confcioufnefs, not eafily furmountcd. If, therefore, our 

 notions of mind and matter are merely relative ; if we know 

 the one, only by fuch fenfible qualities as extenfion, figure, 

 and fohdity, and the other, by fuch operations as fenfation, 

 thought, and volition, vi-e are warranted in faying, that 

 matter and mind, confidered as objefts of human Itudy, are 

 eflentially different ; the fcience of the former reding ulti- 

 mately on the phenomena exhibited to our fenfes, and that of 

 the latter, on the phenomena of which we are confcious. 

 Indead, therefore, of objefting to the fcheme of materialifm, 

 that its conclufions are falfe, it would be more accurate to 

 fay, that its aim is unphilofophical. It proceeds on a mif- 

 apprehenfion of the proper objeft of fcience ; the difficulty 

 which it profefles to remove being manifedly placed beyond 

 the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to 

 explain the nature of that principle which feels, and thinks, 

 and wills, by faying, that it is a material fubdance, or that 

 it is the refult of material organization, we impofe on our- 

 felves by words, forgetting that matter as well as mind is 

 known to us by its qualities and attributes alone, and that 

 we are totally ignorant of the edence of either. Should it 

 be faid that the unknown fubdance which has the qualities of 

 extenfion, figure, and colour, may be the fame with the un- 

 known fubdance which has the attributes of feeling, think- 

 infif, and willing ; this is only an hypothefis, which amounts 

 tonothing more than a mere poffibility ; and even if it were 

 true, it would no more be proper to fay of mind that it is 

 material, than to fay of body that it is fpiritual. 



Souls, Cure of- See Cure. 



Souls, Migration of. See Migr.\tion and Mktem- 



PSVCHOSIS. 



Soul, Sleep of the. See Sleep of the Soul. 



SovL-Scot, a certain fee paid by our Saxon anceftors to 

 the pried on opening a grave. 



Sort'j C/.'ea/, a legacy anciently bequeathed at their 

 deaths by our fcrupuloufly pious ancedors, to the parifh- 

 pried, to compenfate for any tithes that might have been 

 forgot in their lives. 



SOULAINES, in Geography, a town of France, in the 

 department of the Aube, and chief place of a canton, in 

 the didrift of Bar-fur- Aube ; 1 2 miles N. of Bar-fur-Aube. 

 The place contains 763, and the canton 7723 inhabitants, 

 on a territory of 265 kiliometre?, in 21 communes. 



SOULAMEA, in Botany, llightly altered from Sou- 

 lamoe, the name given to the plant in the ifland of Ternate. 

 Lamarck Dift. v. i. 449. jud. 429. This is no other 

 than what we have defcribed under the article Rex Ama- 

 RORIS, to which we refer the reader. Commerfon, it feems, 

 gathered this curious plant at Port Praflin, in the Arfacides. 

 Lamarck defcribes the flowers with a three-cleft calyx, three 

 petals, (ixjlamens, and two fligmas. Thtgermen is fuperior. 



Fruit 



